

# Review Article: ‘Impossible meeting: too strange to each other for misunderstanding’, Darlene Bregman Ehrenberg’s *The Intimate Edge*

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**Abstract** *This review article argues that Darlene Ehrenberg’s psychoanalytic concept of process interaction is the most developed and radical psychoanalytic form of this concept, and is also a bridge to models of integration. Its relation to the concept of ‘implicit knowledge’ is explored.*

*The Intimate Edge: Extending the Reach of Psychoanalytic Interaction*, Darlene Bregman Ehrenberg, New York and London: Norton, 1992, 210 pp, ISBN 0-393-70140-9

## Introduction

Darlene Ehrenberg’s book has been making quiet waves in psychoanalytic circles particularly in the USA for some time. But it ought to be making a *tsunami*! A tidal wave, because this book is actually revolutionary in its implications for psychoanalysis.

Ehrenberg presents a *process* concept of the psychoanalytic interaction. It is a fully articulated conception, one which, as fully articulated, is, so far as I know, unique in psychoanalytic writing, though, since what it presents is so fundamental, there are, inevitably, hints, and incomplete articulations in other psychoanalytic writings. This is, though, usually in a way which is subordinated to a system of interpretation and therefore essentially overrides this insight (for instance, the Kleinian system, in Joseph, 1989). (A striking comparison is, however, Harold Searles’ work, which *exhibits* it through the analysis of countertransference, in an unparalleled way, but nevertheless does not provide the generalised articulated concept Ehrenberg does, c.f., Searles, 1996.)

Once seen it is—in one way!—a very simple concept, but, in another way, it challenges the assumptions of linear reasoning, and content-based interpretation and methodology, fundamentally. It challenges them so fundamentally, that it is quite difficult to ‘get’, apprehend, understand intuitively, unless one already has the imaginative grasp, and experiential freedom and presuppositions to attune to it. It is formulated as the concept of the ‘intimate edge’. This is a profound intuition Ehrenberg has been tenaciously pursuing, from very early on; her original paper was written as far back as 1974; and like certain famous

others (Schopenhauer is an example) her fundamental insight achieved clarity early in her career, and has both been elaborated, and defended, by her ever since!

I shall be discussing later the significance of her relative neglect, or her being routinely misunderstood within psychoanalysis.

Here is the already very clear formulation in her initial paper:

By “intimate edge” I mean that *point of maximum and acknowledged contact at any given moment in a relationship without fusion, without violation of the separateness and integrity of each participant*. This point is not static, and may fluctuate from one moment to the next, so that being able to relate at this point requires ceaseless sensitivity to inner changes in oneself and in the other, and to changes at the interface of the interaction, as these occur in the context of the spiral of reciprocal impact. (My concept thus encompasses spatial as well as temporal dimensions). More often than not this optimal point is over- or under-shot so that there is some kind of intrusion or else overcautiousness. In either case there is a failure on the part of psychoanalyst and patient to meet at the “intimate edge.” (Ehrenberg, 1974)

The claim that it encompasses spatial, as well as temporal, dimensions is very important in the light of the connection across to the concept of ‘implicit knowledge’ we shall be exploring. She also does later develop a more reflexive dialectical conception of how even ‘failures’, through sensitive tracking, are absorbed creatively into the exploration of the ‘intimate edge’.

Ehrenberg draws upon Buber’s concept of the I-Thou to ground her concept. It is:

*To be found neither in one of the two partners, nor in both together, but only in the dialogue itself, in this “between” which they live together* (Buber, 1958, her italics).

This is a very accessible book, with its lines of reasoning closely tied in with detailed, vivid, and touching clinical illustration, which has the power to touch into ones work as soon as one starts to assimilate it, even where one is already disposed to process formulations!

The concept is avowedly process-based, but, in seeking fuller formulation or articulation, there remains a core issue. This is the issue: does she go fully towards the realm Daniel Stern, in line with a great deal of modern cognitive psychology (Stern, 1998), calls ‘implicit knowledge’, that is, awareness which is enacted and ‘lived’, like the awareness of *mirroring*, for instance. This type of knowledge is never ever more than partly accessible to awareness; it is a matter of intentionality and phenomenological process, not exhaustively to be articulated in terms of cognitions. *Or*, does she move towards an interpretative knowing which is propositional and verbal in the classical psychoanalytic paradigm (this is *not* entailed in/by Freud himself, c.f., Totton, 1998, Wilkinson, 2000)? The quotations we have considered so far would take us in the direction of the former, implicit knowledge, alternative.

