An inspired resurrection of Freudian drive theory: but does Nick Totton’s Reichian ‘bodymind’ concept supersede Cartesian dualism?


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Abstract This review article looks at Nick Totton’s book The Water in the Glass as an exceptionally clear and important expression of a Reichian view of Freud and his legacy, which lays serious claim to offer a view of ‘bodymind’ that overcomes Cartesian dualism. It also validates as psychoanalytic work with the body and touch, which was embargoed in orthodox psychoanalysis after Reich’s expulsion. Totton draws out Reich’s linkage to the hidden (unpublished until 1950) visionary Freud of the ‘Project for a scientific psychology’ of 1895 (Freud, 1950), and offers a renewal of the vision of the ‘Project’, but one in which neurological forms of self-representation are replaced by embodied-physiological forms. These, however, serve in the same way as symbolic media for representations of the self in awareness. The review article argues that, despite the breakthrough quality of this, it yet misses another pathway from Freud’s ‘Project’, that of meaning instead of energy, represented by Derrida. This polarisation between energy and meaning is only resolved when the dimension of support (or relation, e.g. attachment theory) and social identification is acknowledged as the vehicle of meaning. This is Freud’s third—not fully explicit—phase, where the vision becomes simultaneously incurably social and yet shot through with all-pervasive and self-transforming meaning at every level. This is not incompatible with Totton’s body-based vision, but transcends its sole limits. Yet Totton’s is a magnificently clear Freudian statement that forces us all to clarify our own positions.

Introductory

This review paper explores some of the issues raised by Nick Totton’s very important recent book on Freud and the body (The Water in the Glass: body and mind in psychoanalysis, 1998), which challenges psychoanalytic dogmas, from a Reichian perspective, about the use of touch in particular, and about the definition of the boundaries of the psychoanalytic in general, but whose implication is much wider than just those. Here I can only touch on one or two key points of this very rich book—a fine and very clear, truly Freudian, book, which invites and challenges dialogue, and likewise forces one to clarify one’s own perspectives on Freud, if one is to dialogue with it.

It is, sadly, not likely to be widely read in psychoanalytic circles. It is, in passing, my aim in this article to touch on why this is so. It is not just because of the silencing of the Reichian...
legacy, though, as Totton argues (pp. 17–19), this is indeed both a crucial, and a disgraceful, element.

**Approaching the heart of Totton’s vision: bodymind**

I am going to plunge straight into the middle, into the heart of the issues Totton’s book raises. The core theses of the book will emerge in this way. (I have not space additionally to summarise the whole book.) By page 151 of the book we are in the thick of the chapter Totton regards as the heart of the book—his Reichian account (through which he emphatically successfully vindicates Reich as a serious contributor—something bodyworkers and humanistic psychotherapists know but which psychoanalysis has mostly nullified) of what he calls ‘bodymind’. This is an account which combines modern neuroscience with a body-based (psyche/soma) account, of mentality and its expressive realisation of body energy. It draws from, for instance, Winnicott, Kristeva, and Daniel Stern. We have by this point already moved through his accounts, and claims, of how Ferenzci, Reich, and Groddeck took forward, and more fully honoured, the essential impulse and innovation of the early Freud—whose seeming involutions regarding the relation of body and mind, and mental±conceptual representation of the body, have also been wrestled with (in Chapters 2 and 3). The theme of conceptual self-representation lies central to his claim that Freud, and most of his followers, are caught in Cartesiandualism, and that, from Reich, we can obtain a way in which to fully dissolve it, through the representing function of the body itself.

By this point in the argument—despite the complex analysis of Freud—it is just beginning to seem to one all too clear that Totton is upholding a utopian vision of the essential vision of the early Freud, and we are beginning to wonder if this is not going to be oversimplifying. For he has previously referred (p. 70) to Freud’s assumption that ‘something organic plays a part in repression’—but this is not, as Freud thought, chemistry, but, in Reich’s terms, physiology! And then he has referred (p. 74) to the future ‘organotherapy’ feared by Freud (in what Reich called ‘a genuine Freudian intuition’, expressed at an inner circle meeting) but welcomed by Reich (p. 74) as ‘the fulfilment of the deepest goals of analytic therapy and theory’ (!).

