



Editorial: To know or not to know: science, beliefs and values in psychotherapy

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Abstract *This Editorial links the papers together in terms of how they relate to a debate/dialogue between a 'belief-free' and 'experimental' model of the values and beliefs of psychotherapy, and an integrationist, assimilative one. Through exploration of the papers, gradually the two positions come together in a synthesis, and the position of psychotherapy is portrayed as a phenomenological one, a creatively self-generating 'idea' in Cardinal Newman's sense, though one which can encompass—but not be confined to—the position of 'positive science', with its focus on individual fact. The Editorial ends with a rectification of the injustice to Heidegger in the Editorial of July 1999, where it was claimed he was a lifelong Nazi, a claim now withdrawn in the light of Julian Young's book on Heidegger, *Philosophy and Nazism*.*

'Can you draw out Leviathan with a fishhook, or press down his tongue with a cord?
Can you put a rope in his nose, or pierce his jaw with a hook? Will he make many
supplications to you? Will he speak to you soft words? Will he make a covenant with
you to take him for your servant forever?' Job, Ch. 41, vv.-4

Introduction: to be or not to be opinionated

The Editorials in this Journal, though sometimes difficult to follow, are not noted for low-key positions or lack of opinions, and this Editorial addresses thorny issues in psychotherapy, arising from the common themes of the papers, yet again.

Now, it is wise, when faced with two polar opposite positions which appear to be contradictory of one another, to explore whether they really are contradictory, or whether there is some third position which would reconcile them. As in philosophy, so in psychotherapy. This has been a familiar *philosophical* possibility since, in modern times, Kant and Hegel; in psychotherapy something like it is a familiar resource, associated, for instance, with Jung, Klein, Winnicott, Gestalt, and Psychodrama. Yet we constantly forget it when we are in a tight corner, either therapeutically or theoretically.

In many ways we continue in a tight corner *now*, in the development and the grounding of our Profession. Theoretically, we are almost as divided as ever as to how to ground our Profession, and whether we have a belief framework of our own—or even sometimes on whether it even *is* a single Profession. This is also reflected *within* Orientations.

Debate between the changeable-experimental and the assimilative

Is it possible to formulate the fundamental predicament in terms of a dialogue taking place (or not taking place) between two positions, the contrast of a position which emphasises the

chameleon-experimental (and theoretically parasitic) character of psychotherapy, with one which emphasises its *assimilative* (*integrationist*) tendencies? Do we borrow our theory, or create our own? Would such a dialogue encompass the central difficulties we face? Something like this dilemma is reflected in the papers in this issue. The heated debates about:

1. whether psychotherapy is or should be a science or a craft (*Young and Heller*);
2. whether research in psychotherapy ethically conforms/should conform to positive science paradigms or whether it is, rather, something like artistic innovation, or participatory in the mode of anthropological field work (*Rowan*);
3. whether Freud was a scientist, and a true neuro-psychologist before his time, or pseudo-scientist and therefore a charlatan,—or a diviner, myth-maker, interpreter/hermeneut; or something else again (*Goldberg; Wilkinson*);
4. whether it is valid to affirm that work with particular ethnic or oppressed groups (thus, here, black women) should be (or may be better if it is) broadly from *within*, not without, or neutral to, their experience frame (*Ablack*);
5. whether psychotherapy is conducted in detachment from real situations, or is engaged with them (presented in Milosevic's paper, perhaps the first paper to describe from within Serbia how the Kosova war affected the practice of psychotherapy) (*Milosevic*);

all these reflect the dilemma: *is psychotherapy a value/belief system in its own right, or does it merely have the function of being an experimental reality, or weather-vane, reflector of, or participant-observer in, realities which are, however, mostly independent of it?*

Each position has some very compelling arguments in its favour. We present this in dialogue form. The sequence in which the two opponents allude to the Papers in this issue will just be as they are pertinent to the argument, not in the order in which they are published in this issue.

Beliefs in psychotherapy: two positions

Belief-freedom psychotherapist

Psychotherapy needs no beliefs, nor admits of any. It is essential to it that it *be free* of belief commitments.

Integrationist psychotherapist

On the contrary, Psychotherapy is, by its very nature, moving ever onward towards a fuller and many-layered *integration* of beliefs, which are its own beliefs which are *sui generis* to it.