But, if one does go towards the implicit knowledge concept, then ‘psychoanalysis’ becomes, primarily, and in every aspect of its activity, *relation*, cognitive articulation then being secondary. And then there would, arguably, be no argument other than prejudice for there being a fixed boundary which separates it from the dialogical and process, the *active*, therapies, such as Gestalt. And this may be a problem for her position, as we shall see.

Ehrenberg writes with a grace, vividness, precision, and delicacy, which make her book an enormous pleasure to read—and to re-read. Here is one illustration, one where she evokes, in her own effortlessly fluent, yet complex, way, the ‘implicit knowledge’ recognition, as well as the ‘performative’ dimension of language, (c.f., Austin, 1976), the dimension of expression and

of manipulation through language, and the whole dimension of reflexive enactment in the process of language); a long quotation is necessary:

Recognizing the power of what goes on beyond words is of course as important in the context of verbalization as it is in the context of its absence. I will begin by addressing the former.

It is well known that words can serve as barriers or bridges to communication, or as both simultaneously. Words can be used to conceal or reveal; they can be used in an attempt to evoke feelings or to elicit certain kinds of behavioral responses; they can be weapons, camouflage, cries for help, a means to test one another, gifts, or even a way to put ideas and images into the mind of another. They can be used to seduce, amuse, amaze, charm, insult, penetrate, invade, betray, hurt, shock, deceive, distract, manipulate. Being able to truly express oneself in words is a rare and special gift, and yet there are times when even with such a gift words are inadequate. Any attempt to capture live experience, for example, is doomed to fall short of the mark, precisely because the very process of attempting to articulate it changes it so that what was true as one began to describe it is no longer true as one does so. Since words can be a medium for acting out by patient or analyst, and since what goes on affectively, often non-verbally, can have profound impact, both positive and negative, the importance of becoming more aware of the impact of what goes on beyond words, even in the context of verbal communication, cannot be overestimated. (Ehrenberg, 1992, p. 14)

I think, nevertheless, despite the unambiguous character of such passages as the above, *in the book* (not in her first paper) Ehrenberg manifests a degree of oscillation on the issue of the primacy of implicit knowledge, which is perhaps to do with the pressure on her in respect of her attempt to communicate it within the culture of the Psychoanalytic community (c.f., again, Totton, 1998, Wilkinson, 2000), and to which we shall come. But her *fundamental* vision is pretty unambiguous on this.

Let us try to clarify, and sharpen, this debate with some basic distinctions first:

There are *two* concepts of 'analytic process'. Both are, *prima facie*, compatible with Freud's emphasis in his first letter to Groddeck that the core of analysis is the 'unconscious, transference, and resistance' (Groddeck, 1998).

(1) **The 'classical' concept.**

This comprises the view that 'analysis' is:

- a. The imparting of insight;
- b. the maintenance of neutrality; which means,
- c. That *this* concept of analysis *precludes relationship*, and therefore:
- d. That the business of analysis is *exclusively* the elucidation of the *client's* intrapsychic
- e. predicament, to enable liberation from their defensive systems. Hence,
- f. When the client potentially does not accept the analyst's (assumed accurate) insight, the concept of either *resistance* or *acquiescence* in the interpretative process becomes paramount or absolute. It is, so to say, exclusively the client's affair. The notions of transference and defence will be correlated with this, as what prevents insight and maintains illusion, and the notion of countertransference becomes a non-relational one, one of, so to say, the analyst's transference response to the client.