Now, suddenly (Chapter 7, p. 142) he embarks upon a survey of information-theory accounts, of psychic/somatic regulation and environmental (mind is here viewed as interactive between brain, body, and environment) feedback-based regulatory decisions, by authors like Gregory Bateson, and he remarks:

> It should be possible on this basis to conceptualise the ego as a runaway feedback phenomenon which *pits muscular energy against itself*—using muscular tension to inhibit muscular impulse. Perhaps the ego is ‘designed’ evolutionarily as a homeostatic governing device, a means of stabilising the flow of energy (drive) in the human system. Given paradoxical information, which resets its threshold, it goes into negative escalation and shuts down energy flow below the organismically healthy point. (Totton, 1998, p. 145)

**The relation to Freud’s ‘Project for a scientific psychology’**

My experience here was that, at this very moment one is about to exclaim, ‘But, come on! This is just where Freud began it all in the ‘Project’!

But then, at this very point, Totton immediately goes on with:

> This sort of idea would take us right back to the *Project*, to Freud’s representation of the conscious mind as a neural monitoring system, a reflexive device for ‘keeping

So, if one major sign of being in touch with the depths of Freud is that one stay in touch with the ‘Project for a scientific psychology’, Totton has been in touch with the Freudian insight all along; one is reminded, don’t jump to conclusions so fast! We turn back to p. 140, where he has said (of a pessimistic yet perceptive and quite ‘Reichian’ Lacanian):

Boothby puts the project of the Project—what I have called ‘the human psychic apparatus as a representation of the human somatic apparatus’—at the centre of human existence, yet maintains that it is unachievable. (Totton, 1998, p. 140, second italics mine)

(And, once again, we notice the key issue of ‘representation’.)

Coming back, following an appeal to Damasio’s theory of neural representation of external situations in terms of modifications of the body, he adds:

As we consider information theory, it becomes apparent that this is what Freud is describing in the Project. His imaginary neurology, although based on what now seems utterly insufficient information, in fact goes straight to the heart of the matter. From his ‘paths’, ‘contact-barriers’ and excitations he constructs what Bateson calls ‘circuits of causation’, or what are now generally known as ‘logic circuits’. (Totton, 1998 p. 151, my italics)

The reformulation of the project of the ‘Project’

It is suddenly clear Totton is indeed moving towards a comprehensive reformulation of the project of the ‘Project’ but in terms of the experienced body rather than neurology. Earlier, he has remarked about one of Reich’s confident formulations concerning the ‘functional unity’ of the ‘ego’ and ‘id’ systems:

Reich believes that he has—in very Freudian style—seen through, pierced through faulty representations to the bodily heart of the matter. There is an uncomfortable triumphalism in all of this, reminiscent of Freud’s and Breuer’s ‘Preliminary Communication’; perhaps it always seems so simple at the start! But Reich’s involvement with the body-as-psyche is not simple-minded—despite his single-minded approach. (Totton, 1998, p. 96)

But, at the point we have now reached, in Totton’s enquiry, it dawns upon one that, if this is triumphalist, he too is ‘triumphalist’. But nor is Totton simple-minded. This very clear book has hidden depths which open up to us the deeper we explore it—open up in the way Freud’s own depth yields more and yet more, inexhaustibly. For it is clear that, under the guidance of Reich, but amplifying and ‘filling in the gaps’ with the work of later theorists, Totton has indeed revived the project of the ‘Project’ in transposed form, moving it from neurology to the whole body (including the brain) conceived as a psycho-physical—environmental whole. In effecting this he makes play with the relative non-location of the correlates of psychic phenomena, as broadly supported by modern neurology.

The argument up to this point is Reichian–energetic

We shall ask later, however, whether Totton, or Damasio, has given a hostage, in terms of the anti-dualistic project, in the appeal to the body as that to which reflexive reference back can be made, in order to make possible representation. It is an argument reminiscent of Freud’s in
'On narcissism' (Freud, 1984b), which precisely begins 'the turn to object relations', and the 'internal world'.

**Messianic triumphalism derivable from Freud and its liability to marginalisation**

An aside on 'triumphalism' and the scope of the Freudian vision. This 'triumphalism'—if such it be—is characteristic of what I shall call (modifying Bion, 1970) a messianic as opposed to a scholastic (see MacIntyre, 1990, pp. 154–155) recovery of Freud. It is a significant truth about Freud, to which we shall return, that he is repeatedly and inexhaustibly amenable to a messianic recovery of aspects of his insight by followers of genius. This inexhaustibility is a prime datum, of which we are exploring examples here.

