Changes in consciousness must be discernable
I am speaking to the sceptical commonsense of an English conference of the relevance to the authorship question of the great Germanophile critic and poet Coleridge. So I must find a strategy to bring continental philosophical insights into view in down to earth ways!
The heart of it is that Coleridge articulated for the first time that Shakespeare, especially Hamlet, represents a new kind of consciousness. This new consciousness could not possibly not be manifest in various powerful ways in the life of the author. If a putative author, for whom we have evidence, lacks any capacity for such kinds of consciousness, he cannot be the author; if we have significant evidence for someone who intimately corresponds to the nature of such consciousness, they are a likely candidate for the authorship.
We need to make distinctions here. Basically, I am offering a very strong philosophical-historical argument to show that James Shapiro and his fellow travellers cannot possibly be correct, when they argue, drawing on Malone (Contested Will, 2010), that the attribution of broadly authoro-biographical significance to Shakespeare’s writing is anachronistic. My argument is based on making distinctions which Shapiro has no thought of making. It’s a quite technical argument which could by no means be used in late night chat shows! But to have a very strong philosophical basis, and foundation for our positions is not a bad thing for our confidence, and clarity. And it illuminates a great deal about where we are starting from.
Both with regard to Samuel Schmucker, the 19th Century Lutheran US writer who used the Authorship issue ironically to discredit DF Strauss’s followers in pursuing scepticism about the historical Jesus
and Edmund Malone, Shapiro, as an argument of convenience, repudiates the whole trend of modern Higher Critical thought and methodology, and painted himself into a position as obscurantist as the most extreme American Evangelical Fundamentalist Creationist.
Here is Shapiro writing about Ireland and Malone with several degrees of malice (pp. 52-53)
‘Malone, much like the scholars who tell his story, spent much of his life surrounded by old books and manuscripts, strained his vision poring over documents in archives, and struggled to complete his life work on Shakespeare. Ireland cheated, took a short cut. But in truth they were in pursuit of the same goal – which may account for the viciousness of his attack on his young rival. Both were committed to rewriting Shakespeare’s life; one forged documents, the other forged connections between the life and the works. In retrospect, the damage done by Malone was far greater and long lasting. He was the first Shakespearean to believe that his hard-earned expertise gave him the right, which he and many scholars have since tried to deny to others, to search Shakespeare’s plays for clues to his personal life.’ [my emphasis]
Whereas, Steevens, quoted with unequivocal approval and emphasis by Shapiro (p. 47)
‘As all that is known with any degree of certainty concerning Shakespeare is – that he was born at Stratford upon Avon – married and had children there – went to London, where he commenced actor, and wrote poems and plays – returned to Stratford, made his will, died, and was buried – I must confess my readiness to combat every unfounded supposition respecting the particular occurrences of his life.’
Consciousness of Historicality – Vico, Coleridge, illustrations from TS Eliot, CS Lewis
Coleridge, more emphatically than any other Englishman, embodies the new form of historical consciousness which arose by the time of Romanticism and was first, precociously (and therefore for a long time wholly unnoticed), articulated by the eighteenth century Neopolitan philosopher, Giambattista Vico, in his New Science of 1725 and 1744. To fully articulate this point we need to draw the distinctions in question. This new form of consciousness is precisely what makes it possible to recognise the radical evolution of consciousness which takes place in Shakespeare.
To bring this initially into view, here, now, is TS Eliot writing about eighteenth century sensibility (Introduction to Johnson’s ‘London’ and ‘The Vanity of Human Wishes’, 1931). It is the presuppositions he invokes which I want to use this passage to illustrate:
‘What really happened is that after Pope there was no one who thought and felt nearly enough like Pope to be able to use his language quite successfully; but a good many second rate writers tried to write something like it, unaware of the fact that the change of sensibility demanded a change of idiom. Sensibility alters from generation to generation in everybody, whether we will or no; but expression is only altered by a man of genius [my italic]. A great many second rate poets, in fact, are second rate just for this reason, that they have not the sensitiveness and the consciousness to perceive that they feel differently from the preceding generation, and therefore must use words differently.’