(2) **The ‘relational process’ concept.**

- a. This conception argues that *all the fundamental concepts of analysis* can be reconstrued relationally, and, extending e.g., Stern’s language, (op. cit.) as *implicit interactive knowledge*. For instance, it would imply that, even when we may validly speak of ‘projection’ in transference, and therefore of transference as an illusion or distortion, *apparently* on the old analytic model, such speaking is ‘within brackets’,—for the context which brackets it is that of what this ‘distortion’ means.
- b. Thus, for example, does it mean an *avoidance* of recognition of the relational stance of the analyst? Or does it, rather, mean that the client is developmentally *unable* to relate at the level at which the analyst is meeting them? Is the client genuinely caught in the re-enactment of a repressed memory, which therefore is an ‘illusion’ *which makes sense* in terms of their developmental or traumatic stage of intentionality? Is the supposed ‘illusion’ therefore not rather to be construed as a relational *potential*? Thus, for instance, if a child cannot construe abandonment without interpreting themselves as ‘bad’, this is a function of their developmental stage, and is *the most enlightened decision* their degree of awareness permits at that point. *It is, therefore, compatible with, and foundation for, potential later developments in which the whole construction of judgement and blame is expressed in a more mature way.*

If this is re-enacted in the ‘transference’, the same applies. This is, in fact, the ‘developmentally needed relationship’, in Clarkson’s (1995) sense, and there would be a serious question, from this point of view, whether the ‘transference relationship’, which she distinguishes, would not always actually turn out to be the ‘developmentally needed relationship’. We do perhaps need to make the distinction, just to have the discussion!

- c. All of these—and other—options place it within a relational frame. Of course, this is on the assumption there is *no* here and now realistic element, as an *ad hominem* argument; normally things will not be as clear cut; usually e.g. the ‘projection’ has *some* basis however small in the analyst’s personal way of being, and so on.
- d. In this concept the notion of ‘insight’ still has a place, but in a Piagetian sense of the attainment of the capacity for reflexive, multi-perspectival thinking (‘formal operations’ in Piaget’s jargon), which is *the articulation into consciousness, of the emergence of the implicit process into awareness*, and is made possible by the internalization of being in relation. This is the movement (Searles, 1993) from ‘concrete’ to ‘metaphorical’ thinking (which is also mapped in his own way in Jaynes, (1990).
- e. In this light the concept of ‘resistance’ simply acknowledges that there are subtle regressive forces at work in even the most relational therapy, as is clear from Ehrenberg’s book, but that, nevertheless, *they are construed as an expression of ‘relation’ in the ‘between’ of client and therapist.*

**Comment on Ehrenberg’s book in this light**

My sense of it is that Ehrenberg, in some small measure, allays the anxieties of the psychoanalytic community as if she were operating the ‘classical’ concept, but in fact she exclusively employs the ‘process’ concept in practice. Of course, *no psychoanalysis of any value could ever have been done* if in practice analysts had not operated upon the basis of the process model of psychoanalysis in some degree. The ‘classical’ model is a draconian, or perhaps (rather) procrustean, extrapolation from certain trends in Freud, which he himself, as well

known, never exclusively adhered to, either in theory or in practice. And therefore the psychoanalytic community in its conservative aspects is equally caught in this conflation, so there is every excuse!

But if one makes the process model *explicit*, then, since it is dialogical and interactive, one cannot define the frame in the old way, and certain arbitrarily imposed boundaries, such as the phobia about touch, and bodywork, which is still a psychoanalytic phobia, have to be reevaluated.

It is indeed arguable that, even on the assumption that the work is exclusively intrapsychic, there is no logical barrier against, for instance, bodywork. But certainly any plausibility the idea of the classical model of abstinence has, is derived from the notion of non-intrusion, or the most minimal intrusion possible, into an exclusively intrapsychic process. Once the notion of relation is introduced, then any fitting form of relation, which does not either violate human rights, or the incest taboo, and can be justified as a valid form of intervention, becomes possible.

Ehrenberg has already moved pretty far on the matter of self-disclosure. And also on the matter of relation. Though (c.f., op. cit., pp. 39–41) she is not *quite* explicitly in the position of saying that the development of a relationship *is* the work, as the dialogical therapists such as Lynne Jacobs and Friedman would do. Ehrenberg argues it is certainly not merely a means to an end, but that it is the ‘medium’ of analytic work, p. 41. She says:

Analytic work actually takes place within, and is a function of the two-person interaction and of the new experience what is generated within it. (op. cit., p. 41).

That is, the relationship itself is not the work, or part of the work, per se or as such. Though she is actually very near to this position.