Now, orthodox scholastic psychoanalysis is suspicious enough of messianic recoverers of Freud, even if they are International Psychoanalytic Association qualified analysts; it is normally a generation before they are assimilated to the 'orthodox mainstream', and then not fully, thus, for instance, Klein, Bion, Langs, Fairbairn, Lacan, Bowlby, Grotstein. If the innovator has been expelled from the International Psychoanalytic Association—which here forms the Church, which (Bion, 1970) is the normal base for the messianic innovator (as Heinlein illustrates in most unexpected fashion in *Stranger in a Strange Land*, 1992)—or has excluded themselves, or has simply never belonged, then they will be disregarded by the bulk of scholastic followers and commentators—the congregation of the faithful. (It is not that both 'scholasticisms', and 'congregations of the faithful' are not necessary and valid in any believing/enquiring community, including that of orthodox science—and, in any case, they are sheer anthropological realities. *But so are their consequences for the marginalised.*) Jung, Adler, Reich, Rank—probably Bowlby and Lacan as well—would be illustrations. Perls, Berne, Groddeck, Horney might illustrate transitional positions.

Those in this position will simply become prey to what Pirsig (1991) calls the 'culture-immune' system—they will simply not be seen. This is certainly allied to, and perhaps includes, the phenomenon Totton evokes (p. 19) of *Todscheiolen* ('Deathly Silence'), but it is a wider phenomenon, not just related in a simple way to repression and chronic shock, as Totton perhaps argues (p. 19), and not warranting or validating a purely 'paranoid' response. But this is why it is unlikely Totton will be read by most psychoanalysts.

**The statement of the core thesis**

I come now to Totton’s key statement and core thesis, which is as follows:

I propose to give (relatively) rigorous form to the popular notion of the ‘bodymind’, through a model (based on Bateson’s and Damasio’s work and that of other researchers in the fields of development and perception) of mind as necessarily manifest in and through body, and to suggest that the concept and experience of mind as disembodied, actually or potentially, is in fact dysfunctional. What follows from the inherent embodiment of mind is a correspondingly inherent ‘mentalisation’ of the body. Psychic processes are in fact widely distributed through the bodybrain system, because of the very nature of neurological activity. Among other things, the body remembers; in particular it remembers trauma. What also follows from this is that subjectivity is a bodily function, not primarily a linguistic one. Subjectivity is also a relational function, but relating occurs first of all through the body. (Totton, 1998, pp. 151–152).

We take this in conjunction with the earlier:
Information theory, particularly in Bateson’s hands, offers a materialist account of why this is so [why there is no cerebral localisation]—and thus renders unnecessary Freud’s invention of a specifically non-material topography of the psyche. ‘Mind’ is a phenomenon consisting of differences manifest (in the case of human beings) in the interaction of brain, body, and environment. Reich’s work, properly viewed, makes a crucial contribution towards understanding this interactive system, the energy of which is provided in large part by the musculature. (Totton 1998, p. 144)

Information, on the Bateson model, is incarnate in energetic systems.

And that incarnation is not a passive but an active process, an ‘interaction between parts’, as Bateson puts it. Freud realised that energy is part of mind, but he did not fully see why: because we need our bodies to think with.

This is, then, I believe, the solution to the question of ‘psychic energy’ which has taken up so many pages of analytic theory. Psychic energy is quite simply bodily, metabolic energy, as that energy involves itself in psychological processes. And ‘drive’ is that energy as perceived by, represented in, an alienated psyche. If Body is part of Mind, as Bateson shows, then the drives are the marks of that partaking. (Totton, 1998, p. 145, second italics mine)

A dramatic Reichian inversion of the Lacanian take on ‘drives’ as signifiers, indeed—which Totton has further elaborated in Chapter 6! And it is but a step—if it is a step, and Totton would hold it is not (c.f., for this, pp. 178–184, on character analysis, which leads naturally on to the political implications of Reich, since this is the point of entry of environmental demands and prohibitions, which we can only note in passing here)—from this Reichian view to Gestalt’s, that the active patterns, forms, gestalten, of our engagements at the contact boundary, and our learnt interruptions to them, are both historically and ongoingly embodied in our body—energetic configurations. To allow and enable the gestalt to unfold is to reenact the history of that ongoing embodiment in the present. This is the Reichian and Gestalt view of transference.

Wide implications of the bodymind view

Energy, and drives, rehabilitated; mind and difference grounded in our phenomenological being-in-the-world; language made secondary to embodiment; the unconscious (and transferential process) construed in terms of repression as a function of the body and the musculature; and embodiment as the means of reflexive self-reference, as the feedback process, which constitutes the process of thought and mind-in-relation; this is an inclusive unification indeed, and one truly regains from it a sense of how compelling, and also how genuinely psychoanalytic, in its own way, the Reichian vision is. But such inclusive unification has its prototype in Freud himself; though Reich and many others would not have known this, the finding of messianic implications in Freud repeats an essential Freudian movement. The proof came in 1950 in the letters to Fliess (Freud, 1950). In the light of these developments Totton is both more Freudian, and less Freudian, than he allows.

