'The Muse as Therapist: A Platonic Paradigm for Knowledge in Psychotherapy': Methodological Commentary on ‘The Muse as Therapist: A New Poetic Paradigm for Psychotherapy’, for Final Submission for Metanoia Institute Doctorate in Psychotherapy by Professional Studies

“Inconsistencies,” answered Imlac, “cannot both be right; but, imputed to man, they may both be true.” (Samuel Johnson, *Rasselas, Prince of Abyssinia*)

_The Muse as Therapist,_. .... seemed at first re-reading to resemble an unfinished giant size jigsaw puzzle: the church spire on the village green is clearly there, and so is the pond, and the cottage on the green, and the cricketers playing in the middle, - but how all these elements were organised in relation to one another, so that I could complete the jigsaw, that was not by any means yet clear! (Heward Wilkinson)

Contents

Abstract

I. Prelude P.3
   Schema of ‘The Muse as Therapist’ P.10
   Schema of Methodological Commentary P. 11

II. First dimension: Poetic and the Literary Dimension P. 12

III. Second Dimension: the Philosophy Dimension P. 26

IV. Third dimension: The Psychotherapy Dimension P. 38

V. Putting the pieces together: completing the Development P. 55

VI. Notes on my participation in Professional Knowledge Seminars P. 58

VII. Future Developments and Applications P. 62

References

Appendices

A. Presentation to Cambridge Conference ‘Revaluing Leavis’: *Leavis’s Concept of Enactment as a Multidisciplinary Paradigm*

B. Presentation to European Association for Integrative Psychotherapy Conference 2009: *A Tale Told by an Idiot: Poetry, or Science, for a broken World? (The Ill-Starred War of Paradigms of Integration and of Psychotherapy)*

C. Review of *The Muse as Therapist* by Richard Waugamann in *Brief Chronicles*

D. RAL 4 and 5 Submission
Abstract of

‘The Muse as Therapist: A Platonic Paradigm for Psychotherapy’
Methodological Commentary on The Muse as Therapist: A New Poetic Paradigm for Psychotherapy - by Heward Wilkinson

This commentary on The Muse as Therapist takes the form of an interwoven, two aspect, account of my core conception. One aspect is exposition and synopsis of the concept as it is developed in the book. The other aspect, grounding it in its full context of how it emerged in my personal journey, is the historical-personal (heuristic enquiry) account of how the vision developed in its three aspects, literary, philosophical, and psychotherapeutic, with an account of how it crystallised into clarity in my participation in the Metanoia Doctorate by Professional Studies.

The core concept is that of enactment, formulated by FR Leavis (The Common Pursuit, 1952/62), which I develop as a concept applying, in triangular three aspect mode (i) the poetic/dramatic dimension of (ii) psychotherapeutic process, articulated (iii) in a philosophical account, one which is, complementarily, grounded in the irreducible apprehension of enactivity in its poetic-psychotherapeutic character. Enactment is not an empirical, but a philosophical-aesthetic concept, of wide scope, involving the a priori of temporality within particular process and context, in its aspect of iterability. Something as simple as the repeatability, with difference, of a joke, would be an illustration. I argue thus it runs counter to empirical epistemologies, even qualitative enquiry, though much qualitative enquiry tacitly presupposes it. It is not the psychoanalytic concept, which, rather, is tantamount to re-enactment.

This developed for me as follows: First, my earliest pathway, literature and literary criticism (1960-1966 approx), consisted of the apprehension, acquisition, and development (but not the application) of the poetic paradigm, and the concept of enactment, as such. Secondly, I articulated a vision and philosophy of the enactive human world, generated from within that, but, guided by Kant more than any other thinker, now extended it into the realm of ontological philosophy (1966-1990 approx). This began to give the poetic paradigm a meta-framework, giving the ‘different way of thinking’ a philosophical grounding, (primarily in terms of the Kantian conception of ‘imagination’ and its derivatives). Thirdly, my gradually developing experience of the process of psychotherapy, as it crystallised, tended more and more towards a process dialogicism amounting almost to experimental theatre, and for which I persistently, with only partial success, sought a paradigm (from 1990, approximately, to, approximately, 2007). Fourthly, when the poetic paradigm did emerge from right under my nose, this revealed itself in the course of the Doctorate also as the solution to the unresolved questions of the reconciliation of poetry and philosophy.

Psychotherapy revealed itself as a living poetic and creative process, enacted in the here and now of the present moment, which could be ‘caught in the arc-lights’ in an unprecedented way. And yet, as enactment, and as iterability, it was also intrinsically a re-enactment of the past in the now, and a projection of the future. The account is related to previous phases of Doctoral submissions; an account of developments putting into practice this concept in many wider contexts is included.
I. Prelude

For ease of reference, I have included links in text of all of my papers mentioned in
the text, which are to be found on my website:
http://hewardwilkinson.co.uk/papers.htm

This is the story of the evolution of my vision, to the point where it became possible
to express it in my book, The Muse as Therapist: a New Poetic Paradigm for
Psychotherapy (Wilkinson, 2009a). In the course of this exploration, it makes explicit
the methodological implications.

It is a retrospective account, which seemingly adds elements which are not in the
book, but they are the account of the pathway of the discovery of the paradigms I put
forward in the book, and are therefore a retrospective elucidation of the implicit
elements of the book as product. I explore the impact the Doctorate itself, and its
Professional Knowledge component, had upon my pathway, mainly in Part V of this
Commentary, but touch on it earlier where appropriate, as I proceed. The chapters of
this book are as follows:

Introduction: Discovering the poetic mystery at the heart of psychotherapy: an
unexpected personal journey

Chapter One: Therapy is Poetry

Chapter Two: A Therapeutic Dialogue

Chapter Three: Poetry or existence? – poetry dialogues with philosophy dialogues
with poetry

Chapter Four: Reality, Existence, and the Shakespeare Authorship Question:
King Lear, Little Dorrit, and the man who was Shakespeare

Part I: ‘The courtier's, soldier's, scholar's, eye, tongue, sword;
The expectancy and rose of the fair state’

Part II: The Author of Shakespeare and King Lear and Little Dorrit

Chapter Five: Poetry and Objectivity: Poetic enactment and propositional truth

Part I: Poetic as enactment

Part II: Kant’s pioneering evocation of imagination and the social-modal nature of
the self

Chapter Six: Epilogue: The Poetry and Politics of Psychotherapy
The pursuit of a unifying multidisciplinary concept, the Poetic Paradigm, relating the three aspects of poetry, psychotherapy, and philosophy, in terms of the concept of enactment, organises this list of contents.

In what follows I attempt gradually to unfold this complex vision into explicitness, making sense, by way of commentary, of its evolution in my understanding. Grasping it is a ‘eureka’ recognition, and, though it can easily be summarised, the summary in turn cannot be grasped without the ‘eureka’.

The initial technical (abstract, basic and unqualified) summary is:

Understanding psychotherapy process and poetry in terms of enactment means taking literally and fully the concept of the ‘total situation’ (Joseph, 1991), in its being enacted firstly, as a totality, and secondly, as inherently replicable, iterable, in its enactability. The iterability, - which is always a modification, but against a background of iteration, - is the Platonic element which I acknowledge as irreducible. There are no original facts, or data, only iterability (Derrida, 1988). To grasp it as enactment, and as enactable, in this sense of enactment - not the more restricted psychoanalytic sense (c.f., e.g., Mann and Cunningham, Eds.) - has far-reaching implications, which I discuss below.

I found, retrospectively, to my initial surprise, that my imaginative and spiritual development, through which I developed the central concepts I have now unified, had taken a quite clear definite three-phase form, demarcated as historic steps. I was not able to unify them until all the steps were in place. I understood the problem, only when in a position to solve it. I only then realised how clear-cut the development is.

The retrospective unification is an emergent process. This became manifest, to my own astonishment, since I had not clearly realised this, when I actually began to tell the story of my writing of the book. I had expected that to be a mere few pages, but it inexorably became, and emerged as, the methodological synthesis as a whole. In this, indeed, it replicated as an enactment the process of the writing of the book, especially the Shakespeare chapter, chapter 4, the chapter which - fittingly - seized ‘centre stage’ in the writing of the book. The concept with which I emerged in clarified form is thus shown here enactively in its process of genesis.

It is a story of how I learnt to apply insights, which I already had in my hands, and which then, belatedly, became obvious to me. But it was an obviousness which was all too much right under my nose, which I therefore could not see, or disregarded. I was inclined to interpret this as lack of courage to be aware, when it was really, I believe now, simply more about my actually not fully seeing significance. When someone ‘gets’ this concept it commonly comes to seem immediately obvious to them also; ‘ah that’s what you mean, why didn’t you say?’ Once grasped, it is a simple concept. It is one, further, which bears affinities to many familiar concepts, but it is also extremely comprehensive, combinatory, possessed of vast implications.

It combines:

i. an account of the a priori (Platonic) character of the temporal process of psychotherapy, in philosophical terms; with
ii. an account of the poetic/narrative/dramatic analogy for psychotherapy (by itself a fairly familiar one); and with  

iii. an extended, and philosophically grounded, conception of ‘enactment’, as foundational concept;  

iv. a three-aspect, non-reductive, ‘existential-phenomenological’, account of the dimensions of psychotherapy; and,  

v. an account which incorporates a recognition of intentional or phenomenological causality (Wilkinson, 1998, 1999, RAL 4 submission).  

vi. a potential historical-philosophical account of the scope of this conception, some of which is given an initial exploration in my book.

This is a scope which grounds psychotherapy in its historical-philosophical background, and validates it itself as an autonomous contributor to a multi-disciplinary understanding of human existence. So this conception is a candidate for being a comprehensive model or paradigm of psychotherapy qua psychotherapy, putting it in its historical-existential context, releasing it from the imperative to conform to any secondary scientific paradigm as if that were the primary one.

Next, because emergence also is an enactment, the story of my development is reflexively an illustration of the model I am articulating (as is the book).

Therefore also it is the best and most penetrating way into the methodological implications of my model. In its idiosyncratic pathway, it illustrates the peculiar mode or process of discovery which has been named ‘heuristic enquiry’ by Moustakas (Moustakas, 1990), which he conceives, broadly speaking, as an empirical mode of enquiry. Moustakas in effect takes phenomenology and gives it an empirical flavour. Of course I mostly agree with his descriptive account of the process of enquiry, which is an accurate and poignant evocation of this mode. I just don’t think he has drawn the philosophical conclusions which are required.

He summarises the characteristics of a good heuristic research question as follows:

1. It seeks to reveal more fully the essence or meaning of a phenomenon of human experience.  

2. It seeks to discover the qualitative aspects, rather than the quantitative dimensions, of the phenomenon.  

3. It engages one’s total self and evokes a personal and passionate involvement and active participation in the process.  

4. It does not seek to predict or to determine causal relationships.  

5. It is illuminated through careful descriptions, illustrations, metaphors, poetry, dialogue, and other creative renderings rather than by measurement, ratings, and scores. (Moustakas, 1990, p. 42)  

Here the standard omission of the recognition of intentional or phenomenological causation, protecting the standard ‘apartheid’ conception (even Derrida subscribes to it, c.f., Derrida, 1962/1989, Wilkinson, 1997) of the enclave of qualitative or hermeneutic-phenomenological enquiry, is an indicator that Moustakas is operating within the tacit agreement that causal questions are to be left to science. Thus a priori insight cannot impinge on the realm of human actualities. I challenged this in my account of phenomenological causality (Wilkinson, 1998, and RAL 4 submission).
My own view of heuristic enquiry is that it is actually an implicit account of enactment, that the enactment concept enables us to see what heuristic enquiry is, rather than the other way around, and that it is not, in any ordinary sense, empirical. In this mode is inherent the mixed ‘a priori of the particular’ mode of research I have developed (which dissolves the empirical/a priori antithesis, and has intentional-causal implications). I touch later on overlaps with narrative concepts presented in the Professional Knowledge Seminars.

Heuristic enquiry, (diegetic narrative, in Aristotle’s terms, Aristotle trans Butcher, 1997), then, essentially refers back, in itself and as such, to enactment (mimesis, in Aristotle’s terms, Aristotle trans Butcher, 1997), and in its enactive character lies that in it which transcends qualitative empirical enquiry.

So, the conception I am developing, have developed, is one which is a phased and multidisciplinary reconciliation of the following elements.

Firstly my earliest pathway, literature and literary criticism (1960-1966 approx), consisted of the apprehension, acquisition, and development (but not the application) of the poetic paradigm, and the concept of enactment, as such.

Secondly, I articulated a vision and philosophy of the enactive human world, which was generated from within that, but - guided by Kant more than any other thinker - now extended it into the realm of ontological philosophy (1966-1990 approx). It began to give the poetic paradigm (which was not, of course, called that then) a meta-framework, began to give the ‘different way of thinking’ a philosophical grounding, (primarily in terms of the Kantian conception of ‘imagination’ and its derivatives).

Thirdly, my gradually developing experience of the process of psychotherapy, as it crystallised, tended more and more towards a process dialogism amounting almost to experimental theatre, and for which I persistently, with only partial success, sought a paradigm (from 1990, approximately, to, approximately, 2007).

Fourthly, then, in turn, - when the paradigm did emerge from right under my nose, as recounted in part V, - this revealed itself also as the solution to the unresolved questions of the reconciliation of poetry and philosophy.

Psychotherapy turned out to be the mediator between the, as it were, more static or previously ‘given’ worlds of philosophy and poetry. It revealed itself as a living poetic and creative process, enacted in the here and now of the present moment, which could be ‘caught in the arc-lights’ in an unprecedented way. And yet, as enactment, and as iterability, it was also intrinsically a Platonic re-enactment of the past in the now, and a projection of the future.

It became the laboratory of belief transformations and juxtapositions, in enactment’s transitional space, the ‘as if’ (Wilkinson, 2002a, 2002b). Caught in the paradoxical amber of the remembered/re-lived present moment, it was simultaneously the realisation of the implicit and infinite totality, both contingent and a priori.

Psychotherapy turned out unexpectedly to be truly a throw-back, a coelacanth, a beautiful living fossil.
It was an enactment and revivification of what poetry is, as, conversely, poetry is a crystallisation of what it is. I had inadvertently stumbled into the solution to the problem - and it was right on my own doorstep. The puzzling aspect of the excesses of psychotherapy - escalating, in the hands of charismatic gurus in the psychotherapy field, the Perlses, the Morenos, the Milton Ericksons, the Hellingers, into a sort of ersatz bardic epiphany - suddenly settled down into their ordinary and natural context, revealing their hidden bardic roots.

For, in this evolution, it gradually became clearer and clearer to me that psychotherapy was and is a dramatic process and a narrative process - a poetic process. And, of course, vice versa. The poetic process is psychotherapeutic, and a great poem, or poetic drama, is a psychotherapy, both for poet, and for hearer/reader.

And this went, at the least, a very long way to solving the philosophical problems I had struggled with for so many years.

\textit{Nel mezzo del cammin di nostra vita} \\
\textit{mi ritrovai per una selva oscura} \\
\textit{ché la diritta via era smarrita.} \\
\textit{Ahi quanto a dir qual era è cosa dura} \\
\textit{esta selva selvaggia e aspra e forte} \\
\textit{che nel pensier rinova la paura!} (Dante, Inferno)

But at this point of crystallisation, my vision eventually converged with that which I had articulated, and had had articulated for me, long ago, and it all came together.

This is what I am mapping here, and it was substantially catalysed by the process of the Metanoia Doctorate, - for the final process of crystallisation, though long-prepared, only took place within its aegis. In a modest way, it is a Koestler-like account of ‘an act of creation’ (Koestler, 1964)

But what boa constrictor twists and turns there were, on the gigantic detours I had to make, ‘ché la diritta via era smarrita’. And how hard it is to shake off the coils of the empirical paradigm.

I gradually came to realise how comprehensive the implications of this insight are.

In particular, I connected it with an old Hegelian intuition that \textit{language, too, in itself and as such}, is revealed as inherently aporetic and poetic. The very language we use is shot through with this aspect. Language itself is enactment, transcending itself in enacting. This enactivity, in an infinite context, is the underlying meaning of
Derrida’s much misunderstood *il n’y a de hors texte* (‘there is no outside-text’, Derrida, 1967/1976), with huge implications for the future I have only just begun to explore. I give a partial account of this in the philosophical development section.

The very language in which our entire self-understanding is immersed, itself, is a key manifestation of poetic transformation. Human meaning, to be sure, is not confined to language, but linguistic intentionalit*y* is our primary medium of social or public access to the world, and uses the paradigm of objectivity as *imaginative metaphor* to acquire its own identity, as Kant first substantially realised (Kant, 1781/1964, Strawson, 1966, Wilkinson, 2009a), which Hegel profoundly developed, till it included a concept of the *metaphoric genesis of intersubjectivity* (Hegel, 1807/1979).

The objective world, together with consciousness, *itself* becomes, in effect, a poem, an enactment, in Kant’s hands.

As he also partially grasped, which again Hegel much developed (Hegel, 1807/1979), in so doing, it, enactively and experientially, brings into being the *aporetic contradictoriness* of the human world, which then takes up the object-language as *metaphor*, with all its vast implications for our impossible and tragic existence.

For the purposes of this commentary, I briefly epitomise all this in an initial way, with a very accessible, and teasingly funny, example, that of the notorious type of graffito paradox:

For instance, the graffito which reads, ‘DO NOT READ THIS!’ (Kamuf, in Derrida, Ed. P. Kamuf, 1991).

What happens here is that to understand the graffito, of course, we have already to have disobeyed it. And that is also what makes us chuckle!

Intrinsically, of its essence, we cannot attempt to obey it, without *ipso facto* having disobeyed it. It is a classic double bind, enacted, essentially enacted, only graspable as enactment, as what it is, and it is a classic self-reference. In the terms of Aristotle’s *Poetics* (Aristotle trans Butcher, 1997), or Girard’s (Girard, 1987) terms, we cannot avoid the enactive mimesis/participatory intentionality required to grasp this.

In using this illustration, all I want to point out is that it is in the nature of the acquisition of language and mentality, that it becomes possible *for us* (though with enormous difficulty) to hold the contradictions, enactively, *in our minds*, without our *minds* being annihilated. Our minds can contain oppositions, they are enactive, they are not pure ‘in-themselves’ entities.

If Girard (1987, following Aristotle, trans. Butcher, 1997) is right in thinking that hominisation, (the process by which reflective man emerged from animal existence), essentially depends on mimesis, as Hegel confirmed profoundly, in his own way, in the Lordship/Vassal analysis (Hegel, 1807/1979), - the pioneering object relations analysis, - *we* can say, from the position of the poetic paradigm, that mimesis/enactment is the mental co-existence of contradictions, or of *complementarities and opacities which are possible contradictions* (which also brings into play a more positive element than Girard formally allows into the ambiguous
phenomenon of mimesis). In Keats’s terms, from which I draw so deeply in my book, it is negative capability:

I had not a dispute but a disquisition, with Dilke on various subjects; several things dove-tailed in my mind, and at once it struck me what quality went to form a Man of Achievement, especially in Literature, and which Shakespeare possessed so enormously - I mean Negative Capability, that is, when a man is capable of being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and reason-Coleridge, for instance, would let go by a fine isolated verisimilitude caught from the Penetrarium of mystery, from being incapable of remaining content with half-knowledge. This pursued through volumes would perhaps take us no further than this, that with a great poet the sense of Beauty overcomes every other consideration, or rather obliterates all consideration. (John Keats Letter to George and Tom Keats, 21 Dec. 1817, Keats, Ed. MB Forman, 1947a, my italics)

This is something which our minds find extremely hard to tolerate without recourse, at some level, to both scapegoating, and to objectification.

The core implicit background philosophical-anthropological question of deconstruction (which connects profoundly with feminist theory, Marxist theory, stigma theory, psychoanalysis, and the theory of marginalisation and institutionalisation - Goffman, 1974 - in a variety of connections) is:

Is objectification itself a form of scapegoating? a drive to avoid, by scapegoating, the contradictory aporetic nature of existence? Is our profound belief drive, our drive to belief certainty, such a scapegoating avoidance?

This is a question which comes alive once one thinks within the framework of enactment, enactment which is also, in Aristotle and Keats, mimesis, and which is in effect taken up in Kant (1781/1964), as his theory of constructive imagination, as I illustrate below. Scapegoating and objectification annuls the understanding of tolerated contradictoriness implicit in being self-accepting mind, which, as already touched upon, Keats (1947a, Ed. MB Forman) indicates in his comments about ‘negative capability’. Conversely, enactment in the Platonic sense transforms them into full symbolisation, embracing oppositions potentially into a fusion and unity. This, now, takes us right into the first step of my development.

At this point, for ease of overview, I insert two schemas, of the book, and of this essay on how I developed it.
Schema of *The Muse as Therapist*

Enactment as the core meta-concept which unifies the multidisciplinary project

Enactment comprises

i. precommunicability (embodied preconceptual enactivity);

ii. textual/contextual cross-referencing and cross-connectivity;

iii. the relational field, intersubjectivity

Chapter 1 introduces the paradigm through the relationship of *poetry* and *therapy*

Chapter 2 shows how the metaphoric cross-connectivity and enactivity comes alive in the *therapy* process

Chapter 3 on Heidegger shows how the supreme exposition of the existential *a priori* position in *philosophy* has to embrace the particularity and connectivity which is exemplified in *poetry*

Chapter 4 illustrates and applies the paradigm to the specific case and problematic of the relationship between the author Shakespeare and his *poetic drama*

Chapter 5 expounds the metaconcept of enactment/enactivity, shows how it is at work in Daniel Stern’s exposition of *psychotherapy*, then how this comes to life in Kant’s *philosophy* thesis of imaginative synthesis, which opens the way to the integration of *philosophy*, *psychotherapy* and *poetry* in a multi-model social-existential concept of the self which reworks the later Freudian conception
Schema of ‘The Muse as Therapist: A Platonic Paradigm for Psychotherapy’
Methodological Commentary on the writing of The Muse as Therapist

1962 (age 17) – 1967
Phase I: Poetry and Literature

1962-1964
Discovery of the Keatsian/Shakespearean understanding of enactive dramatic-aesthetic interdependence of all human qualities

1964-1967
FR Leavis:
Discovery of Enactment as the performative mode of poetry, drama and the novel

1966 (age 21) – 1990 approx
Phase II: Starting to Grasp Philosophical models of Enactment

1966-1969
Discovery of Kantian philosophy: the Imaginative Enactive Experiential Structuring of the Human World
The Kantian insight into difference

1968-1990
Hegel, Nietzsche, and Heidegger: developing the Kantian insights to include embodied intersubjective will or intentionality

Remaining problems: i. Particularity of symbolic-narrative meaning of experience
ii. Residual problematic of inanimate universe beyond our perceptual intersubjectivity

1986 approx (age 41) – 2008 (63)
Phase III: Psychotherapy towards Enactment
Jung: Symbolic Things versus Enacted Total Dramatic Situations: the implication I did not yet grasp

Recognition of Explanatory Connection without Explanatory Reduction
Insights developed through UKCP: Pluralism; Generic Meta-Modality; Broad Spectrum Integration;
Recognition of Silence as opening up the awareness of Enactment
Philosophy and Psychotherapy converging – with new Book and Author Discoveries

2003 – 2008
Phase IV: Crystallising the Vision in the Doctorate, reincorporating Literature
The concept of dynamic patterning as the core psychodynamic discovery

Attempt i. Story and Process
Attempt ii. Episodes and Scenes (Enactment half grasped and yet missed)
Attempt iii. Existential Formulation
Attempt iv. Dissolving the Fact/Fiction antithesis
v. Success: Poetry is Therapy: realised in the concept of Enactment

Phase V: Present: Literary, Philosophical, and Psychotherapeutic Expansions of the Concept
II. First dimension: Poetic and the Literary Dimension

The conjunction of Negative Capability, the vision of plurality of perspectives, and the tragic sense of the whole, as I already partly articulated in Episodes and Scenes (Wilkinson, 2005a), was, in combination, a sense I had acquired by the age of seventeen, in 1962.