If we follow this line of argument, then, all dialogical, integrative, and active and process based work, which works with transference, resistance, and some equivalent of the unconscious, *is seen to be a form of psychoanalysis*. E.g., Gestalt, Psychodrama, Mahrer’s Experiential Psychotherapy, Yalom’s version of Existential Psychotherapy, Transactional Analysis, Reichian and Post-Reichian energetic work, many types of Integrative Psychotherapy, Jungian Analysis, Psychosynthesis, much transpersonal and psychospiritual work, and so on. And Rogers’ work, though avowedly (I believe, through the ‘equal and opposite’ misunderstanding, c.f., Wilkinson, 2002) anti- ‘transference, resistance, and some equivalent of the unconscious’, has had such a key effect on the development of the recognition of the I-Thou in the work that it needs mention; and those who, like Rogers, identify ‘transference, resistance, and some equivalent of the unconscious’ with the classical model fail to see how psychoanalytic they themselves are! The dreadful confusion works both ways.

Many illustrations of how close the Gestalt vision, for example, is to Ehrenberg’s position are to be found in the ‘Gestalt Bible’ of 1951, *Gestalt Therapy, Excitement and Growth in the Human Personality* (Perls *et al.*, 1972); here is one which is representative:

The therapy, then, consists in analysing the internal structure of the actual experience, with whatever degree of contact it has: not so much *what* is being experienced, remembered, done, said, etc., as *how* what is being remembered is remembered, or how what is said is said, with what facial expression, what tone of voice, what syntax, what posture, what affect, what omission, what regard or disregard of the other person, etc. By working on the unity and disunity of this structure of the experience here and now, it is possible to remake the dynamic relations of the figure and ground till the contact is heightened, the awareness brightened and the behaviour energised. Most important of

all, *the achievement of a strong gestalt is itself the cure, for the figure of contact is not a sign of, but is itself the creative integration of experience.* (op. cit., p. 232)

Here, the remnants of old psychoanalytic models which still cling to the formulations do not detract from the radical character of the process emphasis, with the final emphasis that the achievement of relationship is itself the cure, in the last sentence.

So my problem with, who is responsible for the ‘intersubjective turn’, in psychoanalysis is, whose intersubjectivity, whose psychoanalysis? Those of us, who regard ourselves avowedly as ‘process and dialogical psychotherapists’, sometimes see psychoanalytic thinkers rediscovering the wheel, as far as we are concerned, again and again, and now (as others previously, such as Reich, Perls *et al.*, Berne, and so on) have once more begun to name that we believe *we* are arguably the cutting edge of psychoanalysis.

Ehrenberg makes occasional gestures of deference to classical models, such as that in:

In an earlier publication—I emphasised that data from a growing [psychoanalytic] literature—suggest that that—the analyst’s own active affective engagement can be crucial, and that this can be constructive in advancing the analytic effort without compromising its integrity.—direct participation by the analyst need not involve the ‘lending of egos’, acting out, manipulation, seduction, mystification, coercion, or any other non-analytic gesture. (Ehrenberg, op. cit., note 8, p. 196)

If—as she indicates elsewhere, e.g., p. 79—various ‘biased’ feelings and positional stances in the work may be put to use in a transformational process through acknowledgement and the ‘countertransference twist’,—and indeed that *nothing* is neutral in analysis, but *only demonstrated to be analytic through experience and denouement*—these instances too, which are themselves languaged through the lens of those hostile on classical grounds, are potentially capable of such transformation. For example, what is wrong with ‘lending egos’? Even Strachey (1934) argued for this in the famous paper on mutative interpretation. It may be a questionable *conceptualization* in ultimate terms, but the *phenomenon* is quite indispensable.

Here, then, she is tacitly presupposing the classical model I think. But this is about the strongest instance of such deference.

So, even within the internal limits of official psychoanalysis, we also have to place Ehrenberg in the wider context of the psychoanalytic community in the US and UK, thinking of innovators like Fairbairn, Searles, Guntrip, Bowlby, Mitchell, (who looks ‘relational’ enough from our ‘outside’—c.f., Wilkinson, 2001), Sullivan, Ogden, and others, who mostly work within classical abstentive constraints.

Having said all that, for me, the other side of the coin is that, on the basis of Ehrenberg’s book, she is ‘one of us’. We would be talking the same language in a clinical dialogue to all intents and purposes. Her praxis is so fundamentally interactive that it gets under the fence of the classical model, as far as I am concerned!