Belief-freedom psychotherapist

But psychotherapy needs no beliefs, because we *create* the form of psychotherapy we need—or rather that the client or patient needs—for each new client or patient, or even for each new session, and client situation. Indeed, for our clients' sake, we are *required* to have no beliefs of our own, or we cannot be a barometer for theirs. Or rather ours are *in the melting pot, along with theirs*. This does not contradict, rather it is confirmed by, the frank emphasis on a *participant-observer* role offered by Joanne Ablack in her paper on the black woman body psychotherapist working with black women clients.

Difference: from where it 'ought' to be, to where it is: Ablack

For, in her paper Joanne Ablack makes a very striking remark:

In the Black to Black therapeutic setting the client gets to explore and find these truths without having to educate the therapist about racism/discrimination/what it means to be 'minority'.

So is this a form of Apartheid or racism which is envisaged here? I think of it instead as a different approach, to issues like racism, which is gradually making itself felt in our work—for

practitioners of both minority and majority cultures (c.f., also e.g., Judy Ryde's paper in our last issue, Ryde, 2000). Rather, here psychotherapy is frankly reflectively supporting life realities, rather than seeking to impose an *abstract* model of equality. This journal has certainly discussed theory often enough. But the upshot of our discussions is that *merely theory-led psychotherapy is dead*. It is *life* and life's needs which should lead our work. Goethe's Mephistopheles (*Faust, Part I*), in a famous saying, remarks:

'Grau, teurer Freund, ist alle Theorie

Und grün das Lebens goldner Baum'

'Grey, dear friend, is all theory

But green is life's golden tree.'

On the basis of this Joanne Ablack is able to weave a seamless web between this stance, and her use of, and sensitivity to, the communications of, and through, body in her work. 'Body' becomes an index of the profound basis of the work in genuine creative (non-compulsive) identification—with all its paradox manifest in the very aspect of her clients which repudiates that identification, in such passages as:

In other words, in order to survive I, as a Black person, disembody myself as a way of keeping some hold on my core self. This core self is who I am at the core of my being and needs to be protected, so I hide it, maybe even from myself, then I feel unreal, not truly a part of the world, like there is always something between me and the majority culture.

Experimental-creative character of psychotherapy

To return: at best, then, theoretically, this experimental-creative character of psychotherapy admits of an artistic analogy, not a scientific or philosophical one. There are, supposedly, over 400 varieties of psychotherapy (Norcross and Goldfried), something, as has been said, more reminiscent of Protestant Sectarianism gone mad, than sober science. *But, on this argument, that is exactly what we should expect.*

The fact that nearly each and every one of them (of us!) stands on its own little anthill, claiming both uniqueness, and something like finality, is, as it were, no more than the necessary evil of psychotherapy, on this view. Or, more neutrally, it is simply an expression of the fact that, like all disciplines, being able to *do* psychotherapy, does not involve a capacity for *reflexive analysis* of its conceptual status.

It is therefore essential to psychotherapy that it actually *be free* of belief commitments. It creates itself afresh constantly, in accord with its nature as analogous to art. It is like experimental theatre—a barometer, weather-vane, or social *index*, of beliefs, not a substitute for them. (It *can* have a reflexive-transformatory *relation* to them.) The 'integration of beliefs' position is the product of a *reification* of what is essentially *decisional*. It takes what is *precondition*, or *raw material*, in the work, and takes it as *outcome*, or as superseding decision and creation.

That is almost like saying that, because there is a genetic basis for tendencies to reproduction through rape, there is no choice whether to rape or not. (This kind of category mistake is currently being perpetrated on the grand scale in current discussions about the Genome Project—the mapping of the Genome, the supposed 'ultimate truth' about human beings. This, in reality, does something analogous to confusing the English Dictionary, English Grammar—or Generative Grammar, at any rate—with the works of Shakespeare.)

Growth of coherence in the field: developmental theory and common factors

Integrationist psychotherapist

The facts are to the contrary; for the belief frame of psychotherapy is actually becoming ever more coherent. All that is being done within the development of psychoanalysis, of humanistic approaches, and of systems based and constructivist approaches, *including cognitive-behavioural and rational-emotive therapy*,—Meichenbaum's work for instance, is elaborating the

basis for this. This integration is often internal to the specific theories; that is, it does *not* obviously need to lead to the abolition of their differences, because it draws in wider connections within the frame of the theory in question; but it *is*, increasingly, the (e.g., developmental) ‘common factorial’ aspect which *underpins* their differences. Whether this is further claimed to be *the basis of an actual integration of approaches*, is an argument of detail within the Profession, and does not affect our dialogue.