Freud’s own instant of unified vision

At one moment, then, in his development Freud experienced a sense of this sort of inclusiveness, in a passage which Totton, as well as Derrida (in a crucial paper—1978), quotes. In his letter to Fliess of 20 October 1895 (Freud, 1950), shortly after he had sent Fliess the draft ‘Project for a scientific psychology’ (Freud, 1950), we witness Freud’s own
brief ‘instant’ of ‘triumphalist’ confidence in the total neuropsychic unification he momentarily believed himself to have effected. Freud wrote

One strenuous night last week, when I was in the stage of painful discomfort in which my brain works best, the barriers suddenly lifted, the veils dropped, and it was possible to see from the details of neurosis all the way to the very conditioning of consciousness. Everything fell into place, the cogs meshed, the thing really seemed to be a machine which in a moment would run of itself. The three systems of neurons, the ‘free’ and ‘bound’ states of quantity, the primary and secondary processes, the main trend and the compromise trend of the nervous system, the two biological rules of attention and defence, the sexual determination of repression, and finally the factors determining consciousness as a perceptual function—the whole thing held together, and still does. I can hardly contain myself with delight. If I had only waited a fortnight before setting it all down for you. (Freud, 1950, p. 129)

Derrida: a different kind of apotheosis of the ‘Project’—difference as deferral


If we now turn to Derrida this is because, drawing upon the same vein of insight, he represents a radically different possible derivation from Freud, from which we can clarify what is missing from Totton’s version of the derivation—though this does not invalidate what is there. Derrida turns that 30-year delay into an apotheosis of his own kind of ‘triumphalism’. He too succumbs in his own way—as perhaps must anyone who has been gripped by the power of ‘Project for a scientific psychology’ (Freud, 1950), which the great neurologist, Karl Pribram (Pribram & Gill, 1976—incidentally, the reference in Totton’s book is omitted from the bibliography, one of a number of slapdash pieces of proof-reading and indexing) has called ‘a psychobiological Rosetta Stone’—to this ‘triumphalist’ spell of the ‘Project’. In the 30-year arc, from the ‘Project’ to ‘A note on the mystic writing pad’ (Freud, 1984d), Derrida (1978) sees enacted by Freud, in an archetypal form, and as a participant in the Western primal history of ‘writing’, his concept of primary writing.

In the passages I shall quote, Derrida is, in effect, saying that meaning is neither reducible to anything that is not meaning, nor does the reference of any of our meanings have a finite scope; they reverberate and cross-connect infinitely and openendedly, so that no frame of reference has any primacy except in context. Among other things this means that bodies are interactively meaningful within social sign systems, and so more ‘linguistic’ than Totton allows (as quoted above, Totton, 1998):

What also follows from this is that subjectivity is a bodily function, not primarily a linguistic one. Subjectivity is also a relational function, but relating occurs first of all through the body (p. 152).

Derrida calls all this ‘writing’ because writing is—much more clearly than speech—uprooted from its referential context, and becomes ‘free floating’, and reduplicable indefinitely. In contrast to the body, which is an actual individual identity in its being, ‘writing’ is not an individual—it is pure open-ended meaning within a network of meaning. In so far as the body is part of this it is not purely an individual either.

Thus Freud performs for us the scene of writing. Like all those who write. And like all who know how to write, he lets the scene duplicate, repeat, and betray itself within the scene. It is Freud then whom we will allow to say what scene he has
played for us. And from him that we shall borrow the hidden epigraph which has silently governed our reading. (Derrida, 1978, p. 229)

He then refers to those passages where Freud construes any kind of complex machinery in primary process thinking/expression as a representation of the genital apparatus. However, this inverts itself because previously the Freudian schema (including representations of sexuality) has been framed in terms of (the machinery of) the Mystic Pad. The ‘hidden epigraph’, then, is—as we should precisely expect from Derrida—a further ‘duplication’ and inversion, an ironic subversion of the standard ‘sexual interpretation’ Freudian framework!

How different, then, from the Reichian certainty of the body is Derrida’s inverted certainty of pure enacted deferral, postponement, and breaching/rupturing, displacement—(inversion of inversion, displacement of displacement)—all which Derrida places at the heart of the Freudian discovery! Derrida too invokes ‘difference’ (c.f., above, p. 8)—but how differently! It is almost the absolute inversion of the ‘pure presence’ in the individual body, of the Reichian conception.