In terms of my understandings, she again and again illustrates how we use countertransference relational insight/feeling to modulate, calibrate, and give homeopathically, our relational responses, by the way our countertransference indicates to us compassionately the depth of our clients’ predicaments, whilst also indicating whether we should respond in a protagonistic or antagonist fashion! Empathy or a scrap!? I think there is a degree of homeopathic minimalization (but also intensification and concentration) at the heart of the frame—whose-ever version we uphold. Freud of course thought this was of the nature of consciousness itself (e.g., Freud, 1984a). The homeopathic minimalization, the non-consummation, and the hermetic concentration, are intimately connected.



Of course, paradoxically, this often makes for an intensity of relation transcending that of most ‘actual’ relationships!

### **Implicit and explicit knowledge**

To return to Daniel Stern; there is, increasingly, an existential-phenomenological aspect of his work, and this is not irrelevant to Ehrenberg’s work, in the light of the discussion so far! It follows in the footsteps of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Derrida. What does this mean?

‘Being-in-the-world’, to use Heidegger’s jargon, entails the recognition of the following:

My relation to my world is not an add-on but inherent in my being.

Therefore, *every aspect* of me, including my body-being, is fully included.

My relation to my world is continually *enacted*, and is only secondarily or reflexively propositional.

This means not only that it is never *exhaustively* translatable into explicit, sign-based, articulations, formulation, but that any such making explicit is potentially *infinite*.

What does it mean, that it is enacted? Well, for instance, that, to take Heidegger’s instance, that my relation to my environment is that towards a totality of ‘equipmentality’. Thus, in my own home I have instinctive or reflex access to everything in it as an *organized ensemble*, as a totality, a field, a whole. I have a relation to my settee, and the whole organization of my room, as I go to my kettle, and to the tap, to make a cup of tea.

And, then, my access to *persons*, from (my) birth onward, is as to an ever more organized ensemble and whole, like our access to the totality of a piece of music, orchestrated in innumerable and infinite ways, the expression of someone’s face, dancing and altering incandescently in the moment, their body posture, the sense one has of the inner shifts in them, including bodily shifts, interacting with ‘empathic divinings’, the way they interact with existing conventional and power structures and rituals (‘performative situations’, in JL Austin’s sense, *op. cit.*), their shifting personae or ego states (here one is ‘interpreting’ metapsychologically, but one of course has the on-going phenomenology of *some* interpretative framework, and that too is part of the dance), the way in which, in conversation, especially expressive conversation, language and expression, and mutual verbal/non-verbal interchange, interweave in a way which is mostly indescribable, except perhaps in poetry, intermeshing with our inner ‘readings’ of the process (which, for instance, in passionate connection, are most intimately interwoven with the ‘outer’ bodily aspects); and so on.

Here, of course, also comes up the whole business of the way we access fantasy, or phantasy, or the imaginal, in our work, our own and that of others, and the whole business of countertransference based interaction. Ehrenberg’s book has many many rich and subtle examples; but I found I needed to reach them from my own intimate intuitions, to make sense of her work, so here is one of my own.

An abused and agoraphobic client, who had progressed well, had made the decision to move to another part of the country and see me more infrequently on trips to where I work. She then came to a session, when she seemed very stuck and ‘back to square one’. I was curious about this and decided not to get drawn in, but just waited and listened and tracked my response. I became aware of feeling subtly hypnotized and seduced. It was rather pleasant, cosy, much belying the ostensible communication content, which was despondent and had returned to old preoccupations and patterns. I remarked to her—(perhaps, to her mind, right out of the blue)—‘she’d make a great seducer’! Then I explained the route by which I had got to the

point of saying that, and what emerged, in the dialogue, was that she was feeling abandoned by me, and felt she needed to convey that she was ‘no better’, thereby to hold me in to continue to see her in the new situation. (She had a tendency to believe she could only see me if she had ‘real problems’, so any progress was felt by her as a loss!)