Now, in the light of such developmental theory, the psychotherapy-as-experiment, ‘no belief’, position is the product of taking a *particular* tier of developmental process and isolating it and equating it with the *whole*.

Belief-freedom psychotherapist

What do you mean by that? That’s far too cryptic and you need to spell it out.

Over-sophistication of the ‘belief-freedom’ position

Integrationist psychotherapist

What I mean is that developmental theory suggests various levels of cognitive development and personal framing of our world, and that *this one*, in isolation, is drawn from a very late and advanced level. The kind of suspension of belief frame you are talking about implies a very sophisticated cognitive stance; whereas most people including most psychotherapists, are ‘believers’ in one or another belief frame (including positive science) in a much more *concrete* sense, without the ‘as if’. There are various possible illustrations of this, in terms of developmental models: thus, one would be that, in terms of *Daniel Stern’s* developmental theory, the kind of ‘existential experimental’ position you are adopting *is only possible for someone drawing upon the stage of the verbal self* (Stern, 1985). One could argue a similar or parallel case in terms of Winnicott’s, Klein’s, or Balint’s—and indeed Freud’s, or Lacan’s,—developmental conceptions. If one has reservations about psychoanalytic models, from the stance of cognitive science, one could adduce Piaget’s concept of the developments in modes of *thinking operations*.

Continuity of the ethical level with developmental base: Goldberg

Now, in this issue, Dr Goldberg’s paper addresses crucial dimensions of this: he raises the issues of a number of aspects of what might be called the *ethical-existential* aspects of psychoanalysis—freewill; self-deception; the constructive character of memory; the *exceptional and secondary* character (reminiscent of Jaynes, 1990) of the attainment of consciousness, and therefore the readiness of the possibility, in its terms, of self-deception; defences as conscious strategies (suppression rather than repression); the *adult* validity of love and intimacy; the autonomy of virtue, and of the realm of ethical values and duties—pointing the way to a kind of transformation of drive-based psychoanalysis, to which the way was already pointed by (for instance) Alfred Adler and Otto Rank in the early days, as Dr Goldberg acknowledges. This is, in Lacanian terms, the realm of the ethical, of the Law, of the symbolic, which, however, Lacan, (with Freud), believes only possible upon the basis of a *long detour* through the Imaginary, whereas, Dr Goldberg believes that this potential is directly latent in any reasonable human being. (Theologically, this is the difference between Augustine and Luther, versus Pelagius, Erasmus, and Rousseau. Freud and Lacan are Augustinians, believers in something like original sin!) Yet all of them in effect agree about the *level* of this matter; it is the level of human being as potentially *decisionful*, rather than merely driven.

However, for Dr Goldberg—and this is my point—this is put forward upon the basis of a broad-based *relational* developmental theory. He is firmly with those psychodynamic theorists, in the lineage of Rousseau, like Fairbairn and Sullivan and Bowlby, who emphasise the importance and legitimacy of ordinary human attachment and relational needs, and the innocence of the child (c.f., for the problematic of all this, Grotstein, 1997). It is *precisely in that context* that he emphasises the normative *ethical level* of psychotherapeutic work, in relation to evil choice, self-deception, the nature of repression/suppression of memories, and so on.

Values from within versus values independent of psychotherapy

Belief-freedom psychotherapist

But here you are surely confusing *our meta-understanding of the process with the client's own position*. Just because the client cannot yet access this, there is no need to constrain *our* understanding in those terms. It is indeed only when the *client* has themselves reached that level that they can realise there is nothing other than *free decision* to be had—and emphatically *not* a level of a positive ultimate *psychotherapeutic basis* for value, in its own right. These might be, *for instance*—in different theories—genital primacy; or the realm of law as the symbolic; self-actualisation; the realm of alchemical transformation; full contact; and many others.