It is thus the difference between breaches which is the true origin of memory, and thus of the psyche. Only this difference ‘enables a pathway to be preferred (Wegbevorzugung)’: ‘Memory is represented (dargestellt) by the differences in the facilitations in the Y-neurones’. We then must not say that breaching without difference is insufficient for memory; it must be stipulated that there is no pure breaching without difference. Trace as memory is not a pure breaching that might be reappropriated at any time as simple presence; it is rather the ungraspable and invisible difference between breaches. We thus already know that psychic life is neither the transparency of meaning nor the opacity of force but the difference within the exertion of forces. (Derrida, 1978, p. 201, my italics)

Yet in the last sentence—from the meaning/information end of the spectrum, rather than the Reichian energy end—a similar conception to Bateson’s feedback system model is invoked, but inverted. Here there is no unity of presence, as in the Reichian conception of what is at the heart of the ‘Project’; what there is is pure refusal of presence, of any primal unity. Reduplication without an original is all there is—recapitulation without an opening statement. Yet primal difference, in its own way, is as absolute a conception—and as Freudian in the sense of the ‘Project’—as primal unity. It is yet another one-sided finding, within the almost absolute irresolvable tension of the Freudian writings, of a single model—however all-embracing, and endlessly deferred and duplicated, a one. In that endless deferral, and indefinite refusal of any unitary meaning—deferral of meaning which is itself the meaning—the many Derridean texts returning to Freud still hover.

It is still deferred, into an inherent and unresolvable multiplicity of centres of significance, in ‘A note on the mystic writing pad’ (Freud, 1984d), Freud’s evocation, (30 years after the ‘Project’), in the context of his theory of the psyche, of the magic pad, from which one can erase what one has written, and then write it again, indefinitely, whilst it leaves permanent traces at another level, in which Derrida finds the culmination of Freud’s searchings in all these matters:

Writing is unthinkable without repression. The condition for writing is that there be neither permanent contact nor an absolute break between strata; [both] the vigilance and failure of censorship.—If there were only perception, pure permeability to breaching, there would be no breaches.—pure perception does not exist: we are written only as we write, by the agency within us which always already keeps watch over perception, be it internal or external. The ‘subject’ of writing does not exist, if we mean by that some sovereign solitude of the author. The subject of writing is a
system of relations between strata: the Mystic Pad, the psyche, society, the world. Within that scene, on that stage, the punctual simplicity of the classical subject is not to be found. (Derrida, 1978, pp. 226–227)

That is, the whole is an open-ended referential system, without a final individual reference, reference to an individual existent.

Once more, in the sentence,

The subject of writing is a system of relations between strata: the Mystic Pad, the psyche, society, the world.

there is a striking similarity to the Bateson–Damasio conception invoked by Totton. So, who has it right? Where does the systemic conception really take us? At any rate we can vividly see that the Freudian system—which had its (oh so brief!) moment of triumphalism of its own, its imagined ‘impossible moment’ of achieved totality, as if to tantalise all aftercomers by its very momentariness and impossibility!—can generate messianic unities of vision—indeinitely.

Derrida’s model as paradigm of meaning

This is complicated already, but let us be bold and take the risk of complicating matters further! In Derrida the accent is on meaning/information; in Totton/Bateson the accent is on energy (Ekeland, 1997, makes the same fundamental linkage), whilst Totton hardly mentions the paradigm of the meaning problematic in Freud, even the primary process/secondary process contrast, as understood in ‘Interpretation of dreams’ (Freud, 1999).

Three, not two, domains of process

But along with energy, and meaning, in Freud there is a third domain of process—that of support and identification (attachment theory, and Rogerian person-centred work, would be illustrations), to which Freud, not accidentally, has recourse in his third major phase, from the paper ‘On narcissism’ (Freud, 1984b) onwards. And this gives us the shape of the 30-year arc already mentioned. It contains a restlessness and tension Freud never resolves, and which enacts the tension of how to define the repression/repressed dualism (which translates back into meaning/energy) which is undoubtedly central from the ‘Project’ onwards. In this light Freud enacts the following circling, for all to see. (It coincides with his movement from—relatively—open scientific enquiry, to the invocation of the theological principle of authority in 1914, against Jung. Paradoxically, he deals with the ‘religious’ challenge of Jung by adopting a time-honoured theological–dogmatic stance. Yet, the ground of his core unification, which is the catalyst for the messianic unifiers who follow, is a secular vision in which science and religion are not at odds.)

I assume, then, three parallel (or horizontal) forms or realms of process: (1) energy, (2) support, and (3) meaning; in Freudian theory these turn into (1) drives, (2) trauma and identifications (trauma is most fully located here), and (3) significance. The Freudian circle is actually completed (over many years): i.e. energy to meaning, energy to support, and support to meaning. But this cannot be acknowledged overtly, as his system is not developed enough to accomodate it.