We must add of course that the man or woman of genius also creates sensibility and bequeaths the outcome of that creating, as Chaucer, for instance, bequeaths his transformation of Mediaeval sensibility and consciousness for Shakespeare to inherit. And thus also CS Lewis writes emphatically about Courtly Love as follows:
‘French poets, in the eleventh century, discovered or invented, or were the first to express, that romantic species of passion which English poets were still writing about in the nineteenth. They effected a change which has left no corner of our ethics, our imagination, or our daily life untouched, and they erected impassable barriers between us and the classical past or the Oriental present. Compared with this revolution the Renaissance is a mere ripple on the surface of literature.’ (The Allegory of Love)
‘It seems - or it seemed to us till lately - a natural thing that love (under certain conditions) should be regarded as a noble and ennobling passion: it is only if we imagine ourselves trying to explain this doctrine to Aristotle, Virgil, St. Paul, or the author of Beowulf, that we become aware how far from natural it is. Even our code of etiquette, with its rule that women always have precedence, (p4) is a legacy from courtly love, and is felt to be far from natural in modern Japan or India.’ (The Allegory of Love)
We presuppose Sensibility/Consciousness realised in expression, in Shakespeare supremely
Eliot, then, like Lewis, is presupposing that we can determine the character of the sensibility and consciousness an author inhabits, where they succeed in expressing it in poetry, since ‘change in sensibility’ requires ‘change in expression or idiom’. Now, in relation to what FR Leavis always called ‘the Shakespearean use of language’ (e.g., Leavis, Johnson and Augustanism in The Common Pursuit, 1952), above all, do we not then have to assume that we can determine a process of sensibility, and a recreating of sensibility in our reading of it; is that not a fundamental, without which no appreciation of poetry makes any sense?
And this is supremely true of Shakespearean language, first properly critically appreciated by Coleridge. Dramatic consciousness, or imagination, in Shakespeare, for Coleridge, is a mercurial ‘infinite consciousness’, appertaining to the particular conception of the poetic mind as a plurality, and mirroring creation, which is the characteristic of Shakespearean and early 17th Century verse, such as Donne and Marvell (TS Eliot, http://personal.centenary.edu/~dhavird/TSEMetaPoets.html ). Keats deeply follows Coleridge in this conception of the Shakespearean poetic character as dramatic, chameleon like, and ‘without identity’, as opposed to Wordsworth’s ‘egotistical sublime’.
This Shakespearian use of language is epitomised, as briefly as is possible without reductionism, in FR Leavis’s comments on the exquisite ‘swan’s down-feather’ passage, when Octavia is parting from her brother, observed by Antony, from Antony and Cleopatra (Act III, sc. ii):
The April’s in her eyes: it is love’s spring,
And these the showers to bring it on. Be cheerful.
Sir, look well to my husband’s house: and –
I’ll tell you in your ear.
Her tongue will not obey her heart, nor can
Her heart inform her tongue – the swan’s down-feather
That stands upon the swell at full of tide,
And neither way inclines.
The Arden footnote, which regards Antony’s last utterance, runs:
It is not clear whether Octavia’s heart is the swan’s down-feather,
swayed neither way on the full tide of emotion at parting with her
brother to accompany her husband, or whether it is the inaction of
heart and tongue, on the same occasion, which is elliptically compared
to that of the feather.
‘It is not clear’ – it ought to be clear; that is the implication. The implied Criterion, ‘clarity’, entails an ‘either/or’; does the image mean this or that? The reductive absurdity of the conception of language behind the criterion thus brought up is surely plain. It wouldn’t be enough to say the image has both meanings: no one really reading Shakespeare would ask to which it is, or to what, that ‘the swan’s down-feather’ is meant to apply metaphorically, because it would be so plain that the relevant meaning – the communication in which the the image plays its part – is created by the utterance as a totality, and is not a matter of separate local meanings put together more or less felicitiously. The force and precision with which Shakespeare’s Englishimparts its meaning here depend on the impossibility of choosing one of the scholar’s alternatives as right and the clear inapplicability of the question he puts.