This happened especially through my engagement with the writings of John Keats, study of Keats’s evolution and development (Keats, Ed. MB Forman, 1947, Murry, 1925), and those of Dr Samuel Johnson, and James Boswell (c.f., Wilkinson, 2005a).

In Episodes and Scenes (http://hewardwilkinson.co.uk/EpisodesandScenes.pdf) my RPL submission for the Doctorate, I had glimpsed synoptically the understanding I attained explicitly two years later in my book, but did not yet realise what I had grasped. It is, indeed, a graphic illustration of how one may grasp enactively long before one can name (or rather, fully apprehend, for paradoxically I did mainly name it in Episodes and Scenes - but could not hold on to it; I was, as it were, sleepwalking) what one has grasped explicitly.

I cannot here go further back to what, in turn, enabled me to reach this point by the age of seventeen; that is a further story, but there certainly is one. It has to do with my discovery, during adolescence at English public schools, of the realities of evil, alienation, and hypocrisy, which released me from trust in the goodness of life, and from being able to trust the moral authority of those who were in charge of us. I have told a fragment of this story - an episode whose significance on-goingly continues to unfold, inexhaustibly, for me, even in dreams - in Episodes and Scenes (Wilkinson, 2005a, §10, p. 9 http://hewardwilkinson.co.uk/EpisodesandScenes.pdf).

The ‘negative capability’/tragic sense of the whole, vision was developed into a full awareness of enactment, the poetic paradigm, through my experience of the teaching, of the mind and influence, of the, now almost forgotten, but then both famous, and notorious and controversial, literary critic, Dr FR Leavis at Cambridge, and later (Leavis, 1952/1962, 1969, c.f., the recent event: http://www.alumni.cam.ac.uk/events/date/?event=EV200908280004.xml&cat=,*&radar=0, to which I contributed, see below). The formative influence, for instance, that Bakhtin has had for some psychotherapists (Pollard, 2008), and Buber for others (e.g., Hycner, 1985), Leavis was for me.

But my vision, apart from the articulation of ‘enactment’, had already crystallised before then. What then ensued, as I gradually became aware of the incompleteness of the articulation of these matters by Leavis in particular, was a long journey, first through philosophy, and then psychotherapy, back to these roots.

Here then, first, are the most key and central passages of Keats, Johnson, and Leavis, which shaped my vision. I shall follow them with some comment and elucidation. First, from the Keats passage once more:
…at once it struck me what quality went to form a Man of Achievement, especially in Literature, and which Shakespeare possessed so enormously - I mean Negative Capability, that is, *when a man is capable of being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and reason*.... (John Keats Letter to George and Tom Keats, 21 Dec. 1817, Keats, Ed. MB Forman, 1947a, my italics)

Central to psychotherapeutic experience is the tension in the work, between, on the one hand, the drive (super-ego driven, as we may say, in one psychotherapy dialect) to resolve the client’s problems, and, on the other, the capacity to indwell in the uncertainty, so as to allow the enactment to happen which will allow solution to emerge. This latter is Negative Capability. In its openness to the unknown it is also openness to the enactive and mimetic. There is about it an element of the ‘It’, in Groddeck’s (1961) sense, the basis of my questions and discussions with Ken Evans, about dialogue, and Roz Carroll and Susie Orbach, about embodiment, in the Professional Knowledge sequence.

And so, the following passage of Keats, about the poetical character, as will be seen, is, without using the word, about *mimesis* (Aristotle, no date, Girard, 1987), i.e., that is, participatory identification (notice the striking, psychotherapeutically transparent, expression of this, - of projective identification as we would nowadays say, - at the end of the passage):

As to the poetical character itself (I mean that sort of which, if I am anything, I am a member--that sort distinguished from the Wordsworthian or egotistical sublime, which is a thing per se, and stands alone), it is not itself--it has no self. It is everything, and nothing--it has no character. It enjoys light, and shade. It lives in gusto, be it foul or fair, high or low, rich or poor, mean or elevated--it has as much delight in conceiving an Iago as an Imogen. What shocks the virtuous philosopher delights the chameleon poet. It does no harm from its relish of the dark side of things, any more than from its taste for the bright one, because they both end in speculation. A poet is the most unpoetical of anything in existence, because he has no identity: he is continually informing, and filling, some other body. The sun, the moon, the sea, and men and women who are creatures of impulse, are poetical, and have about them an unchangeable attribute: the poet has none, no identity. He is certainly the most unpoetical of all God’s creatures. If then he has no self, and if I am a poet, where is the wonder that I should say I would write no more? Might I not at that very instant have been cogitating on the characters of Saturn and Ops? It is a wretched thing to confess, but it is a very fact, that not one word I ever utter can be taken for granted as an opinion growing out of my identical nature. How can it when I have no nature? When I am in a room with people, if I ever am free from speculating on creations of my own brain, then not myself goes home to myself, but the identity of every one in the room begins to press upon me [so] that I am in a very little time annihilated. Not only among men; it would be the same in a nursery of children. (John Keats Letter to Richard Woodhouse, October 27th, 1818, Keats, Ed. MB Forman, 1947b)
There is an element here of the absolute openness to co-created narrative of which Jane Speedy spoke, in the Professional Knowledge Seminar.

In related vein, Samuel Johnson writes (bridging the gap enactively between the mimetic ‘chameleon poet’, and the totality vision it leads on to):

Shakespeare’s plays are not in the rigorous and critical sense either tragedies or comedies, but compositions of a distinct kind; exhibiting the real state of sublunary nature, which partakes of good and evil, joy and sorrow, mingled with endless variety of proportion and innumerable modes of combination; and expressing the course of the world, in which the loss of one is the gain of another; in which, at the same time, the reveller is hasting to his wine, and the mourner burying his friend; in which the malignity of one is sometimes defeated by the frolick of another; and many mischiefs and many benefits are done and hindered without design. (Johnson, *Preface to Shakespeare*, 1765/1958)

Chaucer and Shakespeare – principally the latter – created this ‘mixed’ English consciousness, in which comedy and tragedy are juxtaposed so profoundly (c.f., De Quincey’s comments on the significance of the enactive juxtapositions in Shakespeare, *On the Knocking on the Gate in Macbeth*, 1823

http://www.ellpos.net/notebook/quincey.htm).

The corresponding positive is when Keats writes, (Keats, November 1817):

"Nothing startles me beyond the moment. The setting sun will always set me to rights; or if a sparrow come before my window, I take part in its existence, and pick about the gravel."

Grotstein (2000), writing of Bion, thinks of this as the ‘transcendent position’.

With regard to this totality vision of the paradoxical capacity/incapacity of ours to stand outside ourselves, Keats (the same Keats who writes of the ‘chameleon poet’) writes, one of his very greatest passages, (which anticipates Darwin beyond and beneath all Romantic idealisation of the innocence of nature, combines all the emphases noted so far, and was a revelation to me when I read Middleton Murry’s account of it, Murry 1925), in the *Letters* (to George and Georgiana Keats Feb to May 1819, op. cit.):

From the manner in which I feel Haslam’s misfortune I perceive how far I am from any humble standard of disinterestedness—Yet this feeling ought to be carried to its highest pitch as there is no fear of its ever injuring Society—which it would do I fear pushed to in extremity—for in wild nature the Hawk would loose his Breakfast of Robins and the Robin his of Worms—the Lion must starve well as the swallow. The greater part of Men make their way with the same instinctiveness, the same unwandering eye from their purposes, the same animal eagerness as the Hawk. The Hawk wants a Mate, so does the man—look at them both they set about it and procure on[e] in the same manner. They want both a nest and they both set about one in the same manner—they get food in the same manner—The noble animal Man
for his amusement smokes his pipe-the Hawk balances about the Clouds- that is the only difference of their pleasures. This it is that makes - the Amusement of Life-to a speculative Mind. I go among the Fields and catch a glimpse of a Stoat or a fieldmouse peeping out of the withered grass-the creature hath a purpose and its eyes are bright with it. I go amongst the buildings of a city and I see a Man hurrying along-to what? the Creature has a purpose and his eyes are bright with it. But then, as Wordsworth says, "we have all one human heart"—there is an electric fire in human nature tending to purify-so that among these human creatures there is continually some birth of new heroism. The pity is that we must wonder at it: as we should at finding a pearl in rubbish. I have no doubt that thousands of people never heard of have had hearts completely disinterested: I can remember but two-Socrates and Jesus-their Histories evince it. What I heard a little time ago, Taylor observe with respect to Socrates may be said of Jesus- That he was so great a man that though he transmitted no writing of his own to posterity, we have his Mind and his sayings and his greatness handed to us by others. It is to be lamented that the history of the latter was written and revised by Men interested in the pious frauds of Religion. Yet through all this I see his splendour. Even here though I myself am pursuing the same instinctive course as the veriest human animal you can think of-I am however young writing at random-straining at particles of light in the midst of a great darkness-without knowing the bearing of any one assertion of any one opinion. Yet may I not in this be free from sin? May there not be superior beings amused with any graceful, though instinctive attitude my mind may fall into, as I am entertained with the alertness of a Stoat or the anxiety of a Deer? Though a quarrel in the Streets is a thing to be hated, the energies displayed in it are fine; the commonest Man shows a grace in his quarrel- By a superior being our reasonings may take the same tone-though erroneous they may be fine -This is the very thing in which consists poetry; and if so it is not so fine a thing as philosophy. For the same reason that an eagle is not so fine a thing as a truth. (Keats, Letter to George and Georgiana Keats Feb to May 1819, op. cit., my italics)

Keats, here, at a phenomenally young age (23), creatively achieves and expresses a complete tragic-poetic vision of the whole of existence, (also partially and implicitly articulated in his great Odes), which is very close to what Nietzsche was to articulate from The Birth of Tragedy (Nietzsche, 1872/1999) onwards, and the paradox of which is enunciated by Dostoievsky (1880) in the Grand Inquisitor parable of The Brothers Karamazov.

As I ventured into John Middleton Murry’s Keats and Shakespeare, (Murry, 1925) at age 17, the validity of this vision became compelling to me and, whilst my sense of its scope has become vastly extended, tested in many ways, it has never actually been superseded for me, but only become richer and more ramified. It also translated into an implicit theodicy, (which had been taken up by my later theology tutor John Hick, in Hick, 1966), in the famous ‘Vale of Soul-Making’ passage:

The common cognomen of this world among the misguided and superstitious is 'a vale of tears' from which we are to be redeemed by a certain arbitrary interposition of God and taken to Heaven -What a little circumscribed straightened notion! Call the world if you Please "The vale of Soul-making". Then you will find out the use of the world (I am speaking now in the highest terms for human nature admitting it to be immortal which I will here take for granted for the purpose of showing a
thought which has struck me concerning it) I say 'Soul making' Soul as distinguished from an Intelligence- There may be intelligences or sparks of the divinity in millions-but they are not Souls till they acquire identities, till each one is personally itself. [In]telligences are atoms of perception-they know and they see and they are pure, in short they are God-How then are Souls to be made? How then are these sparks which are God to have identity given them-so as ever to possess a bliss peculiar to each one's individual existence? how, but by the medium of a world like this? This point I sincerely wish to consider because 'I think it a grander system of salvation than the chrystian religion-or rather it is a system of Spirit-creation-This is effected by three grand materials acting the one upon the other for a series of years. These three Materials are the Intelligence-the human heart (as distinguished from intelligence or Mind) and the World or Elemental space suited for the proper action of Mind and Heart on each other for the purpose of forming the Soul or Intelligence destined to possess the sense of Identity. (Keats, Letter to George and Georgiana Keats Feb to May 1819, op. cit.)

This is a Gnostic articulation of the tragic sense in relation to individuation, which partly explains the interest he has always had for the Jungians (e.g., Roberts, 1993).

Now, as John Middleton Murry grasped (his *Keats and Shakespeare*, Murry 1925, was one of the great discoveries, and most hallowed volumes, of the Cranleigh School library for me), in his pursuit of the tragic sense of life, Keats has a special relationship with Shakespeare.

His conception of *Negative Capability*, as we have seen, he particularly connects with Shakespeare (John Keats Letter to George and Tom Keats, 21 Dec. 1817, Keats, Ed. MB Forman, 1947a, loc. cit.).

Now, here, in relation to Shakespeare, I must trench upon crucial linkages, and pieces of the jigsaw, which I only discovered later, but for which the way was prepared in the most fertile way, at this point, as I shall outline. This vividly illustrates the way in which, as a total journey, this development is not linear, but, as it were, occupies more than one space-time ‘alongside of one another’, picking up a thread here, then leaving it, picking it up again when it is ready, finding much later a significance which was tacitly in it all along, and so on. Murry’s mighty work and enquiry – for all its excesses of idealisation and over-spiritualisation – might, even in terms of heuristic enquiry, be taken as showing that Keats’s search for his own fundamental issues was heuristic enquiry before that had its name. Hiles fittingly observes:

In the light of this last observation, it would seem that heuristic inquiry was probably the first research method adopted for psychological inquiry many, many centuries ago. It should really be regarded as the most ancient of methods, with a proven track record well before the advent of modern science and psychology. (Hiles, 2001)

Now, in the spirit of this, Murry found that, because of the peculiar, almost unique, character of our relationship with Shakespeare, (because he is so mysteriously and unaccountably invisible and absent, personally, despite the greatness of his works, a matter we shall come on to), to make sense of Shakespeare, he had, as it were, to engage with a surrogate, *an actual person*, as an intermediary medium, a real person
with a unique identity and sense of identity, and with a special sense of mission, one which was inextricably woven in with Shakespeare’s identity.

I saw that my one chance of making intelligible these slowly formed convictions of mine concerning Shakespeare was to use the greatest of his successors, John Keats, as though he were a mediator between the normal consciousness of men and the pure poetic consciousness in which form alone Shakespeare remains to us. [my italics] (Murry, 1925, p. 4)

He has to have a real person as proxy, for this type of appeal to ‘pure poetic consciousness’, (here tacitly invoking a deified Shakespeare, c.f., Waugaman, 2009a), of which there are many variants, is a baneful and ubiquitous one, in this type of context, determined in part by the elusiveness of William of Stratford as the author of the works, which I discuss in detail, and challenge, in Chapter Four of The Muse as Therapist.

Murry, like Wilson Knight (c.f., Ch. 4 of The Muse as Therapist), inescapably provides material which deconstructs his own position, later, tacitly contextualising, if not undermining, this position about ‘pure poetic consciousness’; he writes extremely pointedly of Shakespeare, in relation to and comparison to Keats:

He lost grip of his own art under the stress of suffering that appears to have come to him through such a passion as Keats’. The plays of the Hamlet period – Measure for Measure, Troilus and Cressida, All’s Well, and Hamlet itself – are incoherent with an inexpressible pain. Their dramatic purport is unclear: what we can learn from them beyond a doubt is that a sensuous and passionate love has suffered shipwreck. They are, if we judge them objectively, bad plays, but there enters with them into Shakespeare’s drama a new intensity of profound experience which he was henceforth to obey, to rebel against, to obey and follow to its appointed consummation at the last verge of human experience. This baptism into the giant agony of the world caused Shakespeare also to utter himself in a handful of scarcely endurable sonnets. (Murry, 1925, p. 214)

We must add that, clearly, there is, additionally and crucially, a huge live political dimension in Shakespeare (Wilkinson, 2005b).

But, on this conception of Murry’s, these sonnets would be like the late sonnets of Gerard Manley Hopkins, for instance, then, - ones whose life context we do know. There is no longer any question here of any repudiation of the relevance of the work to the life or vice versa. There is nothing here of the sort of pure Platonistic separation of the life and the work which TS Eliot (1921) also expresses, in Tradition and the Individual Talent:

It may partly or exclusively operate upon the experience of the man himself; but, the more perfect the artist, the more completely separate in him will be the man who suffers and the mind which creates; the more perfectly will the mind digest and transmute the passions which are its material.
Again, there is no hint of the similar repudiation, rather Schopenhauerian in its bypassing of causality, Wilson Knight gives us when he writes (I develop commentary on this also, and the elements in Wilson Knight which contradict it, in chapter four of *The Muse as Therapist*):

Reference to the author’s ‘intentions’ is usually a sign that the commentator – in so far as he is a commentator and not a biographer – has lost touch with the essential of the poetic work. He is thinking in terms of the time-sequence and causality, instead of allowing his mind to be completely receptive. It will be clear, then, that the following essays say nothing new as to Shakespeare’s ‘intentions’; attempt to shed no light directly on Shakespeare the man; but claim rather to illuminate our own poetic experiences enjoyed whilst reading, or watching, the plays. In this sense, they are concerned only with realities, since they claim to interpret what is generally admitted to exist: the supreme quality of Shakespeare’s work. (Knight, 1949/1960, p. 7)

Unlike Wilson Knight, and Eliot, then, Murry takes for granted, at least in the second passage, that, in both Keats and Shakespeare, *there is the most intimate relation between work and life*, even if he exaggerates this somewhat.

And Leavis, who is so much clearer than Murry on, and in fact absolutely aware of, the importance of distinguishing direct biographical connections, from what is actually realised in art and the work, nevertheless emphatically responds to Eliot’s formulations by the dictum that ‘between the man who suffers and the mind which createst there can never be a separation’ (Leavis, FR, in Leavis and Leavis, 1969).

However, Murry only has the Shakespeare plays and poems to go upon here, because of the elusiveness of William of Stratford as the author. And so did I in 1962, when I idealised that absence into a kind of myth (Wilkinson, 2005b). The person is altogether absent. That is why Murry summons in Keats. And, like Murry, I was very content, then, to let Keats be a kind of proxy for Shakespeare. It never remotely occurred to me, at that time, to question the strange, the bizarre, position our ignorance of Shakespeare the man puts us in. I just effortlessly integrated the anomaly, using what Pirsig (1991) calls our culture-immune system, our capacity to assimilate anomalies to our existing frameworks of perception and comprehension (c.f., also Kuhn, 1962).

But it is nevertheless an anomaly, which I implicitly was also open to, fertile ground for, a paradigm shift and a crystallisation, because at least I recognised (and indeed was fascinated by) a mystery here. And so the way was prepared for how the mystery was to unfold, when the authorship issue ‘awoke’ for me, much later, after I was entering the world of psychotherapy, illustrating how the pieces of the jigsaw come together for me. As I wrote, in relation to the arresting and magical moment of my discovery in a bookshop, in 1989, of Charlton Ogburn’s book, *The Mystery of William Shakespeare* (Ogburn, 1988):

An excitement stirred in me and I began to dip into the book. Partisan as Ogburn undoubtedly is, his passion for his vision began to impact me. I began to recall that, even during the Quatro-Centenary year of 1964, when I was about to go up to Cambridge to study English, I had written a meditation on
Shakespeare, in which I invoked him as the great mystery of whom we know nothing, and who therefore has a kind of sacred uncanniness in that, unlike for all other authors, our relation to him opens into the sheer mystery of being, transcendent of ordinary criteria, - in rather the way. I argued then, that Christ does. So I already, then, unprejudiced as it were, without doubting the Stratfordian attribution, assumed we know next to nothing, and sought to rationalise it. For, could that assumption of sheer mystery, with its contingent background in our sheer ignorance, really be sustainable? Was that perhaps a myth with which I had consoled and rationalised myself? (Wilkinson, 2005b)

I connected this vision, at that time, with the Keats ‘chameleon poet’ concept. Now, this later discovery of the Shakespeare authorship issue, gives rise to the longest and deepest chapter in my book, in which my youthful intuitions, about Shakespeare and King Lear, come together with a mature engagement with the nature of the man who I believe would have written it. This coincided with a period in my life when I was, serendipitously and accidentally, discovering several emblematic avatars - one of them being the discovery of Ogburn - of ‘becoming myself’, emerging out of hiddenness, in my psychotherapeutic journey after a long period of self-alienation. The ‘hidden ones’ of concealed authorships are emblematic of that. This converged with the gradual rediscovery of the ‘enactment’ concept, in the profoundest way. The significance of all this will be articulated when we reach that point.

But this was essentially, in my view, a vindication of the Keats/Murry strategy, a resolution of the anomaly, an insertion of the missing piece in the Keats/Murry strategy, which, as we have noted, can also be seen as heuristic enquiry.

The Keats/Murry strategy, in relation to Shakespeare, in short, was based upon the far-reaching assumption of psychological congruence.

This psychological congruence is not postulated in a simple mode, but in the rich many-faceted mode, which is compatible with the fullness of the poetic paradigm. The assumption is that there is significant overlap, though assuredly not identity, but a dialectical relationship, between life and work in great art. It parallels the way the within-world of the psychotherapy session replicates, but with differences, in unanticipatable ways, the without-world of the client’s life.

Psychological congruence between fiction and biography, intersecting in the concept of enactment, became the creative concept which drove this chapter, the largest and most far-reaching in the book. This conception relates to the recognition of narrative authenticity which Jane Speedy and Miller Mair explored in their seminars, and which is in the same territory as my formulation of enactment.

Because it invokes the relevance of the fictional, - which is never merely fictional, but, in its iterability, is Platonic, with the historicality of intentionality, - to such enquiry, it essentially parts company from the model of merely empirical, factual, enquiry, even in its qualititative variants. It is not as such the less fundamental enquiry or research. Indeed, because of the grip of the empirical research model, it has only incompletely been possible to apprehend the foundationally non-empirical character of psychotherapy as such (which is not to deny that empirical elements can be
explored in a secondary way). Phenomenology has been assimilated to the empirical in these enquiries.

Psychological congruence with transformation is corollary to the process of mimetic enactive transformation. Actualisation grounded in historical event, at one end of the process, mirrors enactive iterability at the other, in a dialectical relationship. This is both the character of the creation of the work of art, and of the healing enactivity, within sessional process, of psychotherapy.

Given this conceptualisation, in the light of the mystery of the William Shakespeare authorship, right at the centre of our literary history, in retrospect it became inevitable that it would become a central test case for me. So, in Keats and Leavis, I had already apprehended the essential components of my vision, and the journey since has been a return to where I started.