But—as with Ehrenberg’s many examples—the element of *enactment*, timing, and subtle enmeshment went way beyond a simple *verbal* interpretation of a verbal fantasy, for instance: ‘you are feeling abandoned by me’. Had I confined myself to that, it would have been lifeless and stereotyped. The element of seduction, and then of amusement when we both ‘got’ what was going on, and so forth, as with Ehrenberg’s instances, were all there, and essential to it. The element of *timing*, connected to the periodicity to which Freud attached such importance, e.g. *Beyond the pleasure principle* (Freud 1984b), and *A note on the mystic writing pad* (Freud, 1984c), is one element of ‘good interpretation’ which is *irreducibly present* even on the classical model, and cannot be accounted for by it. Indeed, *interpretations themselves* are in fact a particular, perhaps a unique, type of *performative utterance*, (c.f., J. L. Austin, op. cit.), and the classical model, in its ideal form, collapses at the outset therefore.

The verbal response was *both* an epitomisation (condensed! homeopathic! As all such interventions are both ‘homeopathic’ by their nature), and was an enactment which *participated* in the interaction, and, of course, is a *combined total communication* which partakes as such of the nature of implicit or phenomenological ‘knowing’ in the Stern/Merleau-Ponty sense. If one were to try to account for all the dimensions of this interaction—the body dimension, the erotic dimension, the attachment dimension, the eye-contact or absence of it, the *mutual delight in the countertransferential turnaround*, the element of logical paradox which comes into such situations, the element of withdrawing to a *meta-level* perspective which makes such an intervention possible, the element of ‘prescribing the symptom’ in it, etc, etc,—the analysis would be endless (one gets a *little* sense of what it would or might be from *Being and time*, Heidegger, 1962). In other words, any attempt to account for this, in terms *merely* of a verbally articulable content, is a non-starter.

Of course, once one opens all this up, then the objections to *enactments* fall by the wayside, because *all of this*, in some essential measure, is enactment! Thus, for instance, Ehrenberg’s interaction (op. cit., p. 127), with a client whom she let press the buzzer, becomes perfectly natural analytic process interaction, although ‘classical’ technique would object (whilst a Gestaltist would be delighted!), because its not ‘interpretation’. And the problem with Ehrenberg’s position, for me as a ‘dialogical and process therapist’, is, not at all that I disagree with her account, but rather the very reverse, that I take it so much as *the only possible* viable way of seeing all this, that I find it hard to articulate any alternative.

### Propositional Interpretation

This leads me back to the question: what, then, *is* involved at the level of verbal interpretation, on the classical analytic model? What is the residual pull which makes us inclined to say that anything that is non-propositional is *not* a valid interpretation? (And even *within* the sphere of the propositional, there are the debates whether it is present tense, past tense, specific or general elucidatory, and so on, ‘scholastic’ debates, it has to be said, in Alisdair MacIntyre’s sense, (MacIntyre, 1990, p. 154/155), those which are predetermined by the *hidden* unexamined fundamental assumptions, here that of the primacy of propositional ‘insight’)? Why is the ‘insight’ based interpretation assumed to be *propositional*?

I think here we stumble up against a profound prejudice which Whitehead, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and Derrida, in different ways, have all addressed, but to which Freud (in many ways so philosophically sophisticated) was still deeply subjected, namely the primacy in the West of the subject/object antithesis, subject-predicate logic, and of *assertion* as the paradigm of



truth. I think, firstly, that Freud's 'turn towards object relations', to escape Jung's appeal to the archetypal, which is instantiated in the *Narcissism* and *Mourning and Melancholia* papers, and which is based upon the 'realism'-bias hankering, for there to be a definite **individual** or entity to which we 'regress' when narcissistically wounded, is based upon the subject/predicate, and assertion-logic model (c.f., Wilkinson, 2000). And I think this illustrates the trend in his mind which all along sought for 'realistic' explanations, based upon the assumption of actual individuals implicated in actual events. That he came as far as he did towards pluralism and 'infinetism' (c.f., Derrida, 1978, Matte-Blanco, 1998) is remarkable.

But it is a very Kantian compromise he comes to, for the *Critique of Pure Reason* (Kant, 1964) is the ultimate pre-romantic compromise attempt to solidify the Aristotelean subject/predicate and assertion-logic model, upon the basis of a transcendental analysis of human experiential synthesis which actually explodes the subject/predicate and assertion-logic model. And Kant too comes amazingly far. Nevertheless, the categories, with which the Transcendental Deduction in the two editions of the Critique, and the Analogies of Experience, have to do, and into the forms of which experience is to be structured, are the Categories of *Judgement*, i.e. Assertion. Yet the Transcendental Deduction (in the first edition only) invokes a primary imaginative synthesis which is a *totality*, invoking the ground, and total context, of experience, i.e. an all-relational context of the kind Heidegger pushes on from Kant towards, and which breaks out of the Procrustean mould of the categories of assertion. Freud remains hugely, and mainly hidden, in the wake of Kant (whom he refers to at deeply significant moments) in his ultimate structural analyses, such as the primary process/secondary process distinction, and the analysis of it in the last part of *Interpretation of dreams*, but this too is untenable as an ultimate antithesis (c.f., Gouws, 2000).

