

Towards: Theory of Metamodality of Psychotherapy 2025

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Introductory

§1. Humanity, as its consciousness evolved, learnt to tell itself stories. Eventually those stories developed into science and became the theory of causality and causal law. And in the mind of the philosopher Immanuel Kant the theory of causality became story again. And this is the story or narrative hidden behind the rise of psychotherapy.

I have been working my way towards developing an understanding of the meta-modality of the psychotherapies, and evolving a narrative of the process required, and implicit, in this, for several years now. Psychotherapy has the potential to be a major human science discipline, and one of the profoundest, but often does not embrace its full theoretical and vocational potential. My aim in this synopsis is to tell a story, one which can develop into a theory, which will offer a basis for Psychotherapy, on the ground of its being a function of human self consciousness, as a foundation of the whole field of Psychotherapy. Human self-consciousness would be mediated within the concept of Interactive Dualism, which updates Descartes' dualism, one of the key evolvers of this story - but with the integration of embodiment, being-in-the-world, and the unconscious, without, however, superseding the duality. This goes against much modern cognitive science, but we shall come to that.

In a paper of 1917, entitled *A Difficulty in the Path of Psychoanalysis*, Freud says there have been three huge blows to humanity's narcissism: that of Copernicus, which displaced humanity from the centre of the universe; that of Darwin, which displaced us from radical distinctiveness from the animals; and that of Psychoanalysis which, by the recognition of the unconscious, deposed us from mastery 'in our own house'. But in the paper on *The Unconscious* (1915/1957) Freud adds the name of the philosopher Immanuel Kant to this general reflection, writing: "Just as Kant warned us against overlooking how our perception is subjectively determined and cannot be regarded as identical to the unknowable thing that is

perceived, so psychoanalysis warns us not to mistake our perceptions of consciousness for the unconscious psychic processes which are their subject.” And he ends the paper *A Difficulty in the Path of Psychoanalysis* with an appeal to the name of Schopenhauer, who had achieved such centrality in the philosophical and literary world by the end of the 19th Century, as, in the process, had given a massive impetus to the installation of Kant once more at the centre of the philosophical universe, including Freud, the pupil of the grandfather of phenomenology, Franz Brentano.

§2. Now, human self consciousness, thus understood, is profoundly bound up with Time, or Temporality (which I capitalise), and I shall use this connection to ground my whole argument. Temporality is the centre of the Kantian insight. Temporality, in this sense (to be explained in a moment), is one of those things we all take for granted, and as being the basis of human self-narrative, but also which, if one puts it into *philosophical* terms, becomes very confusing to most people. What seems obvious philosophically to us, is not the same as what is obvious to us as commonsensers, - as I shall call us all as non-philosophers! So this may be a bit of a bumpy ride, with more than one story to tell!

§3. That time is just the present moment may initially seem obvious to us – when we begin to think philosophically. So, therefore, many psychotherapy theories, as well as other theories, of Time only deal with the pure present or the present moment (such as even Daniel Stern, in *The Present Moment in Psychotherapy and Everyday Life*). But the *philosophical* thesis I am urging as a basis is that, as Immanuel Kant, more formidably than anyone, argued (*Critique of Pure Reason: Transcendental Analytic*), Temporality comprises all three aspects of time, past, present, and future, as an indissoluble but differentiated whole. And this is the realm of story. In practical commonsense experience, self-consciousness, including our emotions and sociality, and indirectly the implicit and the unconscious, and indeed almost the whole spectrum of the Psychotherapies, inheres in this threefold whole of Temporality. When I refer to Temporality in this way as we go on, it always implies this threefold consciousness of time.

This total threefold awareness is what enables us to reminisce, to anticipate, to muse

in the present, to imagine and rehearse alternative states of affairs, and enormously much else – and, in general, to create and repeat narratives and stories, non-fictional or fictional. And, as we shall explore, as narrative, it is the core of psychotherapy as a human practice.

§4. Human consciousness and awareness has changed and evolved through history. We might therefore wish to ask - and tell the story of - how we came, and indeed come, to be aware of this threefold whole of Temporality. As noted, this total awareness enables us to reminisce, to anticipate, to muse in the present, to imagine and rehearse alternative states of affairs, - in short, to tell and receive stories, - and much else. All these aspects are deeply implicated in Psychotherapy and the Psychotherapies. Temporality even has a peculiar grammar, one peculiar to itself, such as when we might describe our present as the past of what may be, or will have been, our future, or as the future which we envisaged when.... Etc. And we may indeed even add, *Once upon a time.....*

§5. However, these stories and grammars may be speculative; for we are unable to conceptualise, but only metaphorise, the *continuities* which ‘join’ the three modes of time, in its on-going changing, for in our object-based paradigms there is nothing stable there to refer to or to ‘mean’. We are condemned conceptually to be locked into the faith or hope of making reference to a definite being-stably-there of any existent, which may be the case for time as a whole, but not for any instant of it. However, we can always take refuge in, and anchor it by, appealing to a clock, which implicitly embodies the time of physics. This gives it, as Shakespeare writes, ‘a local habitation and a name’, a narrative. Additionally, our own personal time bias, or foremost *focal psychic location*, at any given moment, in past, present, or future, as we reminisce, muse, or anticipate, carries the implication, however little we conceptualise this, that our threefold time, - as narrational, - is a *social* inter-relational mode of time. This connects such thinking about time with Freudian and wider psychotherapeutic thinking.

§6. Therefore, just like consciousness itself, of which indeed it is an expression, the coming to be of this threefold dimensionality of time, is arguably a kind of rupture of consciousness into differences. Historically it emerges very belatedly into

philosophical-conceptual explicitness, out of deeply implicit and world-absorbed modes of being (Heidegger, *Being and Time*), and prior to that, in pre-history, almost certainly there was not even an implicit awareness of developed temporality in our sense (Jaynes, *Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind*). Two very striking witnesses are worth some attention at this point.

Claude Levi-Strauss, the mighty French anthropologist, and structural analyst of native American myths and stories, writes (Levi-Strauss, 2021), in *Wild Thought* (previously translated as *The Savage Mind*, which gave offence); his concept is absolutely relevant to this two-level model:

“Neolithic or protohistoric man was thus heir to a long scientific tradition; nonetheless, if the spirit that inspired him, as well as all his predecessors, had been exactly the same as that of modern people, how are we to understand that he came to a stop and that several thousand years of stagnation intervened, like a landing on a stairway, between the Neolithic revolution and contemporary science? This paradox admits only one solution: that there are two distinct modes of scientific thought, each of them a function, not of unequal stages of the development of the human mind, but of two strategic levels at which nature allows itself to be grasped by scientific knowledge – one approximately congruent with perception and imagination, and the other at a remove. It is as though the necessary relations that are the object of all science – whether Neolithic or modern – might be attained by two different paths, one very close to sensory intuition, the other further from it.” (Levi-Strauss, *Wild