Linkage between energy (theory of drives) and meaning (theory of significance)

The link between these is fundamentally in terms of repression. The basic argument, devel-
oped in terms of the reflex arc model, is already there in the ‘Project’ (Freud, 1950). The schematic form of it runs as follows:

An impulse seeking discharge encounters an obstacle (‘trauma’). It becomes diverted, i.e. displaced, and seeks an alternative expression on the basis of a ‘recognised’ analogy between outlets.

The appeal to analogy is where meaning enters in on this model, and is vastly extended later. In ‘The interpretation of dreams’ (Freud, 1999) the two correlated concepts of displacement (alternative pathway, in the original model) and condensation (linkage by analogy, in the original model) become absolutely central—the forms of significance. The ‘primary process’/‘secondary process’ model is there fully developed as forms of thinking.

But in terms of the Reichian development, here Freud is still trying to map meaning onto neurones—only he no longer has them.

Linkage between energy (theory of drives) and support (theory of identifications)

By 1914, in response to the psychotic threat of Jung’s affirmation, as it were, of pure primary process thinking (in Jung’s theories of symbolic archetypal transformations in the psychotic or quasi-psychotic process), and because he feels he must locate or ground the meaning system of psychosis in a reference to an individual, Freud has assimilated the whole question (but not the answer) of how someone learns to be in relation to another, into his theoretical schema, thus: when a person encounters a rebuff at the hands of the other, the libidoinal energy turns back upon itself, and they take themselves as their own love object.

This then becomes the foundation, through identification, of the whole later metapsychology in ‘Mourning and melancholia’ and ‘The ego and the id’, and the other metapsychological papers and books (Freud, 1984a–d). The parallel to the earlier thinking about displacement is obvious.

But it is now a whole object relation (total situation) which is displaced.

Freud’s demand, against Jung, for a real correlate for psychotic regression is assumed by him to require a real existing object (person), whereas all that is needed is a real sensorily-based linguistic ground of the development of significance. (One wonders, in the light of Derrida’s ‘infinisation’ of the individual reference, would not Freud—and following him Lacan!—find Derrida as ‘psychotic’ as Jung?) Thus, Jaynes (1990) argues, in ways reminiscent of Wittgenstein (1967), that the very possibility of certain experiences is reflexive upon the development of language to a certain point—e.g. the invention of nouns, and then names, are needed to enable us to have the concept of death, bereavement, ancestors, and gods.

In terms of the Reichian development, here Freud is trying to map energy onto the body through identification/support.

In terms of our schema Totton’s argument (p. 8, above) that:

Freud realised that energy is part of mind, but he did not fully see why: because we need our bodies to think with. (Totton, 1998, p. 145)

is in one sense incorrect, for Freud (at around the time of the theory of narcissism, though, as so often, this develops something already expressed as far back as the ‘Project’, Freud, 1950, pp. 423–424, where the motor element in imitated speech is emphasised) in the paper on ‘The unconscious’ (1984a) recognises that we need our bodies to form the sounds of words as the bodily intermediary through which concepts are represented.

The system Ucs. contains the thing-cathexes of the objects’ the first and true object cathexes; the system Pcs. comes about by this thing-presentation being hyper-
cathedected through being linked with the word-presentations corresponding to it. It is these hypercathexes, we may suppose, that bring about a higher psychical organisation and make it possible for the primary process to be succeeded by the secondary process which is dominant in the Pcs.—word-presentations, for their part too, are derived from sense-perceptions, in the same way as thing-presentations are ... (Freud, 1984c, pp. 207–208)

To be sure, here this is sensory not motor—but not, as mentioned, in the ‘Project’. But the logic of the argument is the same, and therefore the Reich/Damasio/Totton argument about the body as intermediary is a Freudian argument.

In one sense certainly Totton is right as against Freud; in the sense of ‘body’ where we mean the psychophysical energetic whole, for Freud is not concerned with the reality of this. The truth is that the two arguments are fused together; but the epistemological argument about the necessity of the body as intermediary, for thinking and self-reference, is already in Freud. This argument goes back to Kant and is also in Wittgenstein (1967). What it amounts to is that mentality has to be mediated through located entities, though not as individuals, but as signs, which give it ‘reference’, functioning implicitly as sign systems. This gives us a social concept of mind, which can apply at any level of micro or macro functioning, whether neurone systems as in the ‘Project’, or the body as a social entity, or trans-individual collective signing systems, such as traffic signalling systems (Heidegger, 1961) or the 6000 individually activated pixels (one person/one pixel) controlling a giant screen, which jointly enacted an airliner landing or a ping-pong match at a large computer conference (Wilson, 1997). None of these has any special priority. In general they go with a Wittgensteinian concept of mind as social—but this ‘social’ includes our ‘internal worlds’, also. The location in the individual person and their individual body has no special priority in this argument.