At each point of my life, I have found myself articulating any advance in some piece of writing, a commentary on, - in what Keats identifies as the allegorical character of a life, - the allegory of my own life. Often, as in the story of my development in this methodological commentary - for instance, in discovering the emerging relevance of the authorship issue as a paradigm of psychological congruence; it has only been later that I have fully understood even what I myself was writing:

A man's life of any worth is a continual allegory — and very few eyes can see the mystery of his life — a life like the Scriptures, figurative. Shakespeare led a Life of Allegory; his works are the commentary on it. (Keats, 1818)

This is the primal appeal to narrative which Miller Mair and Jane Speedy emphasise, as well as Moustakas (1990) in his heuristic enquiry concept, and Stern in his ‘proto-narrative envelope of temporal experience’ (Stern, 1995). As well as the 1964 personal essay, written for my mother, on Shakespeare’s (the Stratford Shakespeare) 400th anniversary, I also gave a talk, around 1962, to the Cranleigh School literary society, about the conception which I had formed of Keats’s tragic-poetic vision of the whole of existence, which I found most strongly expressed, besides the great 1819 letter to George and Georgiana Keats already quoted, and in the incomparable Moneta passage, as sublime as Beethoven’s late string quartets, from the second, unfinished, Hyperion (I also found hints of it in Shelley’s great unfinished final poem, The Triumph of Life):

As near as an immortal's spher'd words
Could to a mother's soften, were these last:
And yet I had a terror of her robes,
And chiefly of the veils, that from her brow
Hung pale, and curtain'd her in mysteries
That made my heart too small to hold its blood.
This saw that Goddess, and with sacred hand
Parted the veils. Then saw I a wan face,
Not pin'd by human sorrows, but bright blanch'd
By an immortal sickness which kills not;
It works a constant change, which happy death
Can put no end to; deathwards progressing
To no death was that visage; it had pass'd
The lily and the snow; and beyond these
I must not think now, though I saw that face.
But for her eyes I should have fled away.
They held me back, with a benignant light
Soft mitigated by divinest lids
Half closed, and visionless entire they seem'd
Of all external things; they saw me not,
But in blank splendour beam'd like the mild moon,
Who comforts those she sees not, who knows not
What eyes are upward cast. (Keats, *The Fall of Hyperion: A Vision*, 1819)

I no longer have either essay now, but I do know that I had grasped, as an ‘aha’, and was seeking to express to my somewhat bewildered schoolfellows, the ‘beyond good and evil’ (Nietzsche, 1886) vision, which is expressed in the Keats letters and in *The Fall of Hyperion*. I was most fascinated by the ‘totality’ vision which I have already quoted (and which I would now regard as having the implication, if followed through, of tragic mimetic enactment):

Yet may I not in this be free from sin? May there not be superior beings amused with any graceful, though instinctive attitude my mind may fall into, as I am entertained with the alertness of a Stoat or the anxiety of a Deer? Though a quarrel in the Streets is a thing to be hated, the energies displayed in it are fine; the commonest Man shows a grace in his quarrel—*by a superior being our reasonings may take the same tone—though erroneous they may be fine—this is the very thing in which consists poetry; and if so it is not so fine a thing as philosophy—*for the same reason that an eagle is not so fine a thing as a truth*. (Keats, Letter to George and Georgiana Keats Feb to May 1819, op. cit., my italics)

As partly noted already, the Herakleitian transcendence of opposites, in the context of individuation, in such a passage, of course parallels Hegel and Jung.

Now, as already indicated, what Leavis indeed did add to Keats, and Murry, apart from his measure of intense moralism, (in certain ways taken almost to fundamentalist and sometimes paranoid lengths, and at odds with the ‘beyond good and evil’ implication, though there are hints of it in him here and there), from which it took me many years to free myself, was the making explicit of enactment. It even had, as I discovered later, which Leavis did not himself articulate, the implication of a relationship to Aristotle’s invocation of *mimesis*, the participatory identification process, in contrast to *diegesis*, the narrative-expository process, in the *Poetics*, (Aristotle trans Butcher, 1997).

Thus Leavis writes:

For images come, in the way in which poems do, *somewhere between full concrete actuality and merely ‘talking about’* [my italics - that is, between *mimesis* and *diegesis*, combining immediacy with repetition, my comment] - their status, their existence, is of the same order; the image is, in this respect, the type of a poem. In reading a successful poem it is as if, with the type of qualifications intimated, one were living that particular action, situation or
piece of life; the qualification representing the condition of the peculiar completeness and fineness of art. (Leavis, *The Living Principle*, 1975, p. 110-111)

Again, writing about Johnson, he says:

Johnson cannot understand that works of art *enact* their moral valuations. It is not enough that Shakespeare, on the evidence of his works, ‘thinks’ (and feels) morally; for Johnson a moral judgement that isn’t *stated* isn’t there. Further he demands that the whole play shall be conceived and composed as statement. The dramatist must start with a conscious and abstractly formulated moral and proceed to manipulate his puppets so as to demonstrate and enforce it. (Leavis, 1952/1962, p. 110/11)

Previously Leavis has written, about Johnson commenting on *Macbeth* (with the dazzling clarity and sharpness of differentiation he commands, at his best):

…even when he is Johnson, whose perception so transcends his training, he cannot securely appreciate the Shakespearean creativeness. He will concede almost unwillingly that here we have ‘all the force of poetry, that force which calls new powers into being, which embodies sentiment and animates matter…’, but as conscious and responsible critic he knows what has to be said of the Shakespearean complexity:

It is incident to him to be now and then entangled with an unwieldy sentiment, which he cannot well express, and will not reject; he struggles with it awhile, and if it continues stubborn, comprises it in words such as occur, and leaves it to be disentangled and evolved by those who have more leisure to bestow on it. (*Preface to Shakespeare*)

Johnson, the supreme Augustan writer, is never entangled with an unwieldy sentiment, which he cannot well express; the mode of creation suggested by ‘comprising’ anything in ‘words such as occur’ is one the Augustan tradition cannot recognise. (Leavis, 1952/1962, p. 109)

There are many other illustrations; they are indeed all-pervasive, in diverse and multiplicitous ways, shifting from context to context in a living way, as is their nature, in the whole cast of Leavis’s extraordinary critical writing; but this will suffice.

In Leavis the enactivity vision is indeed combined with a dialogical moralism, whose limits only gradually became clear to me, but which does not supersede the understanding of enactment, as will become clearer when I come on to the understanding I derived from Nietzsche, where it is expressed in terms of the post-Kantian conception of the *will*.

In the process, Leavis also offered so masterly a map of English literature and history, as even enables one to draw from it when one modifies it (especially in *Revaluation*, Leavis, 1936/1964). In many ways my Hegelian sense of *historicality*, which is one which includes, and is co-founded in, the historicality of text and of consciousness
modes, comes most strongly from Leavis, though much enhanced later by my reading of the master historian, John Lukacs (e.g., especially, Lukacs, 1968), and Julian Jaynes (1990, Wilkinson, 1999). And Heidegger’s (1927/1967) great shift onwards from Husserl, essentially invokes these dimensions of historicality.

Again, Leavis offered a model of focusing upon the central core of a work of literature, which gave me a paradigm of what I later came to know as ‘deconstruction’, but which is in fact simply the model of deep critique in general.

Thus, when I had begun to read Kant, in 1966, and to approach him via Peter Strawson’s great work The Bounds of Sense (Strawson, 1966), I remember at one of the ‘at homes’ of the great Scottish theologian Donald MacKinnon, who had enthused about Strawson’s work in his lectures, I asked him, what was so distinctive about Strawson’s approach, and he explained, doubtless detecting— but to the surprise of my naivety then (!), - the Leavisian literary student in me, that Strawson ‘takes the central core of relevance of Kant’s work and brought it out into focus, rather as Leavis would do with a poem or a novel…’

But the conception of enactment, supplementing Keats’s tragic sense of life, was the central element I gained from him, which has been the most fruitful for me. Leavis’s concepts of ‘the human world’ and ‘the third realm’ (Leavis, 1962, Wilkinson, 2009c) confirmed the dimension of an analysis of the world logically prior to science, based in narratology, which I have maintained ever since.

But, as I have said, I only really grasped the centrality of enactment by, roughly, 2007. Even in 2005, in Episodes and Scenes (Wilkinson, 2005a) when, as already quoted, I decisively formulated the enactment principle in what by that point seems quite a clear formulation (though it still is not free of the concept of enactments as *secondary, diegesis* not *mimesis*):

> At the primary level, the truth of experience for human beings can only be enacted, not stated. It is primarily event, not information. So far as stateable, or processed as information, in any way, this can only be secondarily, on the basis of secondary enactments, told as scenes, symbols, and stories. This is part of the primary logic of human communication, (c.f. e.g., Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, 1967, §244, 245, 256 et seq.), the fundamental concept, in my view, for psychotherapy as a Profession, and the background for this self-presentation, in ways which will gradually become clearer.

As I have said, I was nevertheless still deeply unconscious of what I already knew implicitly, and had only just begun to grasp the full scope of what I had in my hands. Again, this remains, in some measure, true even of The Muse as Therapist (Wilkinson, 2009), written in 2007.

When I re-read, for this commentary, The Muse as Therapist, (but in its form in Microsoft Word), I was shocked, and initially quite crushed, by how unfinished and difficult to read it still seemed to me. The Muse as Therapist, - whilst it is inevitably what it had to be, as a first book, - seemed at first re-reading to resemble an unfinished giant size jigsaw puzzle: the church spire on the village green is clearly there, and so is the pond, and the cottage on the green, and the cricketers playing in...
the middle, - but how all these elements were organised in relation to one another, so that I could complete the jigsaw, that was not by any means yet clear!

This re-reading was when occurred to me this image of the unfinished giant size jigsaw puzzle.

This impression shifted considerably when I reread it again in PDF in the process of editing the proofs, when it seemed much more, though not entirely, an organic unity. And, on a good day, despite its faults, it seems even more an organic unity in print, - so some of this is artefact of the medium! And it is beginning, illustrating its own thesis, to enact itself in the world as other than me! Its faults are acknowledged in an otherwise very favourable review:

As with any book, there are some weaknesses. Wilkinson discusses philosophy a great deal, and Kant in particular. Sadly, Kant’s legacy includes his horrendous writing style. It has led many serious thinkers to confuse obfuscation with profundity. Rather than burden us with the unusual request that we read his book twice (xvii), Wilkinson might have edited his prose more carefully. Literary studies suffer from related problems of opaque writing style just as much as my field of psychoanalysis does, so it is unfair to make too much of this — especially when we are indebted to Wilkinson for educating his readers about the exciting implications of realizing the works of Shakespeare were in fact written by Edward de Vere. (Waugaman, 2009b)


How all these elements are organised in relation to one another, so that I could complete the jigsaw, appeared to be crushingly not by any means yet clear, to my partly jaundiced and self-disillusioned perception. But, as I found retrospectively in relation to Episodes and Scenes (Wilkinson, 2005a), and as came out for me when I read it for the proof-reading, it may implicitly already have been much clearer - once it dawned on me - than I realised at the time, and in retrospect. This is an instance of how insight unfolds and enacts in us serendipitously, at a level deeper than our own will, which is also what heuristic enquiry involves (Hiles, loc. cit.). I have, since I wrote the book, been able to give a number of clear expositions of it at Conferences and in other contexts (see part VII, and Appendices).

And so, in a wider sense, that is a metaphor for the entire development I am describing…. The clarity and sense-making I am finding in it, or imposing upon it, is not one I by any means had explicitly at the time! But in some sense I was led onwards, and it was already present implicitly.

If I say that the research question of this enquiry is something like (though this is of course too simple):

how can the silent core of experience find words, and such richly ramified and concentrated symbolic words, when it cannot be conceptualised as such?

then the answer in short becomes, because it is and becomes enactment. That enactment effortlessly includes the verbal, verbal which in a sense remains secondary.
But I could formulate neither the question, let alone the answer then, back when I was encountering Dr Leavis, even though I had the solution in my hands already, through my understanding of his work. The question arose in a different sphere, which triangulated the enquiry, in a way I could not even glimpse, let alone articulate, then.

So how did I gradually take the further steps which would enable me to develop these insights into something which, I now believe, is a clear and usable paradigm which can be used to articulate the field of psychotherapy? Before I reach the philosophical phase, I mention some final, perhaps transitional, figures in the literary phase.

James Boswell, the biographer of Dr Johnson (Wilkinson, 2005a), and similarly Samuel Taylor Coleridge, gave me, very early on, an apprehension of dramatic-narrative process, which anticipated the psychotherapy dimension for me. What Johnson himself gave me, was much what he gave Carlyle, a sense of the heroic possibility of human life, and human identity, as much as his tragic sense of life as such. The latter was also important, and was occasionally enacted (and wonderfully caught as pure process by Boswell, even whilst he fails to cognize what is going on here philosophically, as I evoked in Episodes and Scenes. Wilkinson, 2005a), in a way not even Leavis could have gainsaid, for instance in the great episode of Bennet Langton’s Will (Wilkinson, 2005a). I identified with Boswell the great mimetic (for two years, 1962-1964, I wrote conversational journals with Boswellian intensity; I have 37 notebooks of them!), but I looked up to Johnson.

I also discovered Kierkegaard, and gained a sense of that crucial place of the single individual, and had thus begun to discover the existential dimension in its modern form. This I connected with Gerard Manley Hopkins’ emphasis, derived from the Mediaeval philosopher-theologian, Duns Scotus, on inscape and selfness, and with William Blake’s emphasis upon ‘minute particulars’ and his rejection of generalisation. All this led me onwards, towards the philosophical-existential dimension.
III. Second Dimension: the Philosophy Dimension

When I went to Cambridge in 1964, on my first evening there I met a man, (shall I call him my Diogenes? - my Samuel Johnson, also, I thought, for a while), brought up in the back streets of Birmingham, who was four years older than me, and a philosopher (as well as a literary, political, psychological and theological polymath), with a formidable will-to-power, who is still a close friend, but whose lop-sided dominance over me prevailed for a long time – but the process of emancipation from whom was also extremely formative for me. My shift towards philosophy was intensified by him, but I already had a natural feel for the issues, and over time, and through formative experience, this enabled me to develop my own conceptions.

From childhood I had been preoccupied with questions of identity, which took the form very much of issues about time; why do I live now, and not in Roman times, as well as those about identity, why am I me, and not someone else? And I was preoccupied also with the puzzle of perception, and the mystery of binocular vision. I even glimpsed or believed, in an ‘aha’ I vividly remember, that in the analogy of binocular vision, and dual perspective, there lay a solution to the predicament of solipsism and the problem of other minds! Perhaps there does! I was gripped and fascinated by the vision of scepticism about sense experience opened up in the first pages of Russell’s Problems of Philosophy (Russell, 1912/1959). Some of the intuitions connected with this were also linked with what I had gained from the work of Wordsworth and Coleridge (in whose footsteps follow aspects of modern post-psychoanalytic and Piagetian developmental psychology, c.f., Leavis/Mill, 1950).

Thus was I prepared for the great work of Kant, with time and identity questions at its heart. I think it was in the seminars of Donald MacKinnon in 1966 that I became aware of PF Strawson’s work on Kant, seeing him from the British Analytic perspective in philosophy, and that, in turn, led me on to Kant himself. What Kant gave me, and still gives me, was a dazzling sense of the a priori and of the possibilities of philosophy. Kant, although initially viewed through Strawson’s majestic, even if limiting, lens, enabled my realisation that the British Analytic tradition in philosophy was not the whole story.

This opened the door for me, and I then began to discover the Continental tradition stemming from Kant: Hegel, Schopenhauer, Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre - along with the later Wittgenstein (whom I did not interpret only in the mode of British Analytic philosophy, but even more in his profound relation to Schopenhauer, and affinity to Nietzsche), Whitehead, and Nietzsche. To this add the great Germanic theologians, Schleiermacher, Karl Barth and Paul Tillich. Karl Barth, in particular, with the fat black volumes of the Church Dogmatics fascinating me, constituted for me the veritable image of massive Himalayan vastness of mind.

So I moved from English to Theology (with a Philosophic slant) after passing my English part I. I was also, as already hinted, influenced by somewhat maverick British philosophers and theologians on the edges of the narrow mainstream of Analytic philosophy: Wittgenstein’s most original pupil, John Wisdom (e.g., Wisdom, 1952), whose beauty of writing, open-mindedness, intense subtlety with the lightest of touches, and merriment, of thought, gave me a sense of epistemological enquiry as joyful wisdom, in Nietzsche’s phrase; Donald MacKinnon (e.g., 1974, whose lectures
on religious knowledge, as well as evoking the immense significance of Kant, also brought home to me the huge importance of Karl Barth; Ronald Hepburn’s sceptically sympathetic *Christianity and Paradox* (1968); and the work of my theology tutor John Hick (*Evil and the God of Love*, 1966, which propounded an innovative view of theodicy, based in particular, as I indicated, on the already quoted vision of life as ‘The Vale of Soul-making’, in Keats’s Letters, 1819, op. cit.).

This is the background to my exploration of Kant, and some of the landmarks involved in my own discovery of him. Some of this discussion will be, of necessity, non-linear jumping ahead from Cambridge.

Both Murry and Leavis had left me in the lurch, in that they dismissed rational philosophy in favour of ‘another mode of thought’, whereas what I needed was help to discover precisely the *philosophical dimension* of this ‘other mode of thought’. I was not satisfied with the element of irrationalism implied in the exclusion of philosophy from the core of this. To illustrate just with Leavis, in Leavis (1976) he begins a substantial positioning chapter with the words:

> I think of myself as an anti-philosopher, which is what a literary critic ought to be – and every intelligent reader of creative literature is a literary critic.

That invokes all ‘intelligent readers’! I did not come to the disputatious tribal dogmatisms of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy unprepared. Between Leavis’s quarrelsomeness, and Murry’s sentimentalised, but also dogmatic, spirituality, I had to learn to do some serious sifting of the wheat from the chaff in the literary thought from which I drew. Karl Barth, himself an indefatigable fighter, once wearily remarked that one of the joys of heaven would be to escape the *rabies theologorum*.

But I had grasped pretty much from the start that Kant was not simply an academic philosopher, but that, underneath the ‘brilliant dryness’ (Schopenhauer) of his writing, lay an immense and epoch-making strategic preoccupation with the most fundamental, and most madness-inducing, enigmas of life. (Miguel de Unamuno, in *The Tragic Sense of Life*, 1921, brought this out for me with extremely graphic force.)

The shift he achieved in this respect is something which has shaped, sometimes in an underground way, the Occidental-Western philosophical world, and (in the broadest sense of the term, including psychology and literature, and philosophy of science too) the anthropological world, both Anglo-American and European-Continental (including South America), since, as no single other philosopher has managed to do.

Ours is still predominantly the age of Kant.

For just one example, Kant centrally underpins the work of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, Freud and Jung, and Piaget and Levi-Strauss, - and, consequently, of half the psychotherapy world. Sometimes opponents see the power of someone’s contribution more vividly. His contemporary Moses Mendelssohn called him the ‘All-Pulverizer’, and Ayn Rand (1971) wrote: ‘Kant is the chief destroyer of the modern world’. And, to discuss Kant in the background of Darwin and Einstein would be too big a theme to pursue here, other than to say that Kant, more radically than anyone before him, opened up the topic of *how consciousness is dynamically acquired and*
what it presupposes, in relation to the world of physics, which is essential to the Darwinian enterprise of seeing man in the context of nature (and such works of philosophically informed developmental psychology as Fonagy et al, 2004, and Stern, 2004, not to mention Jaynes, 1990, are still ploughing this furrow). We must certainly add the trio of Kant, Einstein, and Heisenberg, to the other scientific trio of Freud’s great alterers, and traumatisers of narcissistic consciousness, the preparers of post-modernism, Copernicus, Darwin, and Freud himself (A difficulty in the path of psychoanalysis, Freud, 1917). Where Hegel and Marx (Paul Valery’s successors of Kant, in his uncanny fantasy of Hamlet surveying the great Elsinore of Europe, with all the skulls in his hands, Valery, 1919) come in this, I leave in suspense.

And I had also intuited somehow - and was led forward by the intuition, even though I did not yet have the insights at my fingertips that I needed then - that I was in search of a multidisciplinary synthesis not confined to literature nor to philosophy, nor to any dogmatic lines of thought within them, or within any other discipline. So, this began to create an agenda for ‘the new kind of thought’ that did not seem to exist.

It is to this I alluded above, when I said that the objective world, together with consciousness, itself becomes, in effect, a poem, an enactment, in Kant’s hands. The doctrine of enactment emerges from Kant’s vision and understanding of the volitional basis of consciousness and action. Leavis, too, is ultimately, discreetly, a Kantian. Stern’s ‘proto-narrative envelope of temporal experience’ (Stern, 1995) goes back ultimately to Kant, who thus links with state of the art modern concepts of narrativity (this connecting with Miller Mair’s and Jane Speedy’s work).

It is because this ‘kind of thought which did not exist’ is multidisciplinary, that it cannot be confined to empirical enquiry, which always assumes a pre-given (and philosophically pre-framed) context, but must find and articulate paradigms which give it its full scope and range.

This all foreshadows Freud and Jung, but on what basis?

What, then, did I gain for the present enquiry from Kant?

1. From Kant, first, I gained a sense of an inherent dynamic structuration, in terms ultimately of time, of human experience.

It is already implicit in Kant that, in Heidegger’s later formulation, time is the horizon of being. Kant’s conception that certain fundamental features of our existence, above all the web of ontological interconnections associated with our apprehension of spatio-temporality, are, so to say, part of our ontological a priori ‘hard-wiring’, is the aspect I am concerned with here. This is the element in Kant which is, in some form and on some interpretation, both so compulsive for many, and yet also so abhorrent to others (e.g., Rand, 1971).

I had thus grasped that Kant had comprehensively installed the a priori, ontologically and rationally, as an inescapable dimension of human experience.

But I also intuited that Leavis was right in his Hopkins-ish and Duns Scotus-like emphasis upon the inherent particularity of human reality. Kantian philosophy, as it
stands, with its ostensible sharp division between the *a priori* and the empirical, and between *concepts* and *intuitions*, which continues to be deeply influential, in both phenomenology and analytic philosophy, did not, and could not, in its expressed form, fully address this, though there are elements in Kant, which I am about to come to, which deconstructively tend in a different, inherently narrative-based, direction.

But already I was beginning to sense something of the *shape* of the integrating task, between the *a priori* and particularity, whose contours would sharpen up as I went on.

2. *Second*, and perhaps paradoxically, since Kant had sought to limit metaphysics and ontology within the structurings of empirical experience, from him I gained the sense that metaphysics was after all not dead. His transcendental concept of the ‘bounds of sense’, limiting judgements to the empirical, would only work, either if one accepted his *phomena/noumena* distinction, with his transcendental idealism, or else if one upheld a Strawson-type reduction to commonsense and unquestioned objectivism, with an ‘analytic’ version of Kant underpinning this.

Neither seemed to me tenable as they stood. Rather, Heidegger’s reconstruction of Kant (I write about the strange juxtaposition of Heidegger and Strawson in relation to Kant, in Chapters 3 and 5 of *The Muse as Therapist*), which places a central emphasis upon his doctrine of synthesis and of productive imagination, drawing upon such Kantian themes as:

> we must assume a pure transcendental synthesis of imagination as conditioning the very possibility of all experience. (Kant, 1781/1964, p. 133)

seemed to me to be in some sense essentially valid, because of the inherent circularity of the totality character of all knowledge, which Kant intuited.

But Heidegger (1929/1990), too, ultimately construes Kant’s imagination simply as his (Heidegger’s) *being-in-the-world* structured in *temporal terms*.

I believed this is also something of a short-circuit (c.f., Chapter 3 of *The Muse as Therapist*), but I don’t think I had achieved full explicitness about it all, despite titanic efforts, in Chapter 5 of *The Muse as Therapist*. I did not yet achieve the boldness and clarity which could nail it down as:

> The objective world, together with consciousness, itself becomes, in effect, a poem, an enactment, in Kant’s hands.

Embedded in all this were, and are, struggles for clarity in a very difficult area, the nature of the narratological foundations of consciousness, and of the conception of causality which is involved in this, which I had been wrestling with since the 1960s, and which I addressed in the material on *Phenomenological Causality* [RAL 4 submission, http://hewardwilkinson.co.uk/ATerribleBeautyisBornRal4and5.pdf]. To my understanding of all this I am gradually coming.

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1 It is disputed by Quine in his paper *Two Dogmas of Empiricism* – but in ways which simply in effect eliminate the *a priori* even more decisively. C.f., Quine (1953/1980), Bennett (1966). [http://www.ditext.com/quine/quine.html](http://www.ditext.com/quine/quine.html)
What is by-passed by Heidegger is the Kantian theme of the *narrative organisation of perception*. This makes Heidegger reject Kant’s ‘refutation of idealism’, his proof of the ‘existence of external things’, as an argument based upon a misunderstanding (Heidegger, 1927/1967). He converges with the later Wittgenstein and analytic philosophy at this point. And even Kant’s own argument attempts to be essentially analytic, tautologous.

Thus, even Kant lends himself to equivocation concerning his apprehension of imaginative synthesis, and, as Heidegger (1929/1990) shows, it virtually disappears (apart from in the *Schematism* chapter and the * Analogies of Experience*) in the second edition (much closer to Strawson’s version) of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781/1964) in 1787. But Heidegger defends it, then reinterprets it!