If I were intent on developing the theme of ‘imagery’ I might say that ‘the swan’s down-feather’ gives us an image of weight – or lightness (lack of weight) – but I have already made the offer of such a comment absurd. For it is plain that the effective ‘as if’ value depends on our simultaneous sense of the massive swell of the tidal water, and that the effect of both depends on our being made by that word ‘swell’ to feel the ‘full of tide’ as a swell of emotion in ourselves. There is in fact a complex play of diverse and shifting analogy such as one might – for there is no dividing line – find oneself discussing under the head of ‘imagery’, ‘imagery’ conceived of as that which makes the difference between mere discursive thought and what we require of art. But we find ourselves, without any sense of a break, observing that movement plays an essential part in the analogical potency of the passage, and we could hardly be happy in bringing that under ‘imagery’.’ (The Living Principle, 1975, p. 102)
Obviously innumerable illustrations, both from Shakespeare and from others, can be given of this kind of recognition. I cannot argue it further now, but no literary criticism, no reading, could be possible without this basic assumption. So, we assume that, through reading, we enter in a deep sense into what Husserl calls the total ‘life-world’ of another.
Further, after Vico, Hegel, Coleridge, and others, unless we have a positivist view of history, common enough to be sure, we nowadays assume that this is an historical entering into a life world, in the way Eliot and CS Lewis do in the passages I have quoted.
Shakespeare does not articulate historical consciousness as such but a new historical form of consciousness
Now I have to introduce the further distinctions I have mentioned. So is there at this time, the late 16th Century, an emergence of historical consciousness and understanding, as envisaged first by Vico, and then by Herder, Hegel, Coleridge, culminating in the beginning of scientific modernity around 1830? No! But this consciousness makes it possible to recognise the new consciousness which there was.
For profoundly connected historical reasons, just as the question of the Historical Jesus only properly begins to come explicitly into its own in the 1830s, with DF Strauss’s Life of Jesus in 1835, so does the Shakespeare Authorship Question. John Payne Collier (who also transcribed Coleridge’s Shakespeare lectures of 1811-12, before he had become a creative addition monger – or forger - in his latter years) alludes to an authorship question in 1838 in an Advertisement turned up by Peter Dickson, whilst Samuel Schmucker, as Shapiro himself notes, uses the Shakespeare question ironically in 1848 to satirise DF Strauss.
Sketch of the evolution of consciousness: consciousness and meta-consciousness of history
So, if we view this all precisely in a Vico-like mode, recognising successive changes in consciousness and culture, we have
- Modern individual personal consciousness emerging at the time of the Renaissance, and the Lutheran Reformation, in Hamlet (and Leonardo, Bruno, Montaigne, Descartes, etc) straddling - very roughly! – the period 1500-1600. We may call this mode of modern consciousness reflexivity or reflexive consciousness. It has a personal historical dimension , profoundly illustrated by Sonnet xxx, or Hamlet’s speech, How all occasions do inform against me (Hamlet, IV, iv), for instance, or the Nocturnall Upon St Lucies Eve, but this is only applied to history as such in a limited way, though clearly Shakespeare’s history plays and Roman plays have an emerging, but untheorised, partial conception of historicity. But the problem of history is not articulated as such. It remains implicit. (d.f., Bloom, Shakespeare and the Invention of the Human)
- The emergence of explicit awareness of historical consciousness as such in Vico and then his Romantic period successors. We may call this reflexive theorised consciousness of historicity as such, from 1720-1830. It is clear that historical change of consciousness and historical awareness of change of consciousness are two different things, the latter presupposes the former, and is the latest developing, because awareness and awareness of awareness are two different things. Thus, for instance, it is not before Kant that the possibility of self-consciousness becomes a philosophical recognition, and can be used to solve age old philosophical problems. And in Hegel and Coleridge, building on Kant in their turn, it takes on a historicised form, yet a further step.
- But this runs alongside, and emerges hesitantly from, and in contrast to, Enlightenment actualised as a secular form of the sacred and as a belief framework, and hence initially a-historically, from, roughly, 1660-1780. As TS Eliot indicates, - and as is amplified in Hegel in spades (Phenomenology of Spirit), - this involves, in certain respects, (c.f., Eliot’s ‘dissociation of sensibility’ in the above linked paper on the Metaphysicals) a considerable loss of consciousness which had previously been achieved, but was necessary to differentiate out the sense of historicity in contrast.