If we think, by contrast, of the stoic, logotherapeutic, or cognitive/rational-emotive, affirmations of the primacy of assertiveness or positivity of self-beliefs over any possible circumstance, c.f., Frankl); or of Dr Goldberg's affirmation of the autonomy of ethics; *these* are psychotherapeutic values which avowedly *transcend* psychotherapy, and thus confirm my point; also, you are forgetting the paradox of integration: that as theories are genuinely established as commonalities in developmental theory, they will be absorbed as *part* of developmental psychology, or anthropology, not of psychotherapy.

Integrationist psychotherapist

Very well, then, if so, psychotherapy *itself* will become progressively more a part of developmental psychology, or anthropology! And the realm of decision, or self-creation, as you have half admitted, is *just as much a value*. Nietzschean, Sartrean, Heideggerian, or Gideian 'freedom', the Zen-like absurdity of modern conceptual art, or other forms of Buddhist—or Gestalt—annihilation and recreation of everything 'given', are all characteristic *value affirmations*. They are expressions of the characteristic *self-deification* of modern man¹. They are certainly *not* value neutral-whatever their validity or otherwise.

Indeed, the ultimate realisation and affirmation of some system of value is the culmination of most if not all psychotherapies—who usually find a surreptitious way to place it on a *naturalistic* basis, however, vehement their claims of value-neutrality.

This argument between whether psychotherapy has *intrinsic* values of its own, or taps into wider human values, is a bogus one; *of course* psychotherapy is part of the dialogue of human values, and this *goes with* the gradual process of integration it is engaged in. Dr Goldberg's paper is, then, a classic illustration of this.

Your analogy with conceptual art, and experimental theatre, is indeed just *one more illustration* of psychotherapy's participation in the general community of human exploration of values today.

Open-endedness of psychotherapy versus the myth of its 'positive science': Rowan; Young and Heller

Belief-freedom psychotherapist

But this is not a contradiction of my position; it supports it. Of course this analogy is a recognised general human analogy; but it still overthrows the idea that there is any fixed systematic 'human nature', which is not *profoundly* open-ended. The papers which address issues in relation to science suggest this.

John Rowan's paper evokes how genuinely appropriate research understandings, and their relevant ethics, have evolved in psychotherapy. In his paper it becomes apparent that, as we move away from positive research paradigms, through his five levels or circles:—Natural enquiry; Human enquiry; Critical social action enquiry; Transcendent research; and Complexity enquiry;—the question of research ethics is solved effectively by a *convergence* of the enquired-into activity and its ethics. It is only on an *objectivising* model of science that they

are ostensibly separated. These are understandings of research which a clinical psychologist, using the methods of positive science, would probably not take seriously, and would perhaps regard as *assuming* what it sets out to *prove*. But even hard science method has to *assume* 'hard science method' to prove specific scientific conclusions—the most *any* philosophy of science can do is to formulate the *rules* for this. Psychotherapy has its own perfectly legitimate logical 'circles' of method. It is not much of a step onwards to suggest that the implication of Rowan's position is that psychotherapy in effect *creates* its own values and criteria, and that this is perfectly legitimate. Young's and Heller's paper suggests why: it is because psychotherapy is simply a different kind of animal from a hard science like chemistry; it is a craft. They put a series of arguments on this theme, including appeals to the reality of how we have set about validating our practice in this matter in both the EAP and the UKCP

—the majority of the psychotherapeutic profession in Europe actually believes the subtitle of this article or practices it as if it were true: Psychotherapy is a craft, not a science. If it were a science, then such components would have been/should be inserted as a matter of course. Their omission is tellingly significant.

They also point out that psychotherapy works, in large measure, with forms of 'subtle energy' which, though there is substantial scientific evidence for them, are not recognised by mainstream Western science because they breach the orthodoxies too profoundly. Of course there is an appeal to science here which might be thought inconsistent; but it would be such science as would be compatible with the 'artistic freedom' I envisage as at the heart of psychotherapy. There are several other arguments of a similar kind in this acute, readable, and irreverent paper.

Freud as multiplex reservoir of options: Wilkinson

Integrationist Psychotherapist

I suppose you would consider Wilkinson's Review paper on Nick Totton's *The water in the glass—body and mind in psychotherapy*—a very fine book, which is really in many ways Reich resurrected—to support your position, since his view seems to be that from the protean thought of Freud (c.f., Roger Bacon's review of Fink's *Clinical introduction to Lacanian psychoanalysis*, in *IJP* 5.1., 2000) an indefinitely large range of possibilities can be derived, supporting psychotherapy's specially creative position in the context of science.