But I felt, instinctively, in deep agreement with Leavis, and Blake, and Polanyi and Whitehead, that perception is *creative*, (and hence through and through *individual*) and I was struck by the significance of the depth of the resistance, to accepting this, for instance in Strawson and Bennett. (David Hume has pertinent insights into this in the chapter on *Scepticism Regarding the Senses* of *A Treatise of Human Nature*, 1739-40/1978.)

There seemed to me something quasi-psychoanalytic, repressed, connecting with the scapegoat problem, *about the depth of this resistance to doubting the belief in objectivising commonsense and objectivity*. This resistance is shared by all these great and profound philosophers in varying measure. What was this about? And, on the other side of the coin, we have Hume’s scepticism, derived from his epistemological reliance on sensation, which plunges him into a degree of self-doubt and fear of madness, from which his only refuge is ‘carelessness and inattention’, but which, nevertheless, *does not lead him to re-examine his premises*:

This sceptical doubt, both with respect to reason and the senses, is a malady, which can never be radically cur'd, but must return upon us every moment, however we may chace it away, and sometimes may seem entirely free from it. 'Tis impossible upon any system to defend either our understanding or senses; and we but expose them farther when we endeavour to justify them in that manner. As the sceptical doubt arises naturally from a profound and intense reflection on those subjects, it always encreases, the farther we carry our reflections, whether in opposition or conformity to it. Carelessness and inattention alone can afford us any remedy. For this reason I rely entirely upon them; and take it for granted, whatever may be the reader's opinion at this present moment, that an hour hence he will be persuaded there is both an external and internal world; and going upon that supposition, I intend to examine some general systems both ancient and modern, which have been propos'd of both, before I proceed to a more particular enquiry concerning our impressions… (Hume, 1739-40/1978)

Hume describes the ruin of his objective opinions (though he believes he has a *subjective solution*) at the end of part I of the *Treatise*, in ways which give us a clue by bringing into view the proximity to insanity of these enquiries:
But before I launch out into those immense depths of philosophy, which lie before me, I find myself inclin'd to stop a moment in my present station, and to ponder that voyage, which I have undertaken, and which undoubtedly requires the utmost art and industry to be brought to a happy conclusion. Methinks I am like a man, who having struck on many shoals, and having narrowly escap'd shipwreck in passing a small frith, has yet the temerity to put out to sea in the same leaky weather-beaten vessel, and even carries his ambition so far as to think of compassing the globe under these disadvantageous circumstances. My memory of past errors and perplexities, makes me diffident for the future. The wretched condition, weakness, and disorder of the faculties, I must employ in my enquiries, encrease my apprehensions. And the impossibility of amending or correcting these faculties, reduces me almost to despair, and makes me resolve to perish on the barren rock, on which I am at present, rather than venture myself upon that boundless ocean, which runs out into immensity. This sudden view of my danger strikes me with melancholy; and as 'tis usual for that passion, above all others, to indulge itself; I cannot forbear feeding my despair, with all those desponding reflections, which the present subject furnishes me with in such abundance.

I am first affrighted and confounded with that forelorn solitude, in which I am plac'd in my philosophy, and fancy myself some strange uncouth monster, who not being able to mingle and unite in society, has been expell'd all human commerce, and left utterly abandon'd and disconsolate. Fain wou'd I run into the crowd for shelter and warmth; but cannot prevail with myself to mix with such deformity. I call upon others to join me, in order to make a company apart; but no one will hearken to me. Every one keeps at a distance, and dreads that storm, which beats upon me from every side. I have expos'd myself to the enmity of all metaphysicians, logicians, mathematicians, and even theologians; and can I wonder at the insults I must suffer? I have declar'd my disapprobation of their systems; and can I be surpriz'd, if they shou'd express a hatred of mine and of my person? When I look abroad, I foresee on every side, dispute, contradiction, anger, calumny and detraction. When I turn my eye inward, I find nothing but doubt and ignorance. All the world conspires to oppose and contradict me; tho' such is my weakness, that I feel all my opinions loosen and fall of themselves, when unsupported by the approbation of others. Every step I take is with hesitation, and every new reflection makes me dread an error and absurdity in my reasoning. (Hume, 1739-40/1978)

And, in parallel vein, transforming it all into a sheer voluntarist enactment of Aristotelian ‘articles of faith’ (his transformation of the Kantian a priori of the ‘Copernican revolution’), including our bedrock presuppositions of life, Nietzsche:

Life no argument. – We have arranged for ourselves a world in which we can live – by positing bodies, lines, planes, causes, motion and rest, form and content; without these articles of faith nobody could now endure life. But that does not prove them. Life is no argument. The conditions of life might include error. (Nietzsche, 1882/2001, §121.)
We get a sense that something very peculiar and very deep is going on here. If we relate this profound problematic about the basis of objectivity, and of objectification, which brings us to the edge of the foundations of sanity, to the conceptualisation of ‘enactment’, we also begin to get a glimpse of what it is that makes it so difficult for people to grasp, when I offer the Poetic Paradigm as an ontological position, which involves a rejection of empiricist and commonsense stances, which are both founded upon the objectification paradigm. The hold of objectivising commonsense, and/or empiricist concepts of evidence, even in people ostensibly wedded to holism, on some basis, is intractably tenacious.

Today, it is our default belief position, our mediaevalism, like the gods, and then the God of the Judaeo-Christian heritage (including Islam), for previous epochs. Would this problem apply to any belief? Is it to do with belief as belief? Is it connected with scapegoating and mimesis? The enactive significance of tragic art becomes relevant, exploring the those fundamental faultlines, which compel scapegoating, of the epochs.

I touched on this default position in terms of Kant in Chapter 5 of The Muse as Therapist, Kant’s ambition to ground science in a transcendental logic of the subjective, and suggested both how tenuous, and yet how tenaciously immune to assault, that ambition, and associated belief, is. In that chapter I also connected it to the question of the foundations of sanity in our epoch. I cautiously cross-checked this hidden insecurity in foundational beliefs, when I was writing Chapter 5, by reference to the Flat Earth belief. I ‘googled’ belief in the Flat Earth concept, and had a fairly spooky experience which confirmed my intuition (I felt like Scully in The X Files!):

Not to take this for granted (!), I conscientiously checked, for the record, via Google, websites associated with the Flat Earth belief system. There are indeed several, and to enter them is to enter a mad world (like very much else on the Internet, to be sure) where it is very difficult to tell whether they are serious or spoofs. I realised that I found myself experiencing a sense of madness and destabilisation, as I tried imaginatively to entertain the ‘Flat Earth’ belief system, and at the same time I found myself arguing in my head abjectly and compulsively against the possibility, or the possibility that I might identify with this belief! I also found myself wondering superstitiously and obsessively how many viruses and Trojans had got into my computer as a result of this check, and I found myself feeling ashamed and embarrassed that I had looked at the websites, as if I had been caught looking at pornography! (Wilkinson, 2009a, p. 192)

Without pursuing it further for the moment, it is clear that whatever Kant is doing engages, or touches into, some of the profoundest belief anxieties with which human beings are faced. There is, then, as the Mair/Speedy parallels would suggest, a narrative-metaphoric element even here. There is a connection between the issues about the foundations of belief, the need for certainty, the extraordinarily recent emergence from an unwaveringly hallucinatory framework (akin to what is diagnosed as psychosis today, c.f., Wilkinson, 1999, p. 53ff) of culture (Jaynes, 1975/1900, Wilkinson, 1999, and 2003b), and the difficult shift to a fundamentally dynamic, non-
static, non-objective, narrative-metaphoric, conception of process, such as is embodied in the concept of enactment

So, therefore, he opened the door to a critical scrutiny of the assumptions embedded within commonsense, and thence to a renewed exploration of metaphysics. This takes me on to the third aspect of Kant, which fundamentally explicitly leads on to post-modernism, and to the enactment concept.

3. Third, Kant went on to offer a specific account, in terms of temporality, of the relation between intentional consciousness, and the objectivity of experience, which is as enthralling, as perspective-awakening, as any philosophical argument ever formulated, and leads on, for me, to apprehending the roots of the enactment concept.

Fundamentally it is based on an argument about difference, which has remained the core philosophical insight, at work in both Analytic and Post-Phenomenological philosophy. It is, for instance, at the heart of Derrida’s fundamental presentation of différence (1967/1973), as well as Wittgenstein’s (1953/1967) systematic arguments about private experience in the Philosophical Investigations.

The Strawsonian ‘analytic’ account of it, magnificent as it is, nevertheless essentially puts it back to sleep, avoids those depths we are touching on. It is Kant cauterised and rendered acceptable to mid-20th Century commonsense. It renders that commonsense unproblematic, whereas Kant seeks to plumb the depths of its foundations.

I found myself wanting to wake it up again.

After I had left Cambridge in the year of my father’s death in 1967, I searched for myself in a sort of Tolstoyan kind of way in manual work, and eventually ended up, in the spring and summer of 1968, forty years ago (today, August 21st 2008, on which I am writing, is the 40th anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, something for me which was heart-rending at the time, and I marched, in that year of marches, on the Soviet Embassy, as earlier I had on the US one), scrubbing for several hours a day a long channel running down to a stream at the end of sewage beds, on a sewage farm outside Guildford.

It was leisurely work (those were the days), and I had much time to think.

This was my Cartesian moment, my reaching down beyond doubt to my bedrock certainty, my attaining of the primary sense of being able to judge for myself. I came now to the grounded conclusion that the commonsense approach to perception in particular, and to philosophy in general, embodied in the work of Austin (1962b), Strawson (1959 and 1966), and others of the analytic school, were untenable. We do not, ever, ‘see (or perceive) things as they are’; that is a contradictory concept.

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2 I am not of course saying that any of this is original, as individual steps of understanding taken; at best the synthesis, qua whole, as a whole, may have elements of originality. I track some of the major of, but not all of, the cross-linkages to which I am indebted here, as I go along, but there are far more than I can name.
I was indeed closer to the empiricists like Hume, Russell, and Ayer, believing, with them (Wilkinson, 2009a, p. 73ff), that the argument from illusion is unassailable, but against them I believed their core assumptions were objectivising, and so believed in some understanding of the Kantian *a priori*, and in the creativeness of perception.

These understandings were implemented when, at Professor Ninian Smart’s (c.f., e.g., Smart, 1969) Department of Religious Studies at the University of Lancaster, I did a one-year MA in Religious Studies. My special paper was on Jung (see below), and my dissertation was upon *Kant’s Doctrine of Time*. I wrote preparatory writing, in the summer vacation of 1969, to the tune of 143 pages of A4, about 50,000 words, and the dissertation itself was 10,000 words.

I had an ‘aha’, and come to the conclusion, in my preparatory writing, on the basis of arguments drawn from Kant’s *Transcendental Aesthetic* (Kant, 1781/1964), and his *Transcendental Deduction of the Categories*, that objective space on the model of our visual space, could not exist, because it *could not accommodate temporality*.

Thus, an infinite number of photographic shots could be taken of, say, an aeroplane in motion, - and in *none* of them would any trace of motion be found. And none of them in themselves have anything other than a contingent relation to any other of them. It is we who bring the three-dimensionality, or *aspectuality*, of the temporal dimension. And indeed thus it is for *all* difference; these arguments go back to Parmenides and Zeno, (c.f., e.g., Plato, *Parmenides*). Therefore, if we take this paradigm of visual space as our means of representation, the same problem arises in respect of the presence of temporality, by the same logic, that, according to Hume, arises for causality (Hume, 1739-40/1978), which also cannot be defended in terms of external sequence, but only in terms of ‘inner connection’ (Schopenhauer, 1819/1966).

I also drew from Buber’s conception of *I and Thou* (Buber, 1923/1958) and Schopenhauer as well as Kant. Drawn by the sharp contrast Schopenhauer draws between perception of ourselves as *will*, and perception of ourselves as *represented in space* (Schopenhauer, 1819/1966, book II), and drawing on the sense of the embodied ‘other’ mediated through the senses, as articulated by Buber, it ‘clicked’ for me that there was something wrong with the visual-objective paradigm of spatial existence.

With Kant’s help, I realised what it was (as indicated, it is essentially also the argument Derrida develops to show that *différance* is not, nor can be, a present perception, Derrida, 1967/1973). So, smelling a core insight, I teased out what I found implicit in his first argument for the transcendental ideality of space in the *Transcendental Aesthetic* (Kant, 1781/1964, p. 68, my italics):

Space is not an *empirical* concept which has been derived from outer experiences. *For in order that certain sensations be referred to something outside me (that is, to something in another region of space from that in which I find myself), and similarly in order that I may be able to represent them as outside and alongside one another, and accordingly as not only different but as in different places, the representation of space must be presupposed* [my italics]. The representation of space cannot, therefore, be empirically obtained from the relations of outer appearance. On the contrary, this outer experience is itself possible at all only through that representation.
And from the *Transcendental Deduction of the Categories* (Kant, 1781/1964, p. 131)

Every intuition contains in itself a manifold which can be represented as a manifold only in so far as the mind distinguishes the time in the sequence of one impression upon another; for each representation, *in so far as it is contained in a single moment*, can never be anything but absolute unity.

It ‘clicked’ for me, seemed to me, that implicit in this, is the recognition that ‘pure space’ would be totally inert and undifferentiable, and therefore the implication was that space was and must be a *representing*, not a thing, and must therefore in some sense embody difference, which as such would involve, and be logically embodied through, the sentient apprehension of temporality, as an active process-whole. Kant’s arguments ultimately take us back to the essential temporality of intentionality itself.

This all then led on to me bringing together, as Schopenhauer (1819/1966) did, Kant’s arguments in the *Transcendental Aesthetic* and both those in the *Transcendental Deduction of the Categories*, - which show that subjective experience requires objectivity concepts and experience, but which are articulated *within* the subjective, - and the *Analogies of Experience*, - which show that these objectivity concepts and experience in the physical world must, in an integrated way, include causality, reciprocal mutuality, and a permanent physical framework, against which change is recognisable as such (Kant, 1781/1964).

And, following, for example, Hegel (1807/1979) and Heidegger (1927/1967), I articulated the realm of subjectivity-objectivity, thus opened up, as *a realm of embodied intentionality*, (leading on to the narrative dimension highlighted by Mair and Speedy) which included the recognition of the reality of other persons, within an inherently embodied public realm.

And I was able, in the light of this, drawing on elements in Kant’s *Schematism of the Pure concepts of the Understanding* (Kant, 1781/1964, p. 181ff) chapter, to differentiate strands within the Kantian mapping of the issues, whose divergences, as picked up by successors (I was principally addressing the inheritances of Strawson, Schopenhauer and Heidegger), account for the deeply varying pathways upon which they were led off. Thus, Strawson started from the ‘general/particular’ contrast, in both its senses, Schopenhauer applied systematically the category of causality at the level of the understanding, in the Kantian sense, whilst Heidegger took up the incommensurability of three mode temporality with objective schemas.

As I now am re-reading Kant’s *Schematism* chapter, in my battered and much-annotated Kemp-Smith translation of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, to remind myself of the recognitions I feel I achieved at that time, I find myself once again compelled, and reminded of my original experience of it, by the extraordinary excitement of Kant’s writing and exploration. Such passages as this following are dismissed, even ridiculed, by commentators from the post-analytic Anglo-American tradition, such as Strawson, 1966, and Bennett, 1966, where Kant in effect postulates a *structural a priori* unconscious, which forms the reservoir and basis for Freud’s later, ostensibly more empirical, conception of the unconscious, but whose Kantian aspect is so ubiquitous, yet likewise so under-noticed:

This schematism of our understanding, in its application to appearances and their mere form, is an art concealed in the depths of the human soul, whose
real modes of activity nature is hardly likely ever to allow us to discover, and
to have open to our gaze. This much only we can assert: the image is a product
of the empirical faculty of reproductive imagination; the schema of sensible
concepts, such as of figures in space, is a product and, as it were, a monogram,
of pure a priori imagination, through which, and in accordance with which,
images themselves first become possible. These images can be connected with
the concept only by means of the schema to which they belong. In themselves
they are never completely congruent with the concept. On the other hand, the
schema of a pure concept of understanding can never be brought into any
image whatsoever. It is simply the pure synthesis, determined by a rule of that
unity, in accordance with concepts, to which the category gives expression. It
is a transcendental product of imagination, a product which concerns the
determination of inner sense in general according to conditions of its form
(time), in respect of all representations, so far as these representations are to
be connected a priori in one concept in conformity with the unity of
apperception [final set of italics mine]. (Kant, 1781/1964, p. 183)

The final three italicised sentences here, appealing to the ‘infinite’, empirically
underivable, character of the categories, for me point to that gigantic and awesome a
priori dimension in Kant, which potentially brought the whole of subsequent thought
into the realm of what I am labelling deep ontology. This is the element in Kant which
plumbs the depths implicit in commonsense. In Hegel, Schopenhauer, Husserl,
– his successors also actually do realise that ‘gigantic and awesome dimension’.

They evoke that sense of the mystery ‘in the depths of the human soul’ to which he
refers earlier in the paragraph, which is expressed in one version or another of what,
in association with Hegel, was called ‘objective idealism’, and which leads on to
psychoanalysis and object relations. Psychoanalysis” disavowal of its non-empirical
roots, however - Freud’s ‘philosophical limp’ - remains its chronic fault line (whose
non-empirical philosophical roots keep popping up out above ground again, e.g., in

In Kant, and successors, the task of overcoming scepticism, and the resolution of the
epistemological-ontological problem of ‘the veil of perception’, begins to be resolved,
not by any empirical step (for that is recognised as circular or self-contradictory, as
has been clear since Hume) but by a glimpse of the way in which our being-in-the-
world is a totality, enacted, and as such apprehended, as an indissoluble whole, so
that we are ‘being in itself’, in the terms of the enactment concept. The problem then
resolves into giving an account of how this can be understood.

But I only half glimpsed this at this time.

From the advent of the analysis of intentionality in Husserl and Heidegger onwards,
this is articulated, not, as in Kant and Hegel, by reductio ad absurdum deductions, but
by phenomenologically evoking an apprehended totality in experience.

I believe these two paths of abstruse philosophical debate do complement one
another, inescapably, and that both are necessary. Kant contrasted them as ‘intuition’
and ‘concept’, and ‘sensibility’ and ‘understanding’. I touched on, and explored, the

And I believe that the recognition of enactment is the way in which the whole is actually perceived, and, secondarily, analysable; that enactment is the formulation which makes sense of the whole understanding of intentionality in Husserl (1931/1977), and of significance in Heidegger (1927/1967, Wilkinson, 2009a). The implication of all of Kant’s, Freud’s, Husserl’s, and Jaynes’s work, is to remind us that consciousness itself is an enactment (c.f., especially, Freud, 1925/1984). And thus it is, that ‘The objective world, together with consciousness, itself becomes, in effect, a poem, an enactment, in Kant’s hands’. And all this relates to modern narrative conceptions, which I am associating with Moustakas, Stern, Mair, and Speedy.

I therefore could not simply take over the results of these philosophers’ work, but had to submit Heidegger himself, for instance, in Chapter 3 of The Muse as Therapist, to the process which treats Being and Time, not as a given framework, but as a work which necessarily circularly enters the same enactive melting pot as the experiences it attempts to frame. I did this via the infinity of cross-connections argument, but in fact it also follows directly from an understanding of the enactive dimension of Heidegger.

From that melting pot it is possible to see there is a crucial form of causality (the intentional causality involved in the entirety of the human world and history) embedded in the Heideggerian or Hegelian a priori, and that the anti-Aristotelian exclusion of causality from the teleological non-empirical (the absolute relegation of causality to the empirical), from the Enlightenment onwards, is part of the objectivism which besets all traditions since the Enlightenment, since Bacon and Descartes. This I eventually formulated as phenomenological causality (c.f., RAL 4 submission).

And, in that melting pot, in so doing, a solution has to be sought for the two problems with which I was now faced:

Firstly, the being-in-the-world model now not only included the realm of the physical world as apprehended by us, but the whole human world with all its narrativity and symbolism as such - in a way not excludable from the being-in-the-physical-world. How do justice to this, involving the whole relation between the infinity of the individual expression of subjectivity, which might be construed as empirical, and the a priori insights of metaphysics, ontology, philosophy?

And, secondly, since this whole realm, however profound, was now conceived as subjective-intersubjective, how was I to avoid solipsism, which, taken literally, is strictly insane, as nevertheless our last ditch position? how was I to avoid the residual Kantian presence of the old ‘veil-of-perception/phenomena-noumena’ model coming back to bite us at the very end, nullifying what had gone before? This may seem an insane worry – but that is, in its turn, the voice of the old commonsense and objecthood paradigm speaking, which is, in large part, at least, source of the problem.

But, in effect, that did become the form of the problem, as I developed an approach to symbolism and psychotherapy, based initially in Jung’s work, which consequently and subsequently led me into a whole mass of blind alleys, and blocked me from seeing the narrative-dramatic which was under my nose.
IV. Third dimension: The Psychotherapy Dimension

Thus have I brought my pathway in philosophy up to the point where it begins fully to converge, and re-enter into the connection with where I started from - taking Keats and Leavis as symbols of my original acquiring of a sense of the human world, ‘the whole human world with all its narrativity and symbolism as such, - and in a way not excludable from the being-in-the-physical-world.’

Through the exploration of silence, in a connected cluster of senses, I was gradually led, through a mass of complexities, to the concise formulations I eventually achieved, and in which the complexities not so much vanish as are subsumed – but in ways which can be deceptive.

First, what I am aware of, and must bring into the picture, is the trajectory which led me to become a psychotherapist. Thinking psychotherapeutically was second nature to me from very early. I was early aware of the madness in Shakespeare’s major characters in his greatest plays (Hamlet, Macbeth, and King Lear). I was aware of Sir Henry Harcourt-Reilly, the psychiatrist-psychotherapist in TS Eliot’s The Cocktail Party, and the psychotherapeutic aspects of Eliot’s work in general. My mother had a close friend who was a Jungian Analyst. I used to dip into the Jung books in her library with awe and fascination, when I went there, for instance, to listen to Klemperer concerts on their large radio and speaker system. I sought in Shakespeare and in Tolstoy a universal consciousness and universal human psychology.

I was aware of Walter Jackson Bate’s (1955/1961) comparisons of Johnson’s understanding of psychology with Freud’s, and of the concept of repression in both of them. In terms of Boswell I had a concept of self-examination, and self-exploration, in depth, and of melancholia, in him and in Johnson. I was aware of Boswell’s writing his own literary Journal, actually named The Hypochondriack, the 18th Century name for neurosis. I knew about Robert Burton’s The Anatomy of Melancholy from early on, the favourite reading of both Johnson and Keats. I grasped the psychological dimension of Kierkegaard, Dostoievsky, Nietzsche, and Sartre from early days. My Diogenes was at that time also highly preoccupied with psychotherapeutic psychology, especially of Jung, though he became much more sceptical of it all, as ‘psycho babble’, later. I experienced, and dared to see myself as, a natural healer and listener from schooldays. And of course I did see from the beginning the ‘madness’ dimension of Kant’s and Nietzsche’s enterprises, on which I have touched.

In the domain of reality, I was so crushed in my life sense, had so little core belief in my capacity to be, and was so flawed and frightened, that there was little other option for me. My sense of entanglement with my mother was very profound, really until I had left Cambridge and then headed north to Lancaster in 1968, after which it gradually began to shift into something more creative. I saw myself for a very long time as a Kierkegaardian penitent. That I gradually turned this into a minor messianic destiny, was perhaps both part of the problem, and part of the solution. (Nor have I ever wholly transcended that sense, which nevertheless gives one faith to persist and transform oneself, except in that I can and do treat it as a joke, as burlesque. In the age of Obama, perhaps it has come into fashion. C.f. Freud’s comments on being the favourite of his mother, 1900/1999)
My first job, that was a serious one, was as psychiatric nurse (1970 part time, 1972 onwards, as career). And thus my drift towards psychotherapy was almost inevitable. In retrospect, therefore, it is a puzzle that I did not pursue this career earlier, though perhaps not a surprise, due to my shift away from an academic centre after 1972, because I felt an academic career would leave me without experience of life and overwhelmingly ivory-tower – and I have indeed escaped that fate through the trajectory I chose. But it gradually took on that inevitability.