- Romanticism and the Romantic transformation of consciousness, including the full emergence of historical consciousness as such, roughly 1760-1830. Like the Enlightenment, Romanticism, whether in its conservative or its radical modes, its religious or its irreligious modes, is actualised as a form of sacred consciousness, but now one which is identified with the creative human mind as such, apprehended historically. In England, Coleridge is, however personally erratic, the supreme articulator of this new consciousness. Therefore, by 1840, in his essay on Coleridge, John Stuart Mill, taking this development as read, can write: ‘But the pecularity of the Germano-Coleridgean school is, that they saw beyond the immediate controversy, to the fundamental principles involved in all such controversies…. They thus produced, not a piece of party advocacy, but a philosophy of society, in the only form in which it is yet possible, that of a philosophy of history…’ (Coleridge, my italic)
- And hence there is a profound change of consciousness at the beginning of the scientific-technological era, including the application of scientific-historical methodologies to historical enquiry, from approximately 1830 onwards. This is the point, from which, onwards, Nietzsche’s Death of God as an analysis (which concept I shall use as shorthand) of the secularisation of the modern world becomes applicable. This leads directly on to modern geology, Darwin, Marx, Freud, scientific history, modern neurological enquiry, pessimistic modernism, modern analytical-logical philosophy and mathematical logic, and phenomenology, along with the great age of technological invention, the modern age of war, and the full emergence of the modern state. And from 1830 onwards, with all this, the Shakespeare Authorship question, along with the question of the Historical Jesus, in parallel to all this, is coming into view. Analytic historical enquiry is instituted. But both Shakespeare and the Bible, in the 1830s, are still shrouded with the remnants of both the Enlightenment, and the Romantic, sense of the sacred, and correlated belief investment, and consequently it is attended by a very fierce rearguard action in both cases, still going on today, along also with elements of intense, and sometimes highly idiosyncratic, sacred passion on the side of the analytic revisionists, in both cases.
- Nevertheless, now a retrieval of the modern consciousness, which was, roughly speaking, first articulated in Hamlet and in John Donne, becomes possible, and it is not an accident that Hamlet now becomes the paradigm, for Goethe, for the Schlegels, for Coleridge, for Hazlitt and Keats, for Nietzsche, for Freud, James Joyce, DH Lawrence, TS Eliot, Harold Bloom - and for we Oxfordians.
I am inclined to think that part of the uncanny multi-determination of meaning and decision-making, which is, as Coleridge very nearly saw, the root and source of Hamlet’s inability to solve his problem, is that the Ghost is precisely the haunting death of mediaeval/Catholic feudal (and pre-feudal, pagan) England, which cannot be encompassed and resolved by the Lutheran or Calvinistic Reformation, despite Hamlet’s necessarily returning precisely from Luther’s, - and George Joachim’s, Copernicus’ expositor, c,f,, Gontar, 2013 - Wittenberg. But it signals he is the advance guard of consciousness. Something of all this, for Shakespeare, is surely implicit in the terrible death and oblivion Sonnets, LXXI-LXXIV, with their acutely sharp echoes of Macbeth (LXXIII) and Hamlet (LXXIV), where the intolerable tension between being both feudal/pre-feudal man and modern man is almost tearing him apart before our eyes. [The sense of disgrace and shame is profoundly connected with this, c.f., my analysis of King Lear….]
We can encompass, in our understanding, a conception of Shakespeare which includes the recognition that, whilst there is no one to one relationship between the author and the works, and whilst Oxfordians should not excessively indulge, or rely on, the game of historical hunt-the-slipper, we need to encompass the author in a way which does justice to his myriad-mindedness and multi-determined consciousness. And here we return to Coleridge, for it is in Coleridge that this is done, in Britain, for the first time since Jonson’s tribute.
Coleridge, in philosophical, historical, and literary ability, is the greatest English critical mind, whose life, like those of Hegel and Beethoven, straddles both the revolutionary and post-Napoleonic eras, and who is the epitome of the new historical consciousness which arose in the post-Enlightenment era of Romanticism. He also, - with all due respect to Dr Johnson! - inaugurates English Shakespeare Criticism for the modern era. As John Stuart Mill grasped (Mill on Bentham and Coleridge) he changed the consciousness of his age in Britain and America. In America, yes, also, where he had a profound influence on the transcendentalists, such as Emerson and Henry James Sr, Poe, almost certainly Hawthorne and Melville, and most certainly Henry James Jr, and latterly TS Eliot, (the inaugural Coleridgean mind in 20th Century English Criticism). Serendipitously, for Oxfordians who will be congregating in Toronto, the monumental life work of Kathleen Coburn in recovering the Coleridge Notebooks for posterity, was based in Toronto.