And, in short, it would also be possible to show that the strand of the subject/predicate and assertion-logic model, is the one which is reproduced in the 'classical analysis' propositional interpretation model, whilst the other elements are, in various measures, manifest in both the relational theorists, and the 'linguistic' successors of Freud, especially Lacan, Derrida, and Matte-Blanco (Jung, as often if not always, is somewhere in the middle here).

What, then, Stern is expressing in the concept of 'implicit knowledge' is yet one more bursting out of the seams of the 'infinite aspect' of Freud, which is already, for instance, to be seen in the amazing, but impossible, Freudian attempt to structure and finitise dream analysis in *Interpretation of dreams* (Freud, 1999). And in the light of that we can now see *interpretations themselves* as a certain form of performative utterance, and therefore within the realm, ultimately, of 'implicit knowledge'.

They are both 1. implicit *injunctions*, having the connotation of 'believe this' or 'try believing this' or 'hypothesize this' and also, 2. '*realizations*', analogous to 'I suddenly realize I love her', or 'I do believe in Jesus as my saviour', or 'I don't believe in the goodness of the universe any more', and so on. Once this is seen, *the fact that the interpretative art has actually been developed with considerable subtlety*, even in conservative analytic circles, becomes explicable, for it is *inexplicable* on the subject/predicate and assertion-logic model; its implicit invoking of the 'implicit knowledge' dimension is what explains this.

And, once again, once it is recognized that the ontological-metapsychological foundations of psychoanalysis cannot be sustained on the substance-based subject/predicate and assertion-logic model, but that the 'being-in-the-world'/'implicit knowledge' realm is foundationally primary (a big metaphysical step for psychoanalysis), then the primacy given to insight-based interpretation has no other foundation than ancient metaphysical prejudice, which perhaps not many psychoanalysts are even aware of!

This opens the way to recognizing that the 'enactment' versus 'interpretation' antithesis is both false, and foreign to the fundamental logic of psychoanalytic understanding, and then the real discussions, in our view, can start! I am sure, for instance, that the wonderful intervention

of the imaginal 'lighting a fire' with her cold client (op. cit., pp. 76ff) would be taken as 'therapeutic acting out' by the more conservative analysts. Yet it is exquisite work, and in the second sense of psychoanalysis, utterly psychoanalytic.

So I see Ehrenberg's work as at the heart of these developments, and, from our point of view as 'dialogical and process psychotherapists', as noteworthy for being as explicit an account of the dialogical process from within psychoanalysis as any I have read. The question whether she would consider this affirmation from without the ranks of official psychoanalysis a mixed blessing, and indeed a poisoned chalice, raises the same wider issues implicit in her book; it is not really her problem, but an illustration of the remaining predicament of psychoanalysis.

This, then, is a wonderful book, one which straddles the divide between the psychoanalytic and the humanistic-integrative communities in psychotherapy, and is therefore, like Stern's and Kohut's work, a bridge to dialogue. I am grateful to have had the opportunity to digest it and to weigh its significance.

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**Résumé** *Cet article de revue avance que la conception qu'a Darlene Ehrenberg du concept psychanalytique d'interaction de processus, représente la forme psychanalytique la plus développée et la plus radicale de ce concept, ainsi qu'une passerelle vers des modèles d'intégration. Son rapport au concept de 'connaissance implicite' est exploré ici.*

**Zusammenfassung** *In diesem Artikel wird argumentiert, dass das psychoanalytische Konzept von Darlene Ehrenberg zur Prozessinteraktion die am weitesten entwickelte und radikalste psychoanalytische Form einer diesbezüglichen Konzeption darstellt. Gleichzeitig trägt es zur Integration von Modellen bei. Die Bezüge zu Konzepten des 'impliziten Wissens' werden untersucht.*