So along with Kant and Heidegger, I also was immersing myself in Jung and Freud, and RD Laing and anti-psychiatry, and the great philosopher psychoanalysts, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, and the philosopher-psychologist musician, Richard Wagner. FR Leavis had pointed the way towards DH Lawrence, whose psychological dimension, and relation to depth psychology, was also very emphatic. Again, QD Leavis’s (1970) closing words to Dickens the Novelist were a quotation from Jung on the unfathomable character of artistic creativity. I knew The Interpretation of Dreams (Freud, 1900, 1999) almost by heart (my ‘big dream’ about it in year 2000 is discussed repeatedly, in Wilkinson, 2003a, and then again with later elaborations, in Chaper 1 of The Muse as Therapist). The nature (a Kantian distinction) of primary process and secondary revision of dreams was etched into my imagination. Likewise was the huge and epoch-making creative confusion which was Symbols of Transformation (Jung, 1956). So I began a long struggle to envisage, primarily in psychotherapeutic terms, a concept of symbolisation, and intentionalistic unification, which sought, from the end of the human and symbolic realm, to reconnect with the intentional analysis which had emerged from my work on Kant.

I enrolled for a Bachelor of Divinity Degree at Hull University with a view to developing cross-disciplinary research on this basis. I simply did not have the mental range and clarity to achieve what I set out to achieve. This doctoral submission is the culmination of what I then embarked upon. It completes the conceptualisation of the symbolic-human narrative dimension I was seeking, for such a long time.

Essentially, I was seeking for the riddle-solving concept, which only came to me in the realignment made possible by the concept of enactment, which I had not seen as the solution, probably because it was so familiar to me that it lay outside the circuit of my preoccupations. This was connected with a long struggle with reductionism, both objectivising and developmental, both psychoanalytic and neo-Darwinian. Formulations achieved by Jung in Symbols of Transformation (Jung, 1956) were crucial to me:

In neither case should they [sexual symbols] be taken literally, for they are not to be understood semiotically, as signs for definite things, but as symbols. A symbol is an indefinite expression with many meanings, pointing to something not easily defined and therefore not fully known. But the sign always has a fixed meaning, because it is a conventional abbreviation for, or a commonly accepted indication of, something known. The symbol therefore has a large number of analogous variants, and the more of these variants it has at its disposal, the more complete and clear-cut will be the image it projects of its object. (Jung, 1956, p. 124)

This all looked onwards to the whole conception of the open-endedness of significances (dissemination, Derrida, 1983). I was later to come to recognise this as
formulated independently in Derridean deconstruction (e.g., Derrida, 1988), and it was also deeply developed in my reading of Levi-Strauss, especially the somewhat Hegelian transformatory binary concept developed in Mythologiques (Levi-Strauss, 1964/1969-1981).

But I was still, as it were, seeking the concept of a unified symbol which would express the unity of human and world, as if this infinity of diverse meaning could all be, as it were, stuck on to the symbol, and then stuck on to the world. I was still conceiving this as primarily cognitive and objective, in terms of the ‘concept/object’ opposition of the second edition version of Kant’s transcendental deduction of the categories (Kant, 1781/1964).

And I was, particularly in the Jungian context, further morassed in the tension and confusion between symbols as ‘dynamical’ things, like the sun and moon, and symbols as enacted total dramatic situations, narrative situations, which Jung conceptualised in partially reifying form as archetypal complexes (e.g., Jung, 1956, pp. 389-393), - a confusion Levi-Strauss (1964/1969-1981) set out to challenge systematically.

The ‘enacted total dramatic situations’, which was another form of the solution under my nose, I did not yet see as that, but it was working gradually within me.

In the light of these objectivising aspirations, a dictum from Jung which Richard Adams (1975) used as an epigraph to Shardik:

Superstition and accident manifest the will of God. (Jung, Unsourced)

seemed to me to poignantly express a meaningful intersection between the contingent realm, and the dimension of meaning.

It was particularly expressed also in what I called, from about 1973 onwards, the incognito encounter, the situation of a meeting taking place, unknown by one or both parties, which in some way enacts the core primordial issues of their life for both parties, yet in an individual form. The 'incognito encounter' of Joseph with his brothers in Genesis is different from that of Oedipus and Laius, and from that of Jesus and the disciples on the road to Emmaus (Luke’s Gospel), and Lear and Gloucester on the heath in King Lear, and Wotan and Siegfried in the third act of Siegfried, and Pip and Magwitch in Great Expectations, and Dr Monygham and Nostromo in Conrad’s Nostromo. The 'incognito encounter' is an universal theme - but it is always likewise deeply contextual and shaped by historic meanings. But the implication of something profoundly hidden in the incognito encounter returns as my insight develops. I began to think of the psychoanalytic transference process in these terms. And I also grasped that there was something of a Levi-Straussian intersection of the contingency of action with the structure of symbolisation in connection with these encounters (for instance in Siegfried’s reforging of the sword, having reduced it to smithereens).

Despite all this dramatic aspect to the symbolic process, which emerges into unified meaning effortlessly upon the enactment model, I was still then trapped for many years in the 'cognitive pasting on to the object' model (which is still at work in my later ‘phenomenological causality’ concept, Wilkinson, 1998, 1999), and could not
even clearly distinguish the relevance of the differentiation and correlation between
the actual and the fictional, which is connected with the progress towards the
enactment concept (which relativises, without dissolving, the fact/fiction antithesis).
This significance of the correlation between the fictional and actual I began to sort out
in Episodes and Scenes, (Wilkinson, 2005a).

I experimented with musical conceptions, a foretaste of the enactment concept –
Wagner’s Ring became of huge importance to me as a paradigm (as it was, in the
background to Thus Spake Zarathustra, to Nietzsche and Jung, and as it is to the Levi-
Strauss of Mythologiques, op. cit.), in the seventies, as I approached the beginning of
a Jungian analysis 1980-1981 in Oxford, - one which was very disappointing to me,
and which I broke off, after two years, because of the non-dialogical reductionism I
encountered in this very able, but strongly reductively developmentally focused
Klein-influenced Fordham-School analyst.

But this nevertheless released me to do a major essay on Levi-Straussain lines, re-
analysing Freud’s Wolfman case history (Freud, 1918/1997), and I began to see my
way to banishing reductionism, without losing the value of the significances Freud
had identified, also to dissolve the ostensible either/or between Freud and Jung, as
well as to move in a dialogical direction in my understanding of psychotherapy.

I saw increasingly clearly that it was possible to causally and existentially connect,
something experienced or acted out, with past experience, without reductively
explaining it in terms of the past experience, and its concomitant drives, etc., a move
(ubiquitous in psychoanalytic, and integrative-humanistic psychotherapy) which I
increasingly saw as a kind of explanatory category mistake. Nor were we thereby
merely confined to present time decisionality,which is the common contra-
psychoanalytic move - for instance, in Person-Centred Therapy and Gestalt Therapy.
This arc of thought eventually led first to the phenomenological causality concept
(RAL 4), and then on to the poetic paradigm, and first tentative steps towards an
assimilation of psychoanalytic developmental concepts in ontological and tri-temporal
terms are taken at the end of chapter 5 of The Muse as Therapist (Wilkinson, 2009a).

The enactment model resolves the long-standing dilemma by apprehending the
process of synthesis of past, present, - and future - as first of all a function of action or
en-action. The secondary elucidation of meaning can then be, and is, as infinite as one
wishes, but is derivative upon the life of the enactment, and in such a way as to take
account of those contradictions, and aporias, tragic faultlines, and paradoxical live
cross-connections, which characterise human experience.

There is not a noumenal referential entity apart from it all upon which it is to be
projected. Being and meaning is simply as actualised or lived, in all its infinity,
interconnectedness, and in the context of the infinite background, both actuality and
potentiality. Being is, and is its becoming, - the existentialists’ insight, which I believe
the enactment concept carries to its full conceptual realisation (absorbing the insights
of post-modernism and deconstruction in the process, c.f., Wilkinson, 2009b). As
Derrida grasps, yet not quite fully articulating its implications, in his early writings,
but does substantially later (Derrida, 1967/1978, Wilkinson, 2009b), there is still a
cognitivist centring in the Heideggerian conception of the existential-ontological,
which moves towards an enactive conceptualisation in the later Heidegger.
My chapter 3, perhaps the most difficult chapter, of *The Muse as Therapist*, retraces these issues in the proto-typical lines of reasoning in the early parts of *Being and Time*, in order to show also that the framework *Being and Time* offers is not a more general *a priori* framework, as Heidegger suggests there, but actually is on all fours with the enactment insight, with its post-modern ‘infinitist’ implications regarding meaning and context (a restoration of Hegel, in spite of Heidegger’s ‘finitism’). Heidegger’s ‘ontological/ontic’ contrast – his version of *a priori* versus empirical – is turned into a *spectrum of degrees of particularity*.

The enactment concept also relates this to the narrative recognition (c.f., again, Moustakas, Stern, Mair, and Speedy) that, in terms of the understanding of enactment, the distinction between actuality, and fiction and narrative, is secondary, and that they are mutually entangled. Experimental theatre, (and *Hamlet*, too, is supremely experimental theatre), like Escher in painting [http://www.worldofescher.com/gallery/A13L.html](http://www.worldofescher.com/gallery/A13L.html) exploits this. This is parallel to, or congruent with, a major element in Freud, the concept of *psychic reality*.

And it applies to the concept of ‘data’ also, *mutatis mutandis*. ‘Real life’ is incurably shaped by fictive patterns and constructs, on the one hand (Goffman, 1974), whilst ‘fiction’ and ‘narrative’ have to have profound psychological congruence, relation to ‘real life’, which can seamlessly include historical events, as in *War and Peace*, thus with actualities, on the other. We move effortlessly and freely between these domains.

As we have already seen, this has important implications for the issue of what counts as live material in research like this, because it means that the dialogue with a work of fiction can be as live and as profound, as ‘existential’, as factually-based ‘data’ derived from interviewing and the like.

The supreme narrative example in which I put it to work, though there are several in *The Muse as Therapist*, where I enact my thesis by using as samples, or *improvising* explorations with, certain problems, was my revisiting of Shakespeare’s *King Lear*, and the powerful taking forward of the solution of a literary problem, in chapter 4.

Connecting with the ‘incognito encounter’ concept, I linked the resolution of the enigma of the character of Edgar in that play, to the question of the authorship itself, and suggesting that the ‘unknown identity’ which is enacted in Edgar is congruent with, and deeply emblematical of, the hiddenness of the author, writing at the darkest time in his life, from various external signs, which I touch upon indirectly in the chapter. He is necessarily hidden, and silenced (like Cordelia also) for reasons we do not fully understand, though we have some conjectures, and they are perhaps expressive ultimately of the essential hiddenness of the creative process as such. This is lived in this character, and in his pivotal position in this play, which is, even so, *hidden as nothing else in Shakespeare is hidden*. I stumbled upon instances of this never before noticed, as far as I am aware.

This was also an epitome of my own voyage into the dark Platonic or Nibelungen cave, from which I emerged with treasure in a form I had not expected to find (just as, on a smaller scale, I did not at all expect to find the links between Hopkins’ *No worst*
there is none and King Lear, or the confirmation of the dimension of incommunicability, in my later analysis of my dream on receiving Grotstein’s book) - treasure I have begun to share in workshops, where, for instance, I make the creative links between the alienation Shakespeare explores in King Lear, and the alienation and hiddenness of clients whose resistance to assimilation into social norms can be so profound. For instance, where we are dealing with anorexia, we realise the hidden significance, that it even chooses death rather than surrender to assimilation, and dominates and seduces entire families and institutional care-delivery systems, rather than to surrender the refusal meme, the one which says, and acts, ‘no way!’

I had to go into that cave alone; to discover a tiny glimpse of the darkness of the alienation Shakespeare is enacting, I had to make my descent alone. But as the workshops are beginning to show, and as my work over two decades has been about, the capacity to enter supreme loneliness, and abjectness of experience, to descend into the hiddenness in the face of its shame, is for some persons literally a life-saver, and a source of psychic renewal.

But it is essential to the insight that it is confirmed autonomously, individually (Kierkegaard, 1859/1962). This reflexive, but nevertheless still poetic, insight comes very late in the day of civilisation’s trajectory, constantly pulled back into objectivising modes, such as positivistic empiricism. The poetic paradigm and enactment are articulations of the emergence of an insight, its ontological basis.

Poetry was once a communal vehicle, the bardic poet the vessel of a collective enactment, whose nature as epos, narrative, was taken for granted. Once objectivism gained sway, at the transition in Greece from ‘mythos’ to ‘logos’, from bicameral modes of human being, to consciousness-based ones (Jaynes, 1975/1990, Wilkinson, 1999, 2003b, Frankfort et al., 1949), then collectivism allied itself to that, to the objectivisation of consciousness. Aristotle, fatefuly, defines ‘primary being’ as being an entity, becoming ‘substance’ in the Latin inheritance. Consequently, the affirmation of enactment in the West became a more and more hidden pathway of the ‘solitary individual’, as the objective paradigm was now applied ‘inwardly’: in the Greek Tragic Dramatists, in Plato, Augustine, Anselm, Montaigne, Pascal, Shakespeare, culminating philosophically in Descartes’s great epistemic innovation, with its split between inner and outer, res cogitans and res extensa, and then in Hegel, Keats, Nietzsche, and Kierkegaard, and in Husserl, - to take a range of illustrations.

‘Negative capability’, as Keats (loc. cit.) understood it, is not merely the capacity to tolerate contradictions, and the tension of unknowing and uncertainty; it is likewise the quiet rejection of external authority, and the acceptance of the burden of decision lying with the individual, not the collective - even if the ultimate discovery, made again and again, is that the absolutisation of the individual leads back again to the intrinsic community of insight, as, for instance, Edgar in King Lear incarnates self-elected service as the pathway compelled upon the individual, as if by a destiny, and as scientific investigation submits its result to the community of peer investigators.

And all these creators enact moments in the life of the collective and the cultural community, moments where the perpetual threat of objectivism lapsed for a moment, and something else became possible. The sacrifical transformation of the individual genius into a servant of the community, corresponding to the creative sacrifice and
transformation of the tragic hero in the drama, is only reachable through the pathway of solitude; but from his/her solitude, they return to the community, and help the community recreate itself.

The discovery of enactment is therefore an Ark for the Bardic realisation at the core of human experience, in which a possession which was once realised communally, is reclaimed through the individual pathway. Enactment is a totality mode, what Leavis linked with ‘the Shakespearean use of language’ (Wilkinson, 2009c).

Leavis writes of Shakespeare:

The [Shakespeare’s] quickness was essential for the apprehending and registering of subtleties and complexities, and the English language in 1600 was an ideal medium for the Shakespearian processes of thought. Born into Dryden’s age, when ‘logic’ and ‘clarity’ had triumphed, Shakespeare couldn’t have been Shakespeare, and the modern world would have been without the proof that thought of his kind was possible. We should have lacked convincing evidence with which to enforce the judgement that neither Racine nor Stendhal represents the greatest kind of creative writer….

The point to be stressed is that, whatever was gained by the triumph of ‘clarity’, logic and Descartes, the gain was paid for by an immeasurable loss: you can’t, without basic reservations, subscribe to the assumptions implicit in ‘clear’ and ‘logical’ as criteria without cutting yourself off from the most important capacities and potentialities of thought, which of its nature is essentially heuristic and creative. (Leavis, 1975, p. 97)

If the author, however, was Oxford, who is 14 years earlier than William, then the dating and the whole problematic becomes even more epic, than Leavis’s, already very large, conception implies: Shakespeare is only possible at a moment when he, in a sense, creates the English language, and the modern narrative mode. On this I wrote in chapter 5 (p. 108-9) of The Muse as Therapist:

All this [I had discussed the scope of what he achieved under four major headings, the focus on history; the evocation of the contemporary scene; his grasp of Classical-Rennaissance values in his work; and his addressing the most extreme anxieties of the epoch, pp 107-8, The Muse as Therapist] is offered in modes simultaneously of the utmost realism, and of symbolic and dramatic sophistication; in these works the English Drama virtually moves from its beginnings right to maturity almost single-handedly (contrast the situation of the great Greek drama) in one lifetime and lifework – and against the background of a contempt for the stage, both from puritans, and from aristocratic class values and snobbery, which was at the opposite pole to the Greeks’ recognition of theatre as sacred religious festival (Nietzsche, 1872/1999).

Dryden’s (1668) comment on it was: Shakespeare was the Homer, or father of our dramatic poets; Jonson was the Virgil, the pattern of elaborate writing. I admire him, but I love Shakespeare. But Dryden here is assuming the ‘artless Shakespeare’ model; whereas, in terms of the mastery of language, and of courtly sophistication, Shakespeare is simultaneously Homer and Virgil. And
it is a Drama which provides both a sustained commentary upon how England had come to be, and how she was endangered, and thereby effectively creates a national consciousness (albeit from a monarchist sustaining the Elizabethan settlement).

If Tyndale’s Bible awoke the English language, in Shakespeare it takes oninfinitude, in a manner parallel to, though greater than, the way in which Luther’s Bible created German consciousness and the German language. Shakespeare occupies the role in the creation of English consciousness which Luther occupies in the creation of German consciousness, and this says something very deep about the different way the two nations and peoples hold their respective ‘world-views’! One may say, for instance, that Shakespeare made P.G. Wodehouse and Churchill possible; but there is no equivalent of P.G. Wodehouse or Churchill for Germany!

In parallel, extrication from the thrall of ontological objectivism took half a lifetime for Heidegger, nor can be considered a done deal for any of us. I myself was 61 when I began to write The Muse as Therapist. This journey is one to, and of, the depths.

Returning to Nietzsche, as discussed earlier, he also, developing Schopenhauer, propounded a deeply non-cognitive volitionalist, phenomenological causality, view of human experience which, despite an objectivising element, half pointed the way to the enactment concept, and also enables us, like Keats, to grasp it ‘beyond good and evil’:

The question is ultimately whether we really recognize the will as efficient, whether we believe in the causality of the will: if we do—and at bottom our faith in this is nothing less than our faith in causality itself—, then we must perform the experiment of positing the causality of the will hypothetically as the only one. “Will,” of course, can have an effect only upon “will”— and not upon “matter” (not upon “nerves” for example—): in short, one has to risk the hypothesis whether will has an effect upon will wherever “effects” are recognized—and whether all mechanical occurrences are, insofar as a force is active in them, will force [Willenskraft], effects of will.— Suppose, finally, we succeeded in explaining our entire instinctive life as the development and ramification of one basic form of the will—namely, of the will to power, as my proposition has it—; suppose all organic functions could be traced back to this will to power and one could also find in it the solution to the problem of procreation and nourishment—it is one problem—then one would have gained the right to designate all efficient force unequivocally as: will to power. The world viewed from inside, the world defined and described by its “intelligible character”—it would be simply “will to power” and nothing else. —

(Nietzsche, 1886/2002, §36)

Implicit in this fundamentally a priori and Kantian conception of causal enactment is a reversal of Nietzsche’s anti-Platonism, and reversal of his implicit sceptical radical empiricism. For the realisation here is implicitly ontological, Aristotle’s dunamis and energeia (‘actuality’ and ‘potentiality’ in Latin mediaevalism).

There was for me a decades-long struggle to digest and understand Nietzsche, whom I saw (with Dostoievsky) as the most powerful challenge to an utopian view of the human culture, and so I set about working out how one could sustain in some sense an ethical-dialogical approach to experience without denying the recognitions he brought
home to us as being inescapable, his basic demythologisation of the ‘goodness’ of life, which chimed, as I have said, with what had been early brought home to me: Happiness and virtue are no arguments. But we like to forget, even thoughtful spirits among us, that making unhappy and evil are no counterarguments. Something might be true: even if it were also harmful and dangerous in the highest degree; indeed, it might be part of a basic characteristic of existence that those who would know it completely would perish [ja es könnte selbst zur Grundbeschaffenheit des Daseins gehören, dass man an seiner völligen Erkenntniss zu Grunde giene] — in which case the strength of a spirit should be measured according to how much of the “truth” one could still barely endure or to put it more clearly, to what degree one would require it to be diluted, shrouded, sweetened, blunted, falsified. But there is no doubt at all that the evil and unhappy are more favored when it comes to the discovery of certain parts of truth and the probability of their success is greater; not to mention the evil who are happy—a species that the moralists have kept silent about. (Nietzsche, 1886/2002, §39)

This converges with Anne Kearns concern, expressed in her exploration of the shadow in supervision in her Professional Knowledge Seminar, to foster a sense of reality and starkness in humanistic and integrative psychotherapy, for which I had a strong fellow feeling.

In an Hegelian overturning, the conceptualisation of Nietzsche’s Eternal Return in Thus Spake Zarathustra (Nietzsche, 1883/2006, Heidegger, 1986) is as enactment. Derrida (1980/1987, Wilkinson, 2009b) evokes Freud’s ‘return to Nietzsche’s will-to-power’ as enactment as the core significance of Beyond the Pleasure Principle (Freud, 1920/1984). I was to stumble upon Nietzsche’s hugely significant, purportedly apocryphal, posthumous text, My Sister and I, which I consider below.

But I had a long way to go. I had now got the smell of psychotherapy in my nostrils and I was determined to pursue it on a non-reductive and a dialogical (an interactive, not merely interpretative) model. I had come to Oxford to work in Child Psychiatry in 1979, where (following considerable experience of, and pioneering work in, groupwork, whilst I was still working at Storthes Hall Hospital near Huddersfield), I began tentatively to work psychotherapeutically and psychodramatically. By 1984 I was applying for Nurse Tutor posts running psychodynamic nursing courses there, and in 1986 I finally got a Nurse Tutor’s post which took me back to Yorkshire, at Wakefield, where I set about developing a post-basic psychodynamic nursing course there also. This failed - but nevertheless a small psychotherapy department there, I believe, still exists as the fruit of my efforts.

And there, too, the sharp eyes of my then boss, and senior tutor, Terry Whyke, spotting the inaugural general meeting of an organisation called Yorkshire Association for Psychodynamic Psychotherapy, led me serendipitously back into the psychotherapy world. Elected on to, and attending, the committee meetings, I found out about a thing called the Rugby Psychotherapy Conference. No one else but me wanted to accompany my colleague, Alan Lidmila, then, and so I duly motorcycled 250 miles down to the University of Kent in Canterbury in the great snow of 1987, arrived at what happened to be the very meeting where the Sections (now Colleges)
were formed, and the federal structure set in place, and so embarked on my long association with what eventually became UKCP.

It led also to that with EAP, the European Association for Psychotherapy, of the Journal of which, *International Journal of Psychotherapy*, I became the commissioning inaugural editor in 1994, to 2004. Between 1989 and 1992 I did a psychoanalytically based MSc Psychotherapy training at the University of Leeds.

In 1994, despite representing one for 6 years, and helping the other to achieve membership of UKCP, I was disenfranchised (refused accreditation) by both the Yorkshire-based psychoanalytic organisations, explicitly, and in writing, on the grounds that I was ‘too integrative’, they being in the midst of a conservative-orthodox psychoanalytic reaction, spurred by the emergence of UKCP. I gradually ‘crossed the floor’ and moved into association with the Humanistic and Integrative Psychotherapy community. With my then wife, Kate, in 1991, I set up Scarborough Psychotherapy Training Institute, which in 1994 began Integrative Counselling trainings, and in 1997 Integrative Psychotherapy trainings. It achieved Organisational Membership of UKCP in 2003. These broad brush strokes naturally omit much detail.