Reflexive Infinite Authorial Consciousness in Shakespeare and then Coleridge
Coleridge died in 1834, and I am not (yet) aware of elements in his writing alluding to doubts, - though there are moments of puzzlement, as, for instance, when he wonders how Shakespeare knows the world of the soldier, in Othello - of the Stratfordian’s authorship of the plays. What, however, is new and newly clear in Coleridge is his profound recognition of the author/creator of Hamlet, Falstaff, and Richard II, as one who embodies his own consciousness of authorship, and authorial reflection, in the plays, and to whom a widened conception of authoro-biographical motivation, as expressed, for instance, in Joseph Conrad’s Decoud, in Nostromo, is to be attributed. Belatedly, very belatedly, through the genius of Coleridge, the change of consciousness implicit in Shakespeare (c.f., Bloom, Shakespeare and the Invention of the Human, Valery, The Crisis of the Mind) becomes explicit. The advance in historical consciousness, associated in Britain with Coleridge supremely, in turn makes possible the analytical historical realism which awakes the authorship question.
Dramatic consciousness, or imagination, in Shakespeare, for Coleridge, is a mercurial ‘infinite consciousness’, appertaining to the particular conception of the poetic mind as a plurality, and mirroring creation, which is the characteristic of Shakespearean and early 17th Century verse. Keats deeply follows Coleridge in this conception of the Shakespearean poetic character as dramatic, chameleon like, and ‘without identity’, as opposed to Wordsworth’s ‘egotistical sublime’.
Here he is on:
The ‘Mercutio’ Character
“Shakespeare’s characters might be reduced to a few, that is to say to a few classes of characters. If you took his gentlemen, for instance; the character of Biron was seen again in Mercutio, in Benedick, and a variety of others. They were men who combined the politeness of the Courtier with the faculties of intellect; the powers of combination which only belong to an intellectual mind. The wonder was how he should thus disguise himself, and have such miraculous powers of conveying the Poet, without even raising in ourselves the consciousness of him.
In the address of Mercutio to Romeo regarding the Fairy Queen Mab….there would be noticed all the fancy of the poet, but the language in which was contained possessed such a facility that one would say, almost, that it was impossible for it to be thought, unless it were thought as naturally and without effect as Mercutio represented it. This was the great art by which Shakespeare combined the Poet and the gentleman, throughout borrowing from his own most amiable character that which could only combine them, a perfect simplicity of mind, a delight in what was excellent for its own sake, without reference to himself as causing it….” (Coleridge on Shakespeare, Payne Collier’s original notes, ed. RA Foakes)
And a collection of notes relating to Hamlet; I have made the link with Macbeth Ogburn suggests!
‘Tis now the very witching time of night,
When churchyards yawn and hell itself breathes out
Contagion to this world: now could I drink hot blood,
And do such bitter business as the day
Would quake to look on……’ etc.,
“The utmost Hamlet arrives at is a disposition, a mood, to do something. What is left undecided, while every word he utters tends to betray his disguise.
The perfect equal of any call of the moment is Hamlet, let it only not be for a future.”
The Shakespeare hero cannot deal with the future. He has to be vaulted into it. (c.f., Macbeth I.sc.7, Macbeth on time but also the Hecate speech, III.sc.2). As Ogburn argues, Macbeth is a Hamlet who acts! But is no more decisive, - in the sense of centred, - for all that.
There's comfort yet; they are assailable;
Then be thou jocund: ere the bat hath flown
His cloister'd flight, ere to black Hecate's summons
The shard-borne beetle with his drowsy hums
Hath rung night's yawning peal, there shall be done
A deed of dreadful note…..
……. Come, seeling night,
Scarf up the tender eye of pitiful day;
And with thy bloody and invisible hand
Cancel and tear to pieces that great bond
Which keeps me pale! Light thickens; and the crow
Makes wing to the rooky wood:
Good things of day begin to droop and drowse;
While night's black agents to their preys do rouse.
Coleridge’s deep perception of Hamlet’s inherently self-dramatic self-presentation – one of the keys to the new insight.
‘Terror is closely connected with the ludicrous; the latter is the common mode by which the mind tries to emancipate itself from terror. The laugh is rendered by nature itself the language of extremes, even as tears are. Add too, Hamlet’s wildness is but half-false. O that subtle trick to pretend the acting only when we are very near to being what we act.’
C’s comment on: ‘How all occasions do inform against me….’etc.