Synthesis of both positions

Belief-freedom psychotherapist

Indeed. But I am beginning to wonder if perhaps this is *not* what this is about. Perhaps it is not that psychotherapy is in any sense *neutral*, but rather that it in principle *engages in turn in all possible positions*. That, therefore, it is *inherently* experimental. But that this derives in some way from the intrinsic uniqueness of its nature. Perhaps we are arguing at cross purposes. Maybe we are *both* right.

Integrationist psychotherapist

I for my part was about to argue that Wilkinson's appeal to some kind of tiering, which emerges in the development of Freud's thought, gives grounds for an integrationist model. Which indeed may be so; but here—even on the assumption of a *three* tier model, which is questionable—it is the *range of theoretical options made available by recourse to all three tiers* which is remarkable. And of course those classifications themselves are at best only one possible variant among many.

Belief-freedom psychotherapist

In a dialogue which corresponds to an argument between models tending towards absolute objectivity, and ones tending to absolute subjectivity, we seem to be moving towards a third position. To return to our starting point, what this has in common with what we found in Joanne Ablack's position is that in effect *she allows psychotherapy to be partisan*, without this being taken totally literally or losing the experimental quality. This may also, then, point the way to a genuinely more ecumenical way of regarding belief, including positive science belief, *of which psychotherapy is one of the harbingers or forerunners*.

The developing 'idea' in Newman's sense as a matrix of transformation

What do I mean by all this? An English Roman Catholic author—the greatest British Catholic writer since Anselm and Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham—and whose work is drawn upon by the present Pope (Pope John Paul II, 1991), as well as Wittgenstein (1971) and Jung (1963)—John Henry Newman, in his *Essay upon the development of Christian Doctrine* (1974), offers us a concept which can potentially transform our understandings here. He puts into play the notion of an *Idea*. Of this Jung says:

The archetype is a living idea that constantly produces new interpretations through which that idea unfolds. This was correctly recognised by Cardinal Newman in regard to Christianity. Christian doctrine is a new interpretation and development of its early stages, as we can see very clearly from the ancient tradition of the God-man.

(Jung, 1963, p. 523)

Newman himself says:

But when one and the same idea is held by persons who are independent of each other, and are variously circumstanced, and have possessed themselves of it by different ways, and when it presents itself to them under very different aspects, without losing its substantial unity and its identity, and when it is thus variously presented, yet recommended, to persons similarly circumstanced; and when it is presented to persons variously circumstanced, under aspects, discordant indeed at first sight, but reconcilable under such explanations as their respective states of mind require; then it seems to have a claim to be considered the representative of an objective truth.

(Newman, 1974, p94)

This involves a phenomenological paradigm of truth in terms of *coherent emergence or disclosure*—a Hegelian or Heideggerian paradigm, one akin to textual criticism—rather than one of *correspondence to something external*. This is indeed in fact the model of 'textual analysis' in psychotherapy and of the analysis of what is going on with 'process analysis'. It implies an acceptance of the primacy of metaphor (there is no space to elaborate on this implication here), and the corresponding acceptance of the 'third realm', as people as different as Winnicott, Leavis, and Popper upheld it. It would be neither an 'objective' developmental theory, nor a purely arbitrary 'experimental' theory, but a third thing. But is this not privileging hermeneutics (interpretation) over psychological causality ('phenomenological causality', Wilkinson, 1998)? Well, this is a recognition of *textual causality as a causality in its*

own right. We do, in fact, in real life, invent ourselves as in a living novel. Pure hermeneutics *denies the causal function.* This relates to the ‘distributed’ notion of Mind Totton discusses in passing², since it recognises each level of meaning as valid and real at its own level. Science (positive science) *fundamentally overemphasises* the notion of ‘individual referent’, or actuality as opposed to possibility and the universal. *This is what Newman is on to with the notion of ‘Idea’,* which implies a notion of truth and meaning transcending correspondence to individual facts, but yet not excluding them.

An idea is a *living historical reality.* It is *self-generative.* It is *spontaneous,* self-creating. Its criteria of being are *textual.* It transcends individuals. Nor is it reducible to fixed scientific laws. It is a historical reality, and *history is not reducible to another science.* History includes meaning which transcends events. Its meaning is both distributed *and* transcendent-universal. And psychotherapy is a living ‘idea’ or ‘form’, in this sense. This is why it can be so diverse and yet inclusive.