It became clear, that, with my theological background, and my sense of values derived from elsewhere than psychotherapy, that from the first I took to the the world of *developing ecumenical psychotherapy* politics like a duck to water.

Within the Rugby Conference and UKSCP, I developed frameworks and models to enable a federal holding of the psychoanalytic community, which did indeed hold till 1993, when the British Confederation of Psychotherapists (BCP, now British Psychoanalytic Council, BPC) left UKCP, as had been long feared, but which was held back for the crucial four years after 1989. UKCP then became chronically caught up in, and paralysed by, the psychoanalytic issue for many many long years, until James Pollard, and the College of Psychoanalysts, between them, released us from it, in considerable measure, between 2002/2005.

Now, of course, as we approach statutory regulation, the irony is that the danger for the narrative psychotherapies is from short term immediate-effectiveness based work such as various forms of Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy and, for instance, Mentalization-based therapy (Fonagy et al., 2002).

I achieved or began to achieve four major clarifications in those years, in dialogue with others, some in UKCP, some in EAP, some in the evolution of the Scarborough concept. I may have been the major ‘drafting Caesar’ in UKCP, but was far from the only generator of the ideas. Nevertheless, I was perceived as central to the process, as was reflected in my being chosen to give the inaugural address when UKSCP (United Kingdom Standing Conference for Psychotherapy) was formed in 1989.

First I worked out an overall pluralistic conceptualisation of the psychotherapy field in terms of the *narrative-programmatic* contrast. This relates to Jean Knox’s Professional Knowledge concern for a broad-based approach to monopoly issues in psychotherapy, her asking, ‘who owns the Unconscious?’ That was certainly our major question originally in UKCP.
Secondly, I formulated the concept of a generic meta-modality base, ‘Core Philosophy’ as we in the committee for Section and Organisation called it then, which became the basis of the Sections, and led onwards, perhaps unfortunately in the light of recent events (but I do not think the path could have gone any other way), to the ‘super-modality’ concept which is now currency.

Thirdly, in Scarborough (following, as I have said, prior efforts in Wakefield which came to nothing, educationally, but gave me the curriculum skills, acquired whilst doing my Certificate in Education 1987-1988), I worked to develop the paradigm for an Integrative training first in Counselling and then in Psychotherapy. I drew on John Heron’s Six Category Intervention concept in this (Heron, 1975, 2001) but I adapted it; I divided the six categories into three pairs, Supportive-Catalytic, Cathartic-Confronting, and Informative-Prescriptive. Roughly, these mapped a spectrum of interventions and metapsychologies from Rogerian Person-Centred at one end, through Psychoanalytic and Energetic-Contact based approaches, in the centre, and on to Cognitive and Constructivist approaches. All the approaches had all the elements but with differing emphases.

This model went through various mutations and deepenings, one of which I articulated in my account of three aspects of Freud’s evolution (energy, meaning, and support/identification), as seen through the eyes of both Nick Totton and Jacques Derrida, in 2000 (Wilkinson, 2000). Eventually it linked up with the fourth element to which I am now coming.

The fourth development was the core development, which eventually at long last led to the psychotherapy understanding re-unifying with the literary and philosophical ones, and, in my writing, reaching its apotheosis in the chapter on Shakespeare I have already evoked, in The Muse. It was the recognition of the meaning of silence.

I embarked on a long struggle to understand what was going on with a phenomenon I experienced both in myself and in my clients, and which did not seem to be recognised except sidelong in most of the psychotherapy literature (particular partial exceptions were Searles’s work, Little, 1981, and Winnicott, in Winnicott, 1963). It was the phenomenon of the inexpressible and the silent in the process, the secret and the hidden in the work. It was connected with shame, but was not reducible to shame in terms of the developmental model. Because it epitomised a fundamental ontological chasm between experience and language, recognition of it was tied to a profound rejection which I was seeking to articulate, of reductive, or ideologically psychotherapeutic, models of normality, and of the overcoming of resistance, a rejection I hoped to ground in a different meta-concept.

I was dimly and implicitly aware that, in the intrinsically alienated nature of language derived from the physical realm, from objecthood, as mapped by Kant and Hegel, and in a different way Jaynes (1975/1990), and therefore of the uneliminable primary metaphoricity of language, as applied to human experience and consciousness, lay the solution to my problem (c.f., Hellevig, 2006). Language is inherently incommensurable with experience – any experience – and can only use objectivising metaphors which are quite irreducible, uneliminably metaphoric, and enactive.
Time and again in my own supervision or in therapy I would find myself silent and sensing that there was something to articulate which was intrinsically inarticulable, until it gradually dawned on me that in that ‘intrinsically inarticulable’ lay not only the problem, but also the solution (I recognised a fellow insight in Jon Hellevig’s work, 2006). A way had to be found which, respecting the intrinsically inarticulable aspect, nevertheless allowed us to speak, about feelings, about human situations, about desire, and the nature of desire, about human nature and the content of experience.

*This way is primary metaphoricity enacted and embodied in dramatic interchange.*

The interchanges I have had about the dimension of the ‘It’, in relation with the I-Thou, with Ken Evans, and in relation to embodiment with Roz Carroll and Suzy Orbach, in the Professional Knowledge context, pick up from here.

This was most born in on me in the exploration of my own countertransference in my work with an almost totally silent client, whom I worked with in the early 90s when this development was coming into its own. I have honoured this iconic client indirectly in a fictional exchange which is given as an illustration (in Wilkinson, 2009b) and which approximates *in mode not content* to the way we worked:

- A nearly silent session with a silent client…
- Enactments at the level of countertransference…
- I imagine something vaguely erotic…
- I then experience a sense of paralysis and frozenness…
- Against that background I consider my erotic image…
- It is as if it is excluded by the frozenness of what I suddenly recognise as shame…
- Images of shrivelling and frozen breaking up with such a hard frost come to me…
- I share with my client an image of the perma-frost…
- She nods assent – recognising this completely as a conveying of the atmosphere…
- After scanning the element of risk in saying this, I say I can imagine the spring that is to come…
- I see the ghost of a smile on her face and her colour changes but she remains silent…
- I am certain she has sensed the erotic connotations and I feel a connection and a warming…
- Now I can hear the thunder of the melting waters beneath the ice…
- I share my image with her…
- She smiles again…
- I am aware I am beginning to write a poem in my mind…
- Her silence has not been broken…
- But the spring poem has begun to be written…
- I think of Tolstoy’s *Anna Karenina* and the Russian spring…
- A Russian winter lay across Tolstoy’s own soul…
- Tolstoy tried to shout down his eros…
- In her silence her eros is free to unfold…
- I think of Cordelia, Lear on his ‘wheel of fire’ of shame…
- And Tolstoy’s hatred of *King Lear*…

49
Winston Smith’s wonderfully Blakean dream in Orwell’s 1984…
Suddenly he was standing on short springy turf, on a summer evening when the slanting rays of the sun gilded the ground. The landscape that he was looking at recurred so often in his dreams that he was never fully certain whether or not he had seen it in the real world. In his waking thoughts he called it the Golden Country. It was an old, rabbit-bitten pasture, with a foot-track wandering across it and a molehill here and there. In the ragged hedge on the opposite side of the field the boughs of the elm trees were swaying very faintly in the breeze, their leaves just stirring in dense masses like women’s hair. Somewhere near at hand, though out of sight, there was a clear, slow-moving stream where dace were swimming in the pools under the willow trees.

The girl with dark hair was coming towards them across the field. With what seemed a single movement she tore off her clothes and flung them disdainfully aside. Her body was white and smooth, but it aroused no desire in him, indeed he barely looked at it. What overwhelmed him in that instant was admiration for the gesture with which she had thrown her clothes aside. With its grace and carelessness it seemed to annihilate a whole culture, a whole system of thought, as though Big Brother and the Party and the Thought Police could all be swept into nothingness by a single splendid movement of the arm. That too was a gesture belonging to the ancient time. Winston woke up with the word ‘Shakespeare’ on his lips.

And I think of the affirmation of desire in Blake’s *Ah Sunflower!*
My client looks at me dewy eyed – and sighs deeply and contentedly…
Without a word, she has welcomed her eros…
No more need be said…
The session ends.

I am able to process my images to the point where I can offer her part of one of them – the perma-frost. My relationship with her is such that I know, normally, what she will comfortably receive from me, and this is one such. I then risk mentioning the spring to come – and again she receives this. The third image I share is of the thundering melt-waters beneath the ice. For a third time she receives (Note 6). Then, because she has received my comments and images, I am free to become aware of the poetic flow of my thoughts, and I simply allow them to unfold, and of their own sequence they pass from the Tolstoyan winter in relation to eros to the Shakespearean and Blakean spring and awakening. The flow engages us both at the embodied level without the need of words, but expressed in her dewy-eyed sigh of welcome – which of course is, at the subtlest level, erotic arousal and satisfaction. For the moment, she has passed beyond shame.

These connections of the poem have come up just here; even though the pathway was familiar, but unexpected was the passage into the recognition of Tolstoy’s own shame and shouting down of his own eros, and the greater creativity (and eros) of Shakespeare’s Cordelia. The shame of eros is as equally present in Blake as the release of eros. The range of cross-connections is so vast it is not possible except as an enactment, and as writing.
It gradually also became clear that the (in Stern’s, 2004, language) ‘present moment’ and ‘moment of meeting’ and ‘sloppy’ aspects of the work, the element I thought of in terms of experimental theatre, were equally ‘inexpressible’ in virtue of their ‘intrinsically inarticulable’ character. And the whole of the background presuppositions of the work were equally so. And so on. This gradual emergence led me to the formulations of three dimensions of psychotherapy I expressed in Chapter 1 of The Muse as Therapist (Wilkinson, 2009a), and which supplement the humanistic-integrative prime emphasis on relation and dialogue (e.g., in Ken Evans’ Professional Knowledge presentation, on the primacy of the dialogical):

Both poetry and psychotherapy have a central or primal dimension, an involvement of the experience of the ground of the process, which is the incommunicable or, perhaps, the pre-communicable. This I call ‘pre-communicability’, and it is my starting point above. But, for the full comprehension of what is implicit in that, we need two more dimensions.

Secondly, both psychotherapy and poetry further have a dimension of relation – in a field of relationship – which I call ‘the relational field’. (In relational and attachment-based, developmental, approaches, - both psychoanalytic, and Humanistic-Integrative, - the dimensions of this have of course been pretty fully explored.)

Thirdly, both have a potentially infinite dimension of cross-referential meaning, of textuality, which reaches beyond any specific instance of meaning, and to which I allude as ‘text and context’. This is the dimension, involving the capacity for metaphoric thinking, which Lacan calls the symbolic, Derrida ‘writing’, the dimension which emerges in Piaget as the movement from concrete/animistic to formal mental operations (c.f. Searles, 1965/1993), and which Jaynes (1990) regards as what defines the transition from bicameral/hallucinatory forms of intentionality to consciousness-based ones. (This dimension also provides a developmental criterion, which complicates the picture, but also holds out the prospect of solution to several problems, to which we shall return.)

It will be seen that this is the new version of the three aspect mapping I originally had derived from John Heron. It is the last phase of the emerging understanding of silence and the inexpressible, prior to my grasping the significance of enactment, which unified the three dimensions in a totality.

Once I grasped, following the completion of The Muse as Therapist, that enactment encompasses, in a multiplex and unitive way, the whole of all three aspects, this mapping, though I still think there is something valuable in it, ceased to be quite so crucial. It was the last ditch attempt to find a cognitive expression, however subtle, of the dilemma (this parallels where Derrida, 1967/1973 had reached, see below).

Compassing the nature of integration, and developing curricular models of psychotherapy and counselling training, and pluralistic models of the psychotherapy field, were drawn into this core, where my deepest heart and fascination lay.
It was in this area of the ‘intrinsically inarticulable’. It connected with my search for my deepest self, of course, in the process. In these years from 1987 to 1998, when I moved to London, five major new intellectual-cultural-spiritual discoveries took me forward in this area (and along with them I also found the Wittgenstein of *Philosophical Investigations, On Certainty, and Culture and Value* of huge helpfulness):

Ogburn on Shakespeare,
Jacques Derrida;
Robert Pirsig’s *Lila*;
Nietzsche’s *My Sister and I* (c.f., Wilkinson, 2002c);

I also found the work of Francisco Varela (Varela, et al. 1991) to which I was pointed by David Boadella, very valuable, and I was drawn cautiously in a Buddhist direction.

Derrida I approached via the already mentioned *The Postcard: From Socrates to Freud*, (Derrida, 1980/1987), to which I was introduced by a reference in some material on Lacan’s own commentary on *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (the most uncanny of Freud’s texts) by John Forrester, published in *Free Associations*. But Derrida had suggested, - to my mind, stretching beyond what rationally he is entitled to claim, - that there is a dimension as it were underpinning all rationally articulable dimensions, which cannot be conceptualised at all, in a sense, and can only be approached sidelong. In *Différance* (Derrida, 1967/1973) he puts it as strongly as this (it corresponds to the residually conceptualising ‘expressing the silence’ concept I was drawn to, and, as already indicated, connects up with the Kantian arguments against absolute space and time I have already touched upon):

So much so that the detours, locutions, and syntax in which I will often have to take recourse will resemble those of negative theology, occasionally even to the point of being indistinguishable from negative theology. Already we have had to delineate that *différance is not*, does not exist, is not a present-being (‘on’, Greek) in any form; and we will be led to delineate also everything that it is not, that is, everything; and consequently that it has neither existence nor essence. It derives from no category of being, whether present or absent. And yet those aspects of *différance* which are thereby delineated are not theological, not even in the order of the most negative of negative theologies, which are always: concerned with disengaging a superessentiality beyond the finite categories of essence and existence, that is, of presence, and always hastening to recall that God is refused the predicate of existence, only in order to acknowledge his superior, inconceivable, and ineffable mode of being. Such a development is not in question here, and this will be confirmed progressively. *différance* is not only irreducible to any ontological or theological - ontotheological - reappropriation, but as the very opening of the space in which ontotheology - philosophy - produces its system and its history, it includes ontotheology, inscribing it and exceeding it without return.

What attracted me about this, and similar elements in Derrida’s work, nevertheless, is precisely that sense of the *core of silence and invisibility* underpinning the possibility of explicit conceptualising discourse. At the point I have now reached, I would of course see it as, implicitly, the invoking of the incommensurability with the cognitive-
objective, (but which does not contradict it), of enactment, the element of what Kant calls practical reason (Kant, 1788, 1997), and which is, as such, action, not knowing.

There was a convergence from two sides: from the side of silence, and from the side of text and symbol (both are manifest in the vision of Différance). For a while, also, I felt they were at other ends of the spectrum, if not opposed to one another, until I belatedly understood my intuition that they were two sides of the same coin, and was able to clarify the relationship! (The developed version of the three-aspect model was an expression of that anxiety that they were opposed, but also my way to move to resolution of it.)

I was invited to contribute workshops to Psychodynamic/Integrative Psychotherapy courses in Cork, Eire, from 1993 onwards (they ran up to 2009), and this instinct that they were reciprocal was manifest in the ‘Story Space’ workshop which I developed, in which ‘Story Space’ or ‘Symbolic Space’ (inside the chalk circle) is contrasted with ‘Real Time’ space (outside the chalk circle). Participants use props, or not, as they choose, to enact real – or imaginary, or legendary etc – scenes, or they may just improvise. The work expresses with great vividness the subtle intersection of the ‘symbolic’ with ‘the inexpressible’. We have enacted at various times very directly personal things, but likewise also such narratives as: the funeral of a warrior king of Ireland; and Ophelia floating Hamlet off down the river.

And this tension between silence and symbolic articulation, it will be seen, is the common issue in these works which I was discovering around then.

I found Ogburn’s book in a Wakefield bookshop, opening up for me the Shakespeare authorship issue (as already discussed, carried to its deepest length in the discussion of Edgar, as the cipher of the hidden author, writing almost certainly at the lowest ebb of his life, in King Lear in Chapter 4 of The Muse as Therapist).

Then, from a Sheffield bookshop, came Nietzsche’s asylum writing, My Sister and I, dismissed as fraudulent by the Nietzsche orthodoxy (Wilkinson, 2002c), but for me the most authentic and the furthest and loneliest development of his path into deeper consciousness, where he breaks out of his insulation within his symbolic vision into sheer heart-rending collision with his humanity, and where his discovery and recognition of Diogenes takes him even further into the dimension of the enactive than in his published non-apocryphal works.

And in a Manchester bookshop, I stumbled across Julian Jaynes (1975/1990), account of his discovery that in the longest stretch of our existence as linguistic beings, we humans did not possess the capacity for self-consciousness in the Kantian sense, and that bicameral language was, paradoxically, completely public in Wittgenstein’s sense (Wittgenstein, 1953/1967, Wilkinson, 2003b). He also recognises that self-consciousness is intrinsically based in metaphor, primary metaphoricity, self-narration, which paved the way to the enactment model, for me. His very Kantian line of reasoning and analysis, recognising that human consciousness alters in history, - as it alters in individual development, - through primary metaphorisation, through the development of the metaphorical capacity drawing on objectification, in shaping consciousness in relation to world, and reflexively in relation to itself, led me on to the formulation of phenomenological or intentional causality. This in turn opened the
way to my recognising that the shift in psychotherapeutic thinking which I felt was needed was an ontological one (c.f., Wilkinson, 1998, 1999). In the end, I would now say, it revealed that consciousness itself is an enactment (this harks back to Sartre, who recognises the decisionality of consciousness, once more - in a sense).

Robert Pirsig’s second book, *Lila* (1991), which addressed the anti-psychiatry issues in depth, but also, with his distinction between static quality and dynamic quality, offered another model of the dichotomy I was struggling with. Pirsig (1974) had offered a less complete version of it in the Classic/Romantic disjunction of *Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance*.

This all ran parallel with my move to London, in 1998, which was the expression of a great gradual emergence into my own identity, which had now reached crystallisation point. By 2003 when I began the Doctorate, I had, in a sense, without realising it, ‘got’ my problem, in the manner of heuristic enquiry.

To repeat what I said above, if I say that the research question of this enquiry is something like (though this is of course too simple):

> how could the silent core of experience find words, and such richly ramified and concentrated symbolic words, when it cannot be conceptualised as such?

then the answer becomes, because it is and becomes enactment.

But it was really only the answer which enabled me to name the question.

Initially when I began the Doctorate, it was to be addressed in the terms of a novel, but this proved overambitious. I have discussed the pivotal role of fiction and narrative in my research concept. The journey through the doctorate has been my journey – mainly a matter of clearing false starts out of the way, which I have illustrated in relation to the best of them, *Episodes and Scenes* (Wilkinson, 2005a) – to this conceptualisation.

In essence, all the pieces were now in place; all I had to do was stumble into them, which I have done in the process of the Doctorate. All I needed now to do was to find the key concept which welds it all together.
V. Putting the pieces together: Development and Application

Initially I had intended to organise my approach to the Doctorate around a novel based on a fictional seminar on Nietzsche’s *My Sister and I*. It soon became clear that this was over-ambitious for me, at least at this point.

The steps towards realisation, tracked in the various, both unsuccessful and successful submissions for earlier parts of the Doctorate, were:

1. First came the discovery of the pattern concept, the ‘core psychodynamic discovery’ to which I had alluded in Wilkinson, 2003b, and which I integrated as follows in Wilkinson, 2009c, in connection with the poetic paradigm (the reference to *Unitive* here drew also from the collaboration with Tricia Scott as spearheading the Integrative-Humanistic formulations for the Skills for Health mapping project for Humanistic Psychological Therapy).

   The core idea is that we are all intrinsically engaged in a temporal process, which gets itself structured in ways which relate to patterns which are all-pervasive in our process. This happens in therapy and in ‘real life’ and also in other frame-based contexts (indeed there is no ‘absolute’ ‘real life’, *everything* is in some frame or another, which is why enactment is universal process). The acceptance of this is common ground amongst the psychotherapies, though there are many labels for it.

   Arguably this is the great psychodynamic discovery, more primary than the unconscious and less restricted in its scope (Stern, 2004, Wilkinson, 2003). If this is accepted, then *the whole of experience*, - rather than a split off part, which is seen as the ‘real’ meaning of an expressed part, as in much psychoanalysis, and some elements in integrative and humanistic approaches - becomes the vehicle of therapeutic process.

   Then also therapeutic work can take a whole variety of forms, experimentally and creatively and according to individual style and skill, without the obsession with ‘the one right way’.

   Taking a difference in emphasis to an extreme, one might say that in traditional psychoanalysis the patterned temporal psychodynamic process is channelled into the narrowest channel, so as to intensify the process of dissolution of illusion. By contrast, in an integrative-humanistic, poetic-integrative, framework, the aim, rather, of the use of the psychodynamic process is to increase connection with inner and outer reality by emphasising *unitive* congruences and relationship.

   Even Person-Centred approaches are psychodynamic, in this broad sense, with their inner-outer dialectic, their movement from other-directedness to Self-directedness; and the overlaps with Kohut and Jung have been oft-noted (e.g., Rowan, 1998)!

   So the difference between psychoanalytic approaches and integrative-humanistic ones is *not* in the general acceptance or rejection of the
psychodynamic hypothesis, but in what they do with it, and the scope that they
give it. Perhaps paradoxically, therefore, integrative-humanistic approaches do
indeed normalise the psychodynamic hypothesis itself more comprehensively
than psychoanalytic ones do. The latter stop half way and keep it at the
pathological or reductive end of the spectrum (corresponding to Freud’s
original hypothesis splitting conscious and unconscious, primary process and
secondary process, reality principle and pleasure principle, and so on).

Developing the recognition of the core psychodynamic hypothesis, Stern
writes:

I was prepared to see present behaviour as an instantiation of larger
behavioural and psychological patterns. That is the essence of the
psychodynamic hypothesis. However, I was surprised to see larger
psychodynamic patterns reflected in units as small as present moments.
This realisation opened up the way to consider the present moment,
like a dream [my italics], as a phenomenon worthy of exploration for

Seen in this light, the connection seems straightforward, and my regarding the ‘in the
company of angels’ passage, in my paper on Daniel Stern’s The Present Moment, as a
key formulation of my position up to that point, seems reasonable:

Is this psychoanalysis? Freud wrote to Groddeck (Groddeck, 1988) that the
defining features of psychoanalysis were transference, resistance, and the
unconscious. In such work as we are now envisaging, upon a spectrum,
transference oscillates with dialogue; resistance oscillates with play; and
unconscious or non-conscious are part of a total spectrum, to which total
access even in principle is contradictory, but which exerts its awesome
pressure moment by moment in our work, wherein we both study the sacred
‘Holy Writ’ of the ‘present moment’, - but in the company of angels, of the
whole encompassing ‘kosmos’ of our human, animal, and cultural history
brought to its head in this Kierkegaardian ‘instant’, or the ‘Moment’ of
Nietzsche’s ‘eternal return’ (cf., Thus Spoke Zarathustra, part III, On the
Vision and the Riddle, Nietzsche, 1883); and all of these are in continuity with
what has been known as psychoanalysis; and constant and endless dynamic
effects, in the fullest psychoanalytic sense (this is the core psychoanalytic
discovery, not repression), play through all aspects of the process. And in the
light of this, also, the distinction between ‘active’ and ‘verbal’ psychotherapies
becomes minor, by comparison with the vast processes of pattern-enactments
and explorations, and pattern transcendings, in the work. (Wilkinson, 2003b,
pp. 251-2)

UKCP’s Conference About a Body, my equivalence material for Professional
Knowledge, where I dialogued with Carroll and Orbach, and wrestled with the
paradoxes of embodiment, but before I had conceptualised enactment, came now.