“Yet with all this sense of duty, this resolution arising out of conviction, nothing is done; this admirable and consistent character, deeply acquainted with his own feelings, painting them with such wonderful power and accuracy, and just as strongly convinced of the fitness of executing the solemn charge committed to him, still yields to the same retiring from all reality, which is the result of having what we express by the term, ‘a world within himself’:
Such a mind as this is near akin to madness, Dryden has said. Great wit to madness nearly is allied…
and he was right; for he means by wit that greatness of genius, which led Hamlet to the perfect knowledge of his own character, which with all strength of motive was so weak as to be unable to carry into effect his most obvious duty.”
This profound expression of the priority of dramatic imagination, in Coleridge and Keats, we find recurring latterly in degenerate form in the doctrines of ‘art for arts sake’, and in philistine utilitarian convenience mode in Shapiro’s Contested Will. What is clear in Coleridge is that this is a positive authoro-biographical conception of ‘infinite consciousness’, not an empty and abstract generic consciousness, as it becomes in Shapiro, and that Coleridge is the first since Ben Jonson to be able to grasp its mixed realistic-symbolic nature: ‘so as to transfer from our inward nature a human interest and a semblance of truth sufficient to procure for these shadows of imagination that willing suspension of disbelief for the moment, which constitutes poetic faith’ (Biographia Literaria, Ch. 14). [c.f., Hamlet’s guidance to the Players, ‘How all occasions’, and the Graveyard Scene.] Coleridge’s identification with Hamlet is an identification with Hamlet’s profoundly dramatiform process-based consciousness, and his multiple awareness, embodied in Coleridge’s profoundly multiplex, polymathic, mercurial neo-platonic, and visionary mode.
Even though both Coleridge and Keats, driven by the vacuity of relevant character in William of Stratford, fill in the biographical gaps from their own vision and character, and likewise develop variants on the ‘chameleon poet’ conception, as in the ‘Mercutio’ passage quoted, to escape from the vacuum offered by the Stratford narrative, yet, in the light of the evolution I have sketched, after Coleridge and Keats it is no longer possible to consider as an anachronism, with the expectation we should find it in his life, the attribution of ‘infinite consciousness’ to Shakespeare. In the light of Coleridge’s vast consciousness and span of awareness, we have to recognise the nature of Shakespeare’s own, even greater, giant mind. Such a mind, as with Coleridge, the mind that created Falstaff, Prospero, and Hamlet, - as Coleridge created the all-compelling Ancient Mariner, emblem of his conversational gift and curse, - also could not fail to have given demonstrations of, and left witness of, its live dramatic and conversational genius, even if recording such things was less frequent in Shakespeare’s time. (c.f., also O Wilde and S Johnson).
Fortunately, nevertheless, there is enough testimony to this, in the case of the man who was Shakespeare, even if from his enemies as much as from his friends, - Arundel’s testimony, Harvey’s testimony, Chapman’s testimony, Nashe’s testimony, and Jonson’s testimony, for instance, and in flashes in the Letters to the Cecils - to enable us to recognise the reality of the new consciousness realised in the mercurial mind who created these mercurial plays and poems, (something quite impossible for the taciturn business operative from Stratford). Such a man, spanning the feudal and the pre-Christian, with the consuming intensity of the new modernity of consciousness, is godlike in the Homeric sense, and restores the sense of the Greek grandeur and divinity of consciousness, which is totally evacuated over the centuries through the prosaic mediocrity of the Stratford man:
‘Delicate in speech, quaint in array: conceited in all points,
In Courtly guiles a passing singular odd man,
For Gallants a brave Mirror, a Primrose of Honour,
A Diamond for nonce, a fellow peerless in England.
Not the like discourser for Tongue, and head to be found out,
Not the like resolute man for great and serious affairs,
Not the like Lynx to spy out secrets and privities of States,
Eyed like to Argus, eared like to Midas, nos'd like to Naso,
Wing'd like to Mercury, fittst of a thousand for to be employ'd,
This, nay more than this, doth practice of Italy in one year.
None do I name, but some do I know, that a piece of a twelve month
Hath so perfited outly and inly both body, both soul,
That none for sense and senses half matchable with them.
A vulture's smelling, Ape's tasting, sight of an eagle,
A spider's touching, Hart's hearing, might of a Lion.
Compounds of wisdom, wit, prowess, bounty, behavior,
All gallant virtues, all qualities of body and soul.’