The reality of psychotherapy in a war situation: Milosevic

Vladimir Milosevic’s very moving paper describing his psychodrama work during the Kosova war, the necessary adjustments of approach, and the participation in the reality of hope and fear in wartime, might be considered a prime illustration of how psychotherapy as a living form can adapt to the context and the systemic need.

Psychotherapy is both ecumenical and unscientific—but only in the sense of positive science, no other. The ‘religious status’ of theories is (potentially) taken seriously—they are treated as mutual part truths, as the present Pope (hardly a soft-liner!) treats other faiths as *part of a genuine dialogue of belief.* Psychotherapy is in effect a church without a religion, because it is the return to the forging smithy of which religions are the *product* The link between the *new way of thinking about difference* in Joanne Ablack’s paper, and that implied in the ‘psychotherapy as a church without religion’ model, *is the acceptance of core human phenomenology.* Psychotherapy is potentially *a nuclear matrix and seedbed of core truths and un-prejudice about human nature.*

The phenomenology of transformations

Psychotherapy indeed, then, is a matter of *the phenomenology of transformations.* Jung was a major pioneer here. Its relation to religion is a positive one; it is, that it is potentially *in a more primordial relation to the sources* than the extant, dogmatically formulated and driven, religious frameworks. **It can take us back into the core alternative philosophical frameworks—including Darwinian science³.** Its relation to *science* is that it is there *also*—by *virtue* of precisely its barometric function—in a *privileged* position to study the epistemological roots and sources of the sciences. For it is a *primordially anthropological* enquiry, which gradually *maps the whole spectrum* of human possibilities of creative value and self-organisation.

Integrationist psychotherapist

You realise we have now completely moved away from psychotherapy as based in conventional science, and are near to embracing a Jungian or Heideggerian model of an archetypal matrix of ‘truth’? Even though it claims to *include* science.

Belief-freedom psychotherapist

In suggesting a way forward on one problem we have of course stumbled straight into

another. We cannot pursue it here. But its just worth remembering that this is, unlike classic Jungian positions, an inclusive conception of a matrix, which would incorporate the whole range of conceptual models in psychotherapy in an ecumenical way.

A footnote: justice to Heidegger

Speaking of Heidegger, in the Editorial of *IJP*, 4.2., (Wilkinson, 1999) I was influenced by Farias (1989) in attributing fully-fledged, *lifelong*, Nazism to Heidegger. Now, following Julian Young's careful analysis in *Heidegger, philosophy, nazism*, (Young, 1998), it has come to seem to me clear that, in the course of the lectures and essays on Nietzsche, given or written before and during the Second World War, Heidegger used Nietzsche's thought, on the will-to-power and nihilism, as a vehicle *to diagnose, and free himself from, Nazism*. For instance, writing in 1940 (*after* the war began), he goes out of his way to mention a French and a British thinker along with the Germans, the thought which, in its totality, in his view, and in its loss of the thought of Being, culminates in Nietzsche's rationale for 'the struggle for dominion over the earth—in the name of fundamental philosophical doctrines':

'Fundamental philosophical doctrines' means the essence of self-consummating metaphysics, which in its fundamental traits sustains Western history, shapes it in its modern European form, and destines it for 'world domination'. What is expressed in the thinking of European thinkers can also be historiologically expressed in terms of the national character of those thinkers, but it can never be promulgated as a peculiarity of nationality. Descartes' thought, the metaphysics of Leibniz, Hume's philosophy, are all European and therefore global. Nietzsche's metaphysics is at its core never a specifically German philosophy. It is European, global.

(Heidegger, 1991, pp. 250–251)

Some may hold there is some undifferentiating special pleading for Germany here; arguable; but in any case this is not Nazi Germanic Nationalism any more. There is (non-simplistic) ground for hope and affirmation in Young's touching evocation of Heidegger's complex struggle. The papers in this issue remind us that we are *all* involved.