2. Following that step, I attempted, but without sufficient clarity, to use ‘story and
process’ as paradigms. Something was taking me beyond narrativity per se.
Narrativity and process, alone, did not go far enough, to do the job I needed to do.

3. Next, in Episodes and Scenes
http://hewardwilkinson.co.uk/EpisodesandScenes.pdf
I took a major step forward, using the concept of the dramatic scene, which brought the living dynamic process centre stage. As I have indicated, I already had formulated for use the concept of enactment in this presentation, without realising that it was the solution to my problem. The development of the three aspect model led me to the point where I was able write the book. But the first chapter of the book as it stands only touches on, and lists, enactment merely in a conglomerate fashion.

4. In *A terrible beauty is born*, the RAL 4&5 synopsis of my work http://hewardwilkinson.co.uk/ATerribleBeautyisBornRal4and5.pdf

I tried to solve the problem with an existential formulation, but I also took a big step forward in locating the whole thing in the realm of a literary-aesthetic conceptualisation. In the RAL 4 section, I recognised and articulated my work on phenomenological causality as the foundation of these later developments, and, in the RAL 5 part of the submission, produced a map of all my major writings and papers relevant to the work of the Doctorate. This encompassed the three major themes of my work up to that point, the development of the phenomenological causality line of thought, as ‘Integrative Field Theory of Psychotherapy’, the development of a Pluralistic concept of integration, and the Integration of Existential and Psychoanalytic strands within the field of psychotherapy, culminating in my paper on Daniel Stern’s *The Present Moment* http://hewardwilkinson.co.uk/SternReview.pdf

which, as already indicated, I saw as the fullest statement of my overall concept prior to the Doctorate. The concerns of this mapping overlapped with the material offered by Ken Evans, Jean Knox, and Anne Kearns, and with the *About a Body* Conference. It becomes clear, from this mapping, that the enactment concept of *The Muse as Therapist* is the culmination of my development, the making explicit of something which had been implicit, not something created *de novo.*

5. I also at that point became clear about the need to dissolve the fact/fiction antithesis (comparing Boswellian biography to the great novelists to illustrate the point in *Episodes and Scenes*). This relates to what Miller Mair and Jane Speedy offered in their presentations. All these play some part in the final synthesis.

6. As I strove to communicate my insight, repeated presentations at Metanoia, in Paul Barber’s seminars (Paul helped me reach for clarity in them at a crucial time), and elsewhere, led to the formulations, first, of the ‘Poetry is therapy: therapy is poetry’ slogan, and, secondly, to using the concept of enactment as a way of getting it across, as I explained in my revised Learning Agreement submission in January 2008.

I stumbled into these just by the process of what was forced upon me by default in the process of explaining things. This was an emblem of the catalytic effect the entire Doctoral process had upon me, including the oppositional elements in it. I took for granted these insights, so that it was not until I was compelled to use them in explanations that I realised they were the paradigms I had all along been seeking.

The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something – just because it is always before one’s eyes.) The real foundations of his enquiry do not strike a man at all. Unless that fact has at some time struck him. And this means: we fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and most powerful. (Wittgenstein, 1953/1967, §129)
VI. Notes on my participation in Metanoia Professional Knowledge Seminars

In this note I explore what I found relevant to my project, already touched on in the previous material.

I have attended five professional knowledge seminars, and I also am claiming equivalence for my participation in the UKCP Professional Conference on About a Body of 2004, from which a book arose of which I was co-editor and for which I wrote the Introduction.

The five seminars were delivered by:
Miller Mair
Anne Kearns
Ken Evans
Jean Knox
Jane Speedy

Of these five the most immediately relevant to the poetic paradigm I have developed were Miller Mair’s and Jane Speedy’s. I touch on the other three first, then. Anne Kearns presented a seminar, drawing from her Metanoia Doctoral Project on the Seven Deadly Sins of Supervision. This was a helpful and mature opportunity to explore the tensions of supervision work, the severity of shadow elements, and the ethical dilemmas which are a part of the world of supervision in the context of regulation, and of increasing levels of litigation against practitioners. Ken Evans explored the dialogical paradigm – We Are, Therefore I am - in relation to conflict resolution using psychotherapeutic insight in the modern world. This relational paradigm for me forms one part of the three aspects of poetic disclosure and psychotherapy praxis which I explore in my book, the other two being Text and Context and the Pre-Communicable, the latter which has some relations to Groddeck’s concept of ‘It’, which is different to Buber’s, and more positive. I raised this issue with Ken but in the end it was held in suspense. Jean Knox explored the question, who owns the unconscious, from a Jungian point of view, and in effect offered a broadly ecumenical or integrative understanding, close to my own pluralism, connecting with archetypal understandings of the ground of praxis in our field. I found Jean Knox helpful enough to approach her as my academic adviser but she was unable to take this up.

I found all three useful and stimulating and always they give me opportunity in the process elements of the seminar to test out my own intuitions and how they relate to what is being presented. In all three my intuitions were welcome, in different ways, and appeared to make sense against the background of what was being presented.

Miller Mair’s interest in exploring writing as therapeutic is of course very close to my own concerns, and I found his Seminar exceptionally validating of my poetic starting point, and it was received as such by him. I also approached him as my academic adviser, on the basis of this seminar and he too was unable to take it up.

Jane Speedy’s Seminar on Collective Writing I found extremely clear and useful methodologically, drawing on approaches pioneered in Narrative Therapy, and it gave opportunity to explore the relations between positivistic evidence-based approaches to
research and arts/creative writing narrative based approaches, which are more aesthetically based. This is very close to my own position, although additionally I believe I have elaborated the poetic paradigm as an epistemology, implicating the alternative a priori ontological-philosophical dimension of the ‘a priori of the particular’ as enactivity, in my work, in a way I do not know anyone else has done. Jane Speedy takes for granted a post-modern concept in which ‘the process’ is what is creative, rather than the individual ego of authors and creators. This is very close to what I am evoking in the enactment concept, and it was exceptionally useful to be able to correlate what I have done with such a developed methodological concept.

The UKCP Conference on About a Body, for which I am claiming equivalence, took place in 2004, and the book of the same title, co-edited with Jenny Corrigall and Helen Payne, was produced in 2006. I wrote the introduction, which was praised by Cathy Kaplinsky in her review of it for the Journal of Analytical Psychology in 2008 as a masterly survey of the philosophical intricacies evoked by the different approaches to the body and understanding the body developed at this conference, from neo-Darwinian to full-blooded spiritual-phenomenological understandings, such as those derived from Buddhism presented by Maura Sills. The dialogue between Roz Carroll and Susie Orbach, reproduced much as it took place in the book, evoked in particular an extremely vivid ‘embodied counter-transference’ in the resulting discussion, including my own question about the ‘Id/It’ as a mediating concept, which I would now characterise as an enactment in both the psychoanalytic, and the poetic, senses of the concept. My introduction, written in 2006, is completely comfortable with the neo-Darwinian/phenomenological spirituality spectrum – and there is not yet a hint in it of the concept of enactment as I now formulate it, despite the fact that in my RPPL Episodes and Scenes of 2005 I had already framed this concept.

http://hewardwilkinson.co.uk/EpisodesandScenes.pdf

So hard is it to grasp ones own insights! In this piece, writing about Michael Soth’s presentation, I even wrote:

Soth pursues a narrative as a kind of parable. The parable he is telling is that of convergence – convergence of the whole multiplicity of aspects of the self, in the context of the relational experience of re-enactment.

This is what, once clearly conceptualised as poetic process, the concept of enactment as such in the poetic paradigm. But here I have not yet crossed into that awareness, although it is on the cusp of such awareness. As such I claimed it as a staging post on my way, to be accepted as equivalent to a 6th Professional Knowledge Seminar.
VII. Future Developments and Applications

Central to my enquiry and position, then, is a core challenge upon the limitations of empiricism. Even heuristic enquiry, in my terms, is enactment, and enactment as a concept annuls the empirical/la priori dichotomy. The concept of being for human beings, or for Dasein, is to be delineated in terms of enactment.

The concept of enactment opens up the philosophic, literary, and psychotherapeutic traditions. I cannot do more than allude to it here, but there is an entire background analysis to be given of the history of thought in terms of the enactment concept. I have sketched a little of it with Leavis’s help in relation to Shakespeare; and more of it in relation to Keats. A good deal of Chapter 5 of The Muse as Therapist, developing Kant’s place in history, and the role of the concepts of ‘imagination’ and ‘the dissociation of sensibility’ (TS Eliot) is about this. In further development of this, such names as Spinoza, Leibniz, Pascal, Rousseau, Hamann, Vico, and Herder, and then Kant on Practical Reason, Goethe, Coleridge, Keats, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, Marx, Wagner, the great novelists and poets, the great pioneer psychotherapists, phenomenologists, and existentialists, the theologians Barth, Von Balthasar, and Tillich, as well as Bergson, Wittgenstein, and Whitehead, would come in. The emergence of object relations and self-psychology, and such approaches as Gestalt and Psychodrama, and Core Process, and Focusing, would be reconfigured in this light. This is a mere sketch. I am currently offering aspects of such an overview in the Applied Philosophy courses I am running in Cork and London.

In relation to evidence-based approaches, the inherent open-endedness, and creativity, of enactive enquiry, which annuls any concept of manualisation, is what emerges. The evidence-based concept is at the objectivising end of the polarity I have explored. As such, it cannot provide the epistemology and ontological foundations for its own concept, though it can be conceptualised from this other end of the spectrum. Closed system communication is a subset of open system communication, not the reverse; programme presupposes narrative. The limitations of any aspiration towards a finite mapping of therapy, and a merely ‘doing’-based approach to therapy (for enactment is the very converse of a mere ‘doing’-based approach, though it can incorporate those elements), become deeply evident on an enactment-based approach to therapy. Enactivity can assimilate programme, but not vice versa.

The most significant piece of this enquiry is the chapter on Shakespeare and the authorship issue; this is through and through an existential and narrative enquiry. It is a test case of considerable scope, an application to a specific problem, which sheds dramatic new light. It is of necessity a journey into, but also out of, solitude. If this is not existential research, then nor would any creative activity be. It is the test case of a certain view of the faultlines of modern history, and of the thesis of psychological congruence between life and work. This view has recently received dramatic confirmation in the central framework of James Shapiro’s Stratfordian defence of the authorship of Shakespeare in a principled denial of the congruence thesis (c.f., Wilkinson, 2010):

To counter this without a simplistic biographical concept needs the enactment principle. The scale and number of the incognito encounters in *King Lear* is a cipher or signifier of the author’s predicament. We may think of: Kent, Edgar, Lear himself, possibly Cordelia as the Fool, or mirrored in the Fool, Cordelia as Christ, the kenotic element in the work, disguises, disguises, disguises….; there are the themes of clothes, ‘lendings’, ‘sophistication’, the theme of conferred authority, and so on. As the formal authority frame in the play collapses, there is a deep reversion to pagan themes (which Freud picked up in the *Theme of the three caskets* paper, 1913). Through the psychopomp role of Edgar, I developed the tracing of the Elf King element in *King Lear*, with the allusion to Childe Rolande, the significance of the name Albe/righ (also de Vere’s forebear – and the name which converts into the impresarial Oberon in *A Midsummer Night’s Dream*), etc., the Elf King taking us to the mediaeval Green Man, the ballad of Sir Gawain and the Green Knight, the pagan-Druid core, which both Blake and Keats discerned, and to the Celtic Horned god Cerrenous, Lord of Misrule (brought out in the 2008 Globe production of *King Lear*), - and which also makes sense of the apparent ‘melodrama’, the Grail Knight element, of the Edgar/Edmund re-encounter, which made so little sense to so many, and which the great and revered Peter Brook nevertheless even ventured to cut! This is a major ground-breaking chapter, accessing De Vere’s links with ancient English tradition.

It has been recognised as such in a review in an Oxfordian journal, *Brief Chronicles*: [http://www.briefchronicles.com/ojs/index.php/bc/article/view/18/44](http://www.briefchronicles.com/ojs/index.php/bc/article/view/18/44) and a revised version of it is to be published in the second issue of *Brief Chronicles*. This in turn enables us to see fiction as a path back to fact….. ; the use of the plays as a way in to the Shakespeare authorship question, is the great test case of the annulling of the fact/fiction antithesis. This is multi-disciplinary, not empirical research.

Now I have formulated it all, it is being constantly applied in my work. Again, in the light of the conception I have developed, many invitations to multidisciplinary dialogue are beginning to come my way. I have given:
- A contribution to the Conference on FR Leavis (‘Revaluing Leavis’) at Downing College Cambridge, in 2009;
- A keynote address on the Poetic Paradigm to the European Association for Integrative Psychotherapy in Crewe in 2009;
- Written a paper on Poetic Integration to the Journal of UKAPI (United Kingdom Association for Psychotherapy Integration. Wilkinson, 2009c);
- Contributed a chapter (Wilkinson, 2009b) on Derrida in terms of the Poetic Paradigm to the book *Beyond Post-Modernism: New Dimensions in Clinical Theory and Practice*, Edited by Roger Frie and Donna Orange (Routledge).
- The first chapter of *The Muse as Therapist* is being rewritten for inclusion in the inaugural issue of *The Canadian Journal of Psychotherapy and Counselling*.

I presented two submissions, for a paper, and a workshop, to the SEPI Conference in Florence, May 2010, on Evidence in Psychotherapy; the paper, whose title is (with apologies to WVO Quine) *Occam's Razor or Plato's Beard? Why Psychotherapy Evidence is Philosophical - not Scientific-Empirical*, has now been accepted.

After I had spoken to the Humanistic and Integrative Psychotherapy Section on this theme in July 2008, a colleague wrote to me:
For some time it has seemed to me that as with music a classical foundation is a good basis but for therapy we find each session more like a jazz jam session and that mindful capacity is what training needs to prepare us for as well as knowing our own natural rhythms and inner music. Your conceptual model gives a valuable framework for developing this. At the same time we need to know how to tune the instruments we use and in that sense the scope of a particular nervous system is also important.

The end of chapter 5 offers just a beginning—just a beginning, exceedingly compressed! - of how to go about absorbing (without annulling) the developmental dimension in terms of existential-enactive concepts. Heidegger’s three aspect time concept is applied to Freud and the later metapsychology. This, with its inevitable compression and lack of full elucidation, is certainly indeed just a beginning. There is a new conception of authenticity and negative capability in the work—or rather an application and taking seriously of those conceptions, not abstract and idealised versions of them. There is a new conception of *practical reason*, updating Kant.

It is a sweeping vision—*but* with a nucleus, a major single core concept, that of enactment, in Leavis’s original sense. My *Epilogue*, Chapter 6, having sketched the concept once again in relation to the issues of Statutory Regulation, ends as follows:

I also now think that, as a result of the concerted work which has been over the years, my current endeavour of posing an alternative paradigm for psychotherapy based in poetry and the arts, not in the sciences, is not as absurd seeming or quixotic as it once would have seemed. Of course the powerful movement to scientise psychotherapy will continue, and the advances in neuroscience and similar fields will buttress that. But, as Daniel Stern’s work, and Allan Schore’s work, in particular, illustrates (whatever my theoretical arguments with Stern himself), the awareness of the richer phenomenology of human selfhood is ever-increasing, and is having to be taken into account in the neuroscientific investigations which are going ahead. In such a climate, the emphasis on the poetry of human selfhood and human creativity will be indispensable.

How does your patient, doctor?

**DOCTOR:** Not so sick, my lord,
As she is troubled with thick-coming fancies,
That keep her from her rest.

**MACBETH:** Cure her of that.
Canst thou not minister to a mind diseased,
Pluck from the memory a rooted sorrow,
Raze out the written troubles of the brain,
And with some sweet oblivious antidote
Cleanse the stuff'd bosom of that perilous stuff
Which weighs upon the heart?

**DOCTOR:** Therein the patient
Must minister to himself. (Shakespeare, 2005, Macbeth, V, 3)
No longer! for Asclepios is the son of Apollo!
It is indeed timely to turn to poetry now, to correct the one-sidednesses of medicine,
to correct the one-sided ministrations of psychological science, but also because, thus,
we can enjoy a psychotherapy which is a creative servant of life and laughter and
love.

The emergence over 45 years of my synthesis, derived as it is from several major
sources (including Leavis, Kant, Jung, Keats and Shakespeare, Freud, Derrida) with
which my engagement followed a seemingly foreordained path, like a sleepwalker
(Koestler, 1959, 1964), might almost be seen as designed to challenge the terms in
which Daniel Dennett describes human intentionality (1989).

We can map its relation to core modern conceptions by making some final
comparisons here. Dennett conceives meaning as the serendipitous manifestation and
unfolding of something like the blind driving of ‘DNA’, which has no ‘essential’
meaning and purpose, and therefore whose value and significance are only revealed in
its successful functioning or outcome for some purpose and in some context. He
epitomises this in the witty epigram:

……a scholar is just one library's way of making another library. (Dennett, 1991)

Derrida’s variant of something like this conception, and his denial of the primacy of
presencing intentionality (1988), which overlaps Dennett’s in part, takes it,
conversely, in the direction of suggesting that ‘iterability’ (Derrida’s equivalent of
Dennett’s blind DNA) is open-ended and illimitable, and not to be confined to an
account in terms of its overt intentionality. Outcome determines meaning, not because
meaning is confined to outcome, but because meaning itself has ‘infinite’ potentiality.
This is not to say that its intentionality is an illusion, for Derrida, but rather has an
indefinitely extended and extendable range of wider meaning, in the total context. The
tacit, paradoxically Platonic, view of a Gestalt conception of my formulation would
see it as the gradual emergence over decades of a whole which nevertheless sought
completion and closure. Derrida’s conversely is an open-ended Platonism.

The conception itself, as meta-conception, as enactment, assimilates elements of all
the above conceptions, but gives intentionality a new force. Its emphasis on the
primary of actualisation in the totality of the (incompleteable) deed or enactment, in
which it is incarnate or realised (Derrida’s and the later Heidegger’s accounts
converge with this), binds together present, past, future, the infinite potential, and the
authority of actual emergence and outcome. Thus it is neither inherently complete or
completeable, as on the Gestalt model, nor intrinsically defined merely by its external
functionality, as on Dennett’s account, but rather, as on certain conceptions in Eastern
mysticism, and Meister Eckhart, simultaneously ‘complete in every moment’, yet
embraces open-endedly the universe of being, in its enactment in the ‘eternal now’.

In the ocean of the holy Dharma
There is neither movement nor stillness
…………………………………………
Two years of wandering on Yui beach
There was no need to number off the waves (Leggett, 2003)
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Leavis's Concept of Enactment as a Multidisciplinary Paradigm

This presentation is of necessity oversimplified. To suggest how enactment is a multidisciplinary paradigm, I primarily explore the relation with philosophy, though also touch on psychotherapy/psychology.

I first came to Leavis's concept of enactment, in the Johnson essay in *The Common Pursuit*. I took it as obvious, as commonsense in fact. Leavis says:

Johnson cannot understand that works of art *enact* their moral valuations. It is not enough that Shakespeare, on the evidence of his works, ‘thinks’ (and feels) morally; for Johnson a moral judgement that isn’t *stated* isn’t there. Further he demands that the whole play shall be conceived and composed as statement. The dramatist must start with a conscious and abstractly formulated moral and proceed to manipulate his puppets so as to demonstrate and enforce it.

(Leavis, 1952/1962, p. 110/11)

‘Enactment’ is what Leavis means in his oft-invoked formula, ‘the Shakespearean use of language’, - that book he never wrote, but implicit in everything he wrote, hinted at in the vast condensed sweep of the passages in *English Literature in our Time and the University*, and *The Living Principle*, where he discusses Shakespeare’s historic significance, in the context of Eliot’s ‘dissociation of sensibility’ formula, as developed, enriched, and deepened, over forty years, by Leavis.

Thus, *The Living Principle*:

The [Shakespeare’s] quickness was essential for the apprehending and registering of subtleties and complexities, and the English language in 1600 was an ideal medium for the Shakespearian processes of thought. Born into Dryden’s age, when ‘logic’ and ‘clarity’ had triumphed, Shakespeare couldn’t have been Shakespeare, and the modern world would have been without the proof that thought of his kind was possible………………..

(Leavis, 1975, p. 97)

It is epitomised in the comment on the exquisite ‘swan’s down-feather’ passage from *Antony and Cleopatra*:

*Antony*

Her tongue will not obey her heart, nor can
Her heart inform her tongue – the swan’s down-feather
That stands upon the swell at full of tide,
And neither way inclines.

The Arden footnote……. runs:

It is not clear whether Octavia’s heart is the swan’s down-feather, swayed neither way on the full tide of emotion at parting with her brother to accompany her husband, or whether it is the *inaction* of heart and tongue, on the same occasion, which is elliptically compared to that of the feather.

‘It is not clear’ – it ought to be clear; that is the implication. The implied criterion, ‘clarity’, entails an ‘either/or’; does the image mean *this* or *that*?
The reductive absurdity of the conception of language behind the criterion thus brought up is surely plain. (Leavis, 1975, p. 102)

‘Plain’?! ‘Plain’?! It has taken me 45 years to grasp, that the character of enactment, in Leavis’s sense, is not at all obvious. Still less the full reach of it; many find it excruciatingly difficult to ‘get’ it. The chasm is huge. And his own refusal to extend it to philosophy, is the most Delphic, and inscrutable, anomaly. Leavis’s conception is so powerful, central, and innovative philosophically, so germane to central issues in epistemology, ontology, and semantics, that it is an enigma or paradox to me how he simultaneously both did, and did not, grasp its philosophic significance.

But, then, it is perhaps too powerful; we do not necessarily grasp the deepest significance of what is closest to us. Erstwhile a literary student, I myself am now a psychotherapist. It took me an enormously long time to see, that Leavis’s concept was precisely what I needed to articulate a non-reductive account of psychotherapy. I took his concept so much for granted as bedrock, that it simply did not dawn on me it was the solution to my conceptual problem. As Groucho Marx said, ‘I would not want to join any club that would accept me as a member’.

Something similar might apply to Leavis himself. I, who only met him after he had resigned from the University, readily forget, that Leavis, probably more than any other single person, essentially was Cambridge English, English established as a rigorous and serious autonomous discipline, after it emerged via Mansfield Forbes from the genial clubbability embodied in Sir Arthur Quiller Couch. So much combat being involved in that creation of Cambridge English from the position of a non-Professor, it may have been very hard for the wider perspective to emerge. The end of his institutional duties may have released the enormous synoptising creativity of his last years (even whilst leaving him feeling he may have failed), including the drive to articulate fundamental horizons, and complete his work.

In Thought Words and Creativity Leavis notoriously says,

I think of myself as an anti-philosopher, which is what a literary critic ought to be – and every intelligent reader of creative literature is a literary critic.

Yes – and on philosophical grounds! Philosophically sophisticated like that Sigmund Freud, who carried his own anti-philosophical Oedipal limp! - Possibly more so, since shards of postivism still cling to Freud’s articulations, whereas I can find virtually no trace of it in Leavis.

In fact, his critique of British philosophical attitudes - from which he nevertheless increasingly exempts Whitehead, and other semi-platonists - is extremely reminiscent of those of European philosophers such as Heidegger and Derrida, and going back to Hegel, and Schelling, and that honorary continental, Coleridge. Is he too English to embrace this? Enacting Mill’s ‘antagonistic mode of thought’, he signalily does fail to notice how far neighbouring philosophers, like the later Wittgenstein, JL Austin, and PF Strawson, in various ways, moved a fair way, though not all the way, towards embracing principles of understanding which rest on something very like enactment in Leavis’s sense.
For instance, in Philosophical Investigations §583-4 Wittgenstein comes near to grasping, perhaps actually does grasp, the character of enactment and its inherent enmeshment in context (truncated quotation):

§ 583-4. What is happening now has significance – in these surroundings. The surroundings give it its importance…..