To return in the light of this to Freud’s demand, not only is this, Freud’s demand, against Jung, for a real individual correlate for psychotic regression, not necessary for his purposes; it is not sufficient either, since it still does not, by itself, without further linkages being made, account for the nature of language as sensory sign, for representation and reference and the presence of meaning as such—the Derridean recognition. However, Freud at the same period did attain this in the related (though very terse) formulations which we have touched upon. It is arguable, then, that, as Fairbairn (1952) perhaps implies, Freud has accounted for depression here in the ‘Narcissism’ papers, but not schizophrenia; however, the formulations in ‘The unconscious’ are the most valuable things he ever wrote on schizophrenia.

Thus, if the body is so central we are beginning to glimpse that the body, as a source of reflexive reference, may here be meant in more than one sense—for instance, the body and its experience as ‘socially’ referential-symbolic as opposed to its ‘direct’ (non-symbolic) functioning, and identity, as this individual body. And perhaps, crucially, Totton’s argument, and similar arguments, plays on this ambiguity. Thus, in the sentences from above, in the core argument:

What also follows from this is that subjectivity is a bodily function, not primarily a linguistic one. Subjectivity is also a relational function, but relating occurs first of all through the body. (Totton, 1998, p. 152)

Here, at the heart of his argument, the reference to ‘linguistic’ slides over the issue of whether the body ‘refers’, or ‘means’, in the sense of signifying. And, is being ‘relational’ referential, or not? Thus, Daniel Stern’s ‘intersubjective self’ (Stern, 1985) is not linguistic, but it is intentional, and embeds a concept or reference to the other’s subjectivity. Totton shows uneasiness on this type of issue in a number of ways, of which the following is only one:

However, the bodily phenomena with which Reich is concerned here are not
signifiers; they have no communicative purpose at all. They lack the arbitrary quality which is essential to the Saussurian notion of signification—they are still essentially discharge phenomena. (Totton, 1998 p. 127)

This misses the whole dimension of psychic writing—of what Stern is concerned with when he talks of ‘proto-narrative envelopes of temporal experience’ (Stern, 1995). If Reich is right in saying the body’s expression cannot lie (c.f. Totton, 1998, p. 171), then Wittgenstein would ask whether, in that case, it can tell the truth either (Wittgenstein, 1967, p. 90c). And Totton’s fascinating recounting of Reich’s case history of the man who identified successively with the fish and then the ape (pp. 107–112) clearly indicates (pp. 160–163) (certainly along with the body realisations, and with Kristeva’s semiotic chora, i.e. her concept of what is transitional to the sign) a dimension of embodied historical narrative (and proto-narrative) meaning, unfolding through the communicative process of the work, in a way which is fundamentally not different, apart from the lack of the body dimension, from the unfolding reconstructed narratives, and proto-narratives, of classical psychoanalysis and their humanistic equivalents.

To clarify all of this we must turn to the question of the identificatory processes involved in the ‘turn to object relations’, and their relation to meaning systems.

**Linkage between support (theory of identifications) and meaning (theory of significance)**

Gradually, via this development of the notion of libido turned back upon the self, Freud implicitly realises—the implicit proof is in the endless reflexive biographical–historical involutions and duplications of ‘Beyond the pleasure principle’ (Freud, 1984c), analysed by Derrida (1987)—that meaning is reflexively mapped into the process of interacting identities itself. That is, the transference and transference process now becomes ‘the royal road’ to the unconscious meaning. Dreams are enacted in the session, or in children’s play, as well as psychotic or quasi-psychotic phantasy. The psyche, in its social relations, becomes the scene of multiple inscriptions (Derrida, 1978)—inscriptions upon lower level inscriptions—all reflexively enacted in complex totality in the transferential process. It all becomes an enacted Lebenswelt, lifeworld, in the mode of existential phenomenology.

In the light of our earlier comments, the open-endedness of transference inherently transcends specific situational reference; it is inherently partly ‘general’, and this is the source of its ‘feeling of unreality’. The now completely open-ended reflexivity may be one motivation for the mysteriousness of the movements of drive theory—the last ditch attempt to put all the eggs in the basket of ‘drives’—in ‘Beyond the pleasure principle’ (Freud, 1984c; see Derrida, 1987).