Notes

1. Generic sense! I find, in the present state of linguistic meaning acceptances, there is no satisfactory substitute, of equivalent meaning, for this word here.
2. My colleague Andries Gouws, in his remarkable unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, notes that here, in respect of the 'distributed mind' system, Freud converges in his own way upon the 'subtle energy' recognitions of which Young and Heller write:

Although Freud does not here [in *The project for a scientific psychology*] *work out this possibility, I see no a priori* reason why parts of the psychical apparatus may not be more intimately connected with—and dependent upon—parts of other psychical apparatuses than with other parts of themselves. (C.f., Freud's later remark [paper on The unconscious]: 'The *Ucs* of one human being can react upon that of another without passing through the *Cs*.')

Gouws, 1998

3. If we scratch beneath the surface of the matrix of the psyche (or soul) we find four major religious underpinning models and one scientific—with many subdivisions of course. There are three ancient religious versions, one more modern, and the scientific is mainly modern. These are: i. the index or sign in the spirit of an absolute *creator God*, in the Judaic, Christian, or Islamic moulds. Augustine is a *locus classicus* here. ii. the presence (in the mode of identity or eminence) in the empirical self of the absolute self—Hindu monism (Sankara), or Plotinus in the West, are the classic expressions. Ken Wilber is the most prominent quasi-psychotherapist expression of this, though overlapping into the next one. iii. the

discovery of the *unreality* (or foundationlessness) of both empirical and cosmic self—Buddhism in many variations (including arguably some—Hume, Nietzsche—in the West). The modern variants are: iv. a conception, drawing upon Platonism but powerful since the Renaissance, *though never systematic like the other four*—which is why it has mainly gone unnoticed—o *relative and participatory deity* (pan-entheism). This has been pronounced since the Romantic epoch: Hegel, Schelling, Modernist Protestantism, Whitehead, arguably the later Heidegger, DH Lawrence, Jung, Levinas, and Derrida, are a few major representatives. Because it has been unsystematic it has not been taken as a serious option. I think that, unrecognised, a great deal of psychotherapy takes place in the light of this option. v. The matrix or *information system*, inherent in the physical, of a genetic-environmental whole, understood in Darwinian terms. This is, in many ways, creationism without a creator. Freud (probably Marx also) is on the cusp between iv. and v.

These variants are what we encounter when we scratch beneath the surface in our psychotherapeutic work. We find five medieval or quasi-medieval belief frameworks. It is important to realise that post-Darwinian science is not neutral in this but one of the contestants. The problem these all raise is how they are lived, and how they may dialogue, today, in our world, and in psychotherapeutic work.

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Résumé *Cet éditorial établit un lien entre les articles, basé sur la nature de leur contribution au débat/dialogue entre les psychothérapies dont le système de valeur est basé sur un modèle expérimental et libre et celles qui ont une approche intégrationniste et assimilatrice. L'exploration des articles amène les deux positions à se rejoindre dans une synthèse et la position de la psychothérapie est dépeinte en tant que phénoménologie, dans le sens donné par Cardinal Newman, c'est à dire d'une idée qui se régénère créativement. Une idée qui peut envelopper—mais pas se limiter à—la position de 'science positive', avec sa concentration sur le fait individuel. L'éditorial s'achève avec une rectification de l'injustice faite à Heidegger dans l'éditorial de Juillet 1999, ou il avait été allégué qu'il avait été un Nazi toute sa vie, une allégation maintenant retirée à la lumière du livre de Julian Young sur Heidegger, Philosophie et Nazisme.*

Zusammenfassung *Dieses Editorial verbindet die verschiedenen Beiträge aus dem Blickwinkel, wie sie sich innerhalb der Debatte/des Dialogs zwischen meinungsfreiem' und 'experimentierendem' Werte- und Meinungsmodell der Psychotherapie und einem integrierendem, assimilatorischem zueinander verhalten. Durch Exploration der Beiträge kommen die zwei Positionen schrittweise in einer Synthese zusammen und die Position der Psychotherapie wird als eine phänomenologische dargestellt, eine kreativ selbst generierende 'Idee' im Sinne von Kardinal Newman, obgleich eine, die die Position einer 'positiven Wissenschaft' mit dem Fokus auf individuelle Tatsachen umfassen kann—aber nicht darauf begrenzt ist. Das Editorial endet mit einer Richtigstellung betreffend Heidegger im Editorial vom Juli 1999, wo behauptet wurde, daß er lebenslang ein Nazi war. Eine Behauptung, die nun auf dem Hintergrund von Julian Youngs Buch über Heidegger, Philosophie und Nazismus zurückgenommen wurde.*