A coronation is the picture of pomp and dignity. Cut one minute of this proceeding out of its surroundings: the crown is being placed on the head of the king in his coronation robes. – But in different surroundings gold is the cheapest of metals, its gleam is thought vulgar. There the fabric of the robe is cheap to produce. A crown is a parody of a respectable hat. And so on.

In the sense of German idealism, and the British and American philosophies and visions which draw from it, directly or indirectly, such as Coleridge, Carlyle and Dickens, FH Bradley, Emerson, Thoreau, Henry James, TS Eliot, DH Lawrence, Whitehead, Collingwood, and Polanyi, which unequivocally propound the vision of 'organic wholes', the background of the formulation of enactment, Leavis is undoubtedly, and unequivocally, an 'organic wholes' thinker. Wittgenstein's account of meaning-enactment, - with the ambiguity of that possibly contra-textual word 'surroundings'! - perhaps shrinks from going all the way to such an ‘organicism’.

Again, JL Austin's account of performativity goes a very long way towards affirming the primacy of enactment, in Leavisian language, - as Derrida recognises, in repeatedly taking up Austin's analyses, and relating them to the generic concept of ‘iterability’ (e.g., Limited Inc., 1977/88), - yet Austin remains caught in the appeal to ordinary circumstances, relegating to secondarity the fictional, the parasitic, etc., etc., parallel to Wittgenstein’s ambiguous appeal to 'surroundings'.

Leavis would not have been phased by, he grasps, the generic conception of ‘iterability’, with the element of repetition, in poetry as a creative enactment. In the Aristotelian formulation of The Living Principle:

For images come, in the way in which poems do, somewhere between full concrete actuality and merely ‘talking about’ – their status, their existence, is of the same order; the image is, in this respect, the type of a poem. In reading a successful poem it is as if, with the type of qualifications intimated, one were living that particular action, situation or piece of life; the qualification representing the condition of the peculiar completeness and fineness of art. (Leavis, The Living Principle, 1975, p. 110-111)

His grasp of these subtleties connects, at their root, with his conception of the ‘third realm’. The philosophers Frege, and Popper and Eccles, and the psychoanalyst Winnicott, all used the ‘third world’ or ‘third realm’ phraseology. There is, especially in Winnicott’s case, considerable overlap with what Leavis is up to. Consequently, it was from Leavis, more than any psychotherapy theorist, (they mostly remaining in the grip of content-based, or causal-reductive, analyses), that I learnt how to think about sheer process, as such, the enactive process of interaction in psychotherapy. From, for instance, such passages as Leavis’s commentary on William Dorrit’s shame-ridden outburst to Amy in the Marshalsea late in the evening, after his dropped hint about John Chivery’s courtship, or the comment in The Great Tradition (1948/1962), upon
Gwendolen’s prevarication whether to accept Grandcourt’s visit, now knowing, as she knows, about his betrayal of Lydia Glasher and the diamonds, Leavis writes:

Reading this, it is hard to remember that George Eliot was contemporary with Trollope. What later novelist has rendered the inner movement of impulse, the play of motives that issues in speech and act and underlies formed thought and conscious will, with more penetrating subtlety than she? It is partly done through speech and action. But there is also, co-operating with these, a kind of psychological notation that is well represented in the passage quoted above, and is exemplified in ‘Quick, quick, like pictures in a book beaten open with a sense of hurry….’, and ‘yet in the dark seed-growths of consciousness a new wish was forming itself….’ And ‘The young activity within her made a warm current through her terror….’, and ‘All the while there was a busy under-current in her, like the thought of a man who keeps up a dialogue while he is considering how he can slip away’ – and so much else.

The psychotherapy session as dramatic poem then!? Because Leavis has poetry, and the novel, to hand, his touch is surer than Wittgenstein or Austin, or psychotherapy theorists, in relation to the meaning structures of human existence and the human world; it is the ‘literary philosopher’ Derrida, particularly the later Derrida, who has comparable sureness and freedom from confusion.

The concentrated philosophical clarity and brevity with which Leavis introduces the ‘Third Realm’ concept in, especially, Two Cultures? The significance of CP Snow, is so brilliantly brief, one can, as many have noted, easily miss its significance. In what he calls ‘unphilosophical’ language, here is a whole master concept of Human Existence, history, culture, anthropology, and the human world, as, implicitly, enactment, as I’ll highlight (my italics here):

More largely Snow exclaims: ‘As though the scientific edifice of the physical world were not, in its intellectual depth, complexity and articulation, the most beautiful and wonderful collective work of the mind of man.’

It is pleasant to think of Snow contemplating, daily perhaps, the intellectual depth, complexity, and articulation, in all their beauty. But there is a prior human achievement of collaborative creation, a more basic work of the mind of man (and more than the mind), one without which the triumphant erection of the scientific edifice would not have been possible: that is, the creation of the human world, including language. It is something we cannot rest on as something done in the past. It lives in the living creative response to change in the present. I mentioned language because it is in terms of literature that I can most easily make my meaning plain, and because of the answer that seems to me called for by Snow’s designs on the university. It is in the study of literature, the literature of ones own language in the first place, that one comes to recognise the nature and priority of the third realm (as, unphilosophically no doubt, I call it, talking with my pupils), the realm of that which is neither merely private and personal, nor public in the sense that it can be brought into the laboratory or pointed to. You cannot point to the poem; it is ‘there’ only in the re-creative response of individual minds to the black marks on the page. But – a necessary faith – it is something in which minds can meet. The process
in which this faith is justified is given fairly enough in an account of the nature of criticism. A judgement is personal or it is nothing; you cannot take over someone else’s. The implicit form of a judgement is: this is so, isn’t it? The question is an appeal for confirmation that the thing is so; implicitly that, though expecting, characteristically, an answer in the form, ‘yes, but…’ the ‘but’ standing for qualifications, reserves, corrections. Here we have a diagram of the collaborative-creative process in which the poem comes to be established as something ‘out there’, of common access in what is in some sense a public world. It gives us, too, the nature of the existence of English literature, a living whole that can have its life only in the living present, in the creative response of individuals, who collaboratively renew and perpetuate what they participate in – a cultural community or consciousness. More, it gives us the nature in general of what I have called the ‘third realm’ to which all that makes us human belongs.

Snow’s rhetoric had serendipitously summoned from Leavis this surpassing formulation. Ironically, it had somehow managed to awaken the third phase Leavis. After the Richmond Lecture something kicks in, something which makes one feel, as Hazlitt said of Byron, ‘he hath a demon!’ - Possessed by something profoundly reshaping his whole vision, - in a sense without changing anything, but crystallising, crystallising, it!

He defines the existential primacy of creativity, - without existentialist bootstrapping. He grasps that there is in language an inherent surpassing of the public-private epistemic dilemma, as Heidegger grasps this in Being and Time in the context of our primordial relation to tool use, and its contextualisation, which Heidegger labels ‘significance’. In invoking a third space encompassing the other two, Leavis releases himself from the objective/subjective, public/private antitheses, which Wittgenstein still struggles with in the ‘private language’ arguments. Leavis, thinking at the metalevel, philosophical level, is profoundly free of the usual antitheses. Drawing deeply on Blake, and EH Gombrich’s work, the creativity of perception was axiomatic for him. Utterly clear about the ‘impersonality’ confusions of Eliot’s Tradition and the Individual Talent, he does not fall into the trap Eliot, and sometimes Wilson Knight, fell into, of repudiating any connection between life and work (something relevant to the authorship question in Shakespeare), Leavis’s variant dictum being rather:

‘between the man who suffers and the mind which creates there can never be a separation’. (Leavis, FR, in Leavis and Leavis, 1969)

In this passage of the Richmond Lecture, as elsewhere, - in the light of enactivity, - he is completely, luminously, clear about the relation between present and past, tradition and creativity, individuality and co-operative participation, - even faith and justification, to hint at a theological theme. When he invokes

the ‘third realm’ to which all that makes us human belongs [my emphasis]

suddenly we see he belongs with those resolvers of the epistemic dilemma, like Schelling, Coleridge, and Heidegger, and before them Aristotle, who have grasped that experience is a primordial unity, which cannot be split into Cartesian parts, not because logical behaviourism is true, but because being is an enactive totality.
But, as Chris Joyce has hinted, like Newman in *The Grammar of Assent*, he remains a kind of English empiricist in his very repudiation of empiricism! Blessed with an almost Kantian genius for the use of specific paradigms in generic epitomisation, he transposes it into the English passion for being particularistic and specific.

Yet, in his intense secular and immanent sense of the sacred, there is something of the sparse incandescent concentration of a Spinoza, a Plotinus, even a Herakleitos, in Leavis. His view of Bunyan is relevant. In Leavis’s hands, Bunyan yields dramatically to an account, in which theistic belief and credo are simply stripped out and away from, the concentrated enactive life-affirmation which Leavis finds at his core. Ironically, as it were, this ‘redeems’ a work written within the belief-framework of an intolerable, starkly terrible Calvinist creed. We thus gain a glimpse of a quasi-post-modern centrality of pure enactment in Leavis’s Weltanschauung. Tom Brangwen’s oft cited ‘He knew that he did not belong to himself’ is denuded of its Pauline belief background. It becomes an affirmation of the pure flame of life itself. Sought in this phoenix flame is a purity, a magnificent concentration of spirit, an ascetic yet alchemically scintillating affirmation of sacred glory, cleansed of dross, and of nihilistic or trivialising chaos. As with Spinoza, Freud, Heidegger, it is a stoicism of a transfigured, yet immanent, ‘Nature’, physis. Heidegger culminates by affirming the poetic flame of spirit (‘Geistige’) in Trakl’s poetry; Leavis by affirming the enactive pure flame of the Lawrentian phoenix-wings (the Eliotic Pentecost being more suspect).

We may leave suspended the question, - the one which would pursue his ‘yes, but…’ seriously, - does this particular stoic vision too starkly exclude other possibilities? That would not diminish his significance. It would enable us to allow for, and indeed celebrate, his special character, seeing it in the light of a certain fine grain asceticism and concentration, like that of Jane Austen, working on a particular piece of ivory. This special concentrated character stemmed from, and enabled him to bring into view, as no one else, the nature of enactment.

As his reference to: *the mind of man (and more than the mind)* suggests, he is radically opposed to all cognitivism, yet he rightly claims enactivity, in its many modes, as thought - thought, however, as action, realisation, enacted belief, as embodied, mutating-transforming mind and being (Amy Dorrit’s thought changing Clennam, and Cordelia’s King Lear). In enactment, in the Shakespearean use of language, he possesses ‘a living principle’, which he believes is *not* philosophical, - since he identifies philosophy with Descartes, clarity, the cognitivist end of the dissociation of sensibility spectrum. He believes it is heuristic, a form of action, as Kant felt the moral will and moral action was not a form of knowledge, but heuristic in the form of action. Like Freud, Leavis is in the end Kantian. Invertedly, he remains in the thrall of an *over-cognitivist conception of philosophy*.

Thus, as the critic-philosopher of enactment, the very thing that makes him believe he is *not* a philosopher – is precisely why he *is* one!

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A Tale Told by an Idiot: Poetry, or Science, for a broken World? (The Ill-Starred War of Paradigms of Integration and of Psychotherapy)

Has Psychotherapy nowadays mortgaged itself to Science? By science we mean the hypothetico-deductive method of empirical enquiry. Why are we tempted by the idea, that to challenge the hypothetico-deductive method is almost a kind of category mistake?

Is it not because we are compellingly wedded, in the West, to the method of differentiation? And the logical outcome of this seems to be scientific method, with its emphasis on the factual, the contingent, and on falsifiability through differentiated empirical evidence! Today the challenge of all this has, termite-like, got right into the woodwork of psychotherapy, including modern integrative psychotherapy, which for me means primarily those core elements, which make us all integrative psychotherapists now. Some just don’t know it yet!

Now, does this, or not, collide with or contradict holism as a method? And is the method of psychotherapy inherently holistic? What I proposed in my book is that the paradigm for the kinds of process we know as psychotherapy is poetic. I want to illustrate the sense in which poetic understanding is holistic, determinately and concretely holistic in a quite specific sense. This is a sense which I think everyone will find they are already familiar with, as having an essential analogy to the holism of psychotherapeutic method.

Here is one of William Wordsworth’s greatest short poems, A slumber did my spirit seal. It is an extraordinary and heart rending poem, about the death of a child, in which the apparent deadpan neutrality of the diction conceals, by what is not said, what is not expressed, a volcanic eruption of experience, in the contrasting ‘before’ and ‘after’ pattern of the poem, a pattern which overtly completely passes over the terrible sheer moment of the loss, yet expresses, and enacts, it - all the more completely, in so passing over it, enacting the very silencing itself the poem is about – and which is, as such, so profound an analogue to the processes of silence, hiatus, and ellipsis in our work:

A slumber did my spirit seal;
I had no human fears:
She seem'd a thing that could not feel
The touch of earthly years.

No motion has she now, no force;
She neither hears nor sees;
Roll'd round in earth's diurnal course
With rocks, and stones, and trees.

The analysis of this poem could fill a whole seminar. Against the background of that silent moment of loss, I am just going to comment on one element in it. Why does Wordsworth say ‘stones’ as well as ‘rocks’? Why the apparent repetition? Well, I think, you will find that ‘stones’ carries a greater element of a ‘human’ aspect, and thus, in FR Leavis’s coinage, it implicitly invokes the actuality of the full human world, balancing and offsetting the vast sense of the astronomical Copernican motion...
of the earth as a cosmic body, evoked in ‘earth’s diurnal course’, and implicit in the ‘rocks’. We throw ‘stones’ and earth onto a coffin, not ‘rocks’, so to speak. Nor is it a simple matter of size. ‘Stones’ are the humanised non-human, the non-human as humanised. So, if Wordsworth had avoided the repetition and banally put ‘soil’, the transitional significance, which picks up that total context of the human/non-human silencing I spoke about, the human/non-human silencing of death, which the poem is about, would have been entirely lost. The whole poem would be altered, and altered as a whole, just as in the well-known gestalt perceptual-cognitive experiments the vase, for instance, is altered as a whole in perceptual awareness, so that it becomes the two faces. We shall return to the implication of all this shortly.

All human communication, - especially such communication as in this poem, that evokes the sombre power of being, and of visceral humanity, but also the most simple and banal realities of human propositional communication, - is, in this sense, holistic. Thus, for instance, every the most simple use of the word ‘is’ we ever make, and upon which the whole of science rests, is holistic, and, as such, is grasped by the mind, by the person. And so any analysis of the work of psychotherapy which makes a sheer division between the experience of the work, and the outcomes of the work, is a denial of that holistic dimension. Any analysis of the methodology of psychotherapy work, which imagines it can be translated into a repetitional prescribable manualised technology, in American language, is such a denial of the holistic character, inherently creative, of the work. And, of course, a denial of those elements of the work which are silent, elliptical, opaque, hiatus, expression of ‘negative capability’, in Keats’s words, - what I called the ‘pre-communicable’ in my book.

Any scientific account of psychotherapy worth anything must manage to give an account of these elements, and not eliminate them from the equation because they are inconvenient to it.

In our own epoch, from the eighteenth century onwards, roughly since the invention of the spinning jenny and the steam engine, science has increasingly yielded to, become equated with, machine technology. This was the impetus behind the first great positivistic philosophy, Jeremy Bentham’s Utilitarianism, which Dickens satirised, in a way by no means out of date, in Hard Times. Then Darwin’s work appeared to overthrow any defence of a theistic account of human origins, to universalise the implication of what ‘worked’ or ‘succeeded’ as a form of explanation, and today we have the strange phenomenon of a major biological thinker, Richard Dawkins, seeking to counter the fundamentalism of anti-Darwinian neo-creationist thinkers, by turning Darwinism into a fundamentalism of its own. And Psychotherapy becomes a mere ‘technology’, within one powerful American world view.

Now, if we take account of the fact that, if we look round this room at each other, and remind ourselves that for each of us it is a different room, and my room will never ever be Ken’s room, or Maria’s room, or the room of any one of you, if thus we take account of the irreducibility of the person, of the subject, then we are introducing something that nineteenth century science, and positivism, seeks to deny, and with which modern Anglo-American philosophy struggles. 'The fool sees not the same tree which the wise man sees', wrote William Blake. Nineteenth century science and modern positivism aspires to a third-person account of the world, an account of the world from which the philosophising observer is eliminated.
But the great scientists, and mathematicians, who, in the wake of Einstein, wrestled with the peculiarities of quantum phenomena, and its irreducibility of the observer, as enshrined in Heisenberg’s Principle, did not dismiss the philosophical irreducibility of the observer in any such way. No true or pure scientist will attempt to account for human existence without taking account of all the realities.

And thus our little bit of holistic analysis of poetry, as a model for psychotherapy, comes into its own. Far from being a bit of literary eccentricity, it is a central and indispensable expression of what it means to be human, which does not contradict fundamental science, or mathematics. It is bedrock, axiomatic that any true scientific method will have to take account of it. So psychotherapy needs to do a little bit of philosophy, if it is not to succumb to the paradigm of the Utilitarian Technologism and Pseudo-Science which rules today, which is not fully scientific, but rather a piece of a new Scientific Mediaevalism. This is tacitly based on an objectivism which is as concrete as that of any nineteenth century materialism.

So we move forward with the assumption that there need be no ill-starred war between science and literature, or between science and philosophy. What would an enquiry into psychotherapy look like which was scientific in this larger sense? In the first place there is nothing in this which rules out statistical and probabilistic enquiry into certain aspects of validation or invalidation of our work.

But to go beyond those, we psychotherapists have a job to do, a philosophical job, if our references to art, and poetry, and holism, and quality, and qualitative research, are not to be a kind of secular ‘God of the Gaps’ argument against scientific reductionism. The ‘God of the Gaps’ argument was the theological attempt to find something that was exempt from the causal explanations of science, and it of course constantly ran into difficulties about both rapidly outdated data, and an argument of principle against a ‘two-world’ position - ultimately a reversion to Cartesian dualism. At Vienna airport, recently, I saw a KIA advert: KIA hat SOUL - surely that is Cartesianism alive and well in popular culture, though there might be a hint of a Greek view of technology there as well.

It feels as if the pressure on us to think within a scientific-technological frame is so overwhelming, that we just only dare to allow ourselves a few Cartesian nooks and crannies, a few enclaves, instead of genuinely tackling the interface of philosophy, science, and experience. As just one example, I myself found Clark Moustakas’ (1990) conception of heuristic enquiry exceedingly helpful in understanding the pathways of how I had reached the point where I was able to write my book; he has a profound intuitive feel for those mysterious dynamic exploratory processes, those muse-driven processes which also pervade psychotherapy. But he also assumes that phenomenology has provided an adequate framework for understanding this, against the background of which narrative exploration is a factual enquiry. By default we are left with a kind of narrative empiricism in practice, in this mode of qualitative research.

Virtually all major philosophers of the last century endorsed that demarcation, that apartheid, between philosophy and science, in one form or another. So is it yet another way in which I myself can come out as a crank, if I say that my conclusion is that that apartheid is quite unjustified?! This is where it gets tricky!
To explain what I am up to, I return to Gestalt holism. And the reality we have to come to terms with, is that the shift in meaning which makes possible an alternative Gestalt perception, such as the vase and the faces one - is not in fact merely a perception, not empirical; it is a shift in meaning, a priori, in the philosophical sense since Kant; it is a Platonic universal. Hermeneutics, the theory of the exploration of meanings, is a priori. And consequently our understanding of the entire human world, all the events within it, has an irreducible a priori dimension, which is also the dimension and space psychotherapy occupies. Where the philosophers have let us down, is their failure for the most part, - in line with the apartheid solution to which I have referred, - to acknowledge that the human world as such has a causal dimension.

In practice this is completely obvious; we, of all people, know that shifts in the meaning of our life-self-understandings change experience. And no neuroscientist or cyberneticist is going to tell us different: for instance Benjamin Libet’s experiments showing that actual volition at the neural level precedes consciousness of active intentionality, - because without language, meaning, intentionality, and the a priori dimension, there would be no neuroscience or cybernetics. So, for instance, our experience of music shows us, we simply have to solve the time problem here, by moving away from the exclusive reliance on linear and clock time, the so-called time of physics.

So we cannot avoid a philosophical engagement with science. This is where psychotherapy is relevant. Psychotherapy is practical philosophy in the concrete, in the same way poetry is, it is personal-historical in its essence. If we go back to Wordsworth, such a poem cannot be written today; for instance, the immediate relation to the Copernican insight, which Wordsworth expresses in 'roll’d round in earth's diurnal course', is simply not possible for us.

So, too Psychotherapy is always historic. I hope we pay more than lip service to cultural difference, but its deeper meaning is historic difference, and that means the historicity of the person. If the huge experimental process which psychotherapy is, is to be genuinely investigated, that investigation has to be both empirical and a priori, hermeneutic. Therefore the way forward, a way forward to which psychotherapy can profoundly contribute, because we are dealing with the raw material of the construction of meaning, embodied meaning, every day of our work, has to be, to laboriously explore meaning - along, if one wishes, with physiological and neurological and outcome-type enquiry. Otherwise we leave the way clear open to technologism masquerading as science, as the new Mediaevalism. We need to begin to come at the problem from the other end, from the enigma of our causal embodiment in the human world as a function of meaning.

What I am talking about is easily illustrated by the Eureka moment, which we have all experienced, and which is a key element in so much of our work. We can all have an instantaneous experience of this in the post-modern Graffito: DO NOT READ THIS! It takes us an instant to get the joke, - and then we go on thinking about the philosophical paradox of self-reference! Libet would tell us our neuro processes pass through a causal sequence and reach a threshold – assuredly! We can tell a long story about how the machinery works. But what counts for us is simply – did we get the joke?! And that is irreducibly a matter of embodied meaning, embodied intentionality, with the total temporal structuring which that involves.
There needs to be peace and creative co-operation between philosophy and empirical science. But this does not mean a dictated peace from the side of science, but rather a full scale negotiated process between two equally powerful principals. The fundamental nature of time, as accessible to us in experience, in literature, and through the gigantic perspective shifts of philosophy, is not the exclusive preserve of science, although of course science has much to say that is relevant to it.

I end with the whole of another poetic paradigm – Andrew Marvell’s *To His Coy Mistress* - where the diverse modal experiential dimensions of the time reference, invoking temporal ontology, in connection with the core nature of inferential logic, are emphatic! Three parts, three ‘times’!

Had we but world enough, and time,
This coyness, lady, were no crime.
We would sit down and think which way
To walk, and pass our long love's day;
Thou by the Indian Ganges' side
Shouldst rubies find; I by the tide
Of Humber would complain. I would
Love you ten years before the Flood;
And you should, if you please, refuse
Till the conversion of the Jews.
My vegetable love should grow
Vaster than empires, and more slow.
An hundred years should go to praise
Thine eyes, and on thy forehead gaze;
Two hundred to adore each breast,
But thirty thousand to the rest;
An age at least to every part,
And the last age should show your heart.
For, lady, you deserve this state,
Nor would I love at lower rate.

But at my back I always hear
Time's winged chariot hurrying near;
And yonder all before us lie
Deserts of vast eternity.
Thy beauty shall no more be found,
Nor, in thy marble vault, shall sound
My echoing song; then worms shall try
That long preserv'd virginity,
And your quaint honour turn to dust,
And into ashes all my lust.
The grave's a fine and private place,
But none I think do there embrace.

Now therefore, while the youthful hue
Sits on thy skin like morning dew,
And while thy willing soul transpires
At every pore with instant fires,
Now let us sport us while we may;
And now, like am'rous birds of prey,
Rather at once our time devour,
Than languish in his slow-chapp'd power.
Let us roll all our strength, and all
Our sweetness, up into one ball;
And tear our pleasures with rough strife
Thorough the iron gates of life.
Thus, though we cannot make our sun
Stand still, yet we will make him run.