At this point we have reached, now, in terms of the Reichean development, there is only an indefinite situational reflexivity: the total relational situation.

This is not confined to actuality, and actuality’s reduplicated patterned inscription in multitudinous forms (including all the enactments in the body, which is one reason why classical analysis is grossly over-circumscribed in its conceptions of transference/countertransference), but is also caught or inscribed in an indefinite and endless network of significances.

Thus the Freudian circle is actually completed: i.e. energy to meaning, energy to support, and support to meaning. But the residual Freudian (and Reichian) formulations are still primarily in terms of energy, a formulation which is dashed repeatedly on the shores of the further reaches of meaning in ‘Beyond the pleasure principle’, and which can no longer remotely do justice to the relational–existential significance—which, in turn, is the reason why, however, in
their reality never made explicit reality, the conceptions of this last period of his work remain so compelling.

No ‘project’-type model of relational–existential significances

Unless Derrida’s mentioned commentary on ‘Beyond the pleasure principle’ in *The Postcard* (1987) is it, there is, as far as I at present know, no ‘triumphal model’ derived from the ‘Project’ in this *third form*—that of significances mapped on to relational/transferential transformations as such. If the vast exploration of projective identification in Searle’s (1978, 1993) work had been mapped with the relational precision of a Fairbairn (1952) that might be it—unless Matte-Blanco, whom I have only just begun to study, has done just this (Matte-Blanco, 1998); but I am beginning to think he may not have made the step to socially embedded relational meaning, despite the extraordinary insight of his work into the nature of the *reflexively generalising* aspect of psychoanalytic insight—yet another one-sided messianic extrapolation of genius from Freud! There certainly, however, *could* be a model in this third mode. Our conclusion is that the body is incurably social—and that means incurably pervaded and laden with significances.

There is no reason why Reich’s embodied energy should not be included in this. But this cannot be *exhaustively* understood in terms of embodied energy.

Meaning, the symbolic, and intentionality, as *intrinsic*, open-ended, categories, come back in. And, if *intentionality* comes back in we are faced with the problem of the possible *pure reflexivity* of intentionality—the Cartesian or Husserlian *epoché*, the epistemological suspension of (belief in) the reality of the physical world. I am not saying there is no answer to Descartes here; but there is no *simple* knock-out. In this sense there is, in fact, a classic crypto-Cartesian fishiness about the ‘mutual brain–body interactions’ that Tutton quotes from as referred to by Damasio (1996, p. 147) in his anti-Cartesian book!

> a normal mind will happen only if those circuits [developed by evolution] contain *basic representations of the organism.* (Damasio, 1996, quoted by Totton, 1998, p. 147, my italics)

For once there is an autonomous realm of representations, however deeply derived from embodied experience, all the Cartesian problems and challenges return.

In illustration, in Totton’s two key paragraphs on pp. 151–152 he slides from the physical to the phenomenological body, as follows:

> Psychic processes are in fact widely *distributed* through the body–brain system, because of the very nature of neurological activity. [My comment: so this is the *physical* body–brain system—the neurological system as a whole.] Among other things, the body *remembers* in particular it remembers trauma. [Comment: here, suddenly we switch to the *phenomenological* body.] (Totton, 1998, p. 152)

Descartes is not eliminated so easily!

Conclusion

The movement mapped here is: energy is transformed into represented meaning located in the individual body; but this requires the infinitisation, and de-individualisation, of the embodied meaning and its reflexive potential; which in turn requires its incurable and irreducible sociality. The last two steps are at best assumed to be present in the first in Totton, and are not unpacked.
However, Nick Totton does evoke Reich’s rehabilitation, through embodiment, of Freud’s drive theory, magnificently. And, like so many messianic claimings of Freud, it remains a magnificent part-truth. How tragic that it will probably not be read by the orthodox, and that they will miss, yet again, what a tribute it is to the genius of Freud to be so fertile of magnificent part-truth reconstructions! Nick Totton has given us, both in what we disagree with and in what we agree with, a marvelous reminder of that fertility. This is a great Freudian book.

References


support (ou relation, par ex. théorie d’attachement) et l’identification sociale est reconnue comme étant le véhicule de la signification. Ceci représente la troisième phase de Freud—pas totalement explicite—où sa vision devient simultanément incurablement sociale tout en étant cependant aussi une explosion imbuee de signification transformante du Moi à tous les niveaux! Ceci n’est pas incompatible avec la vision incarnée de Totton, mais transcende ses limites. Totton est une profession de foi Freudienne magnifiquement claire et qui nous force tous à clarifier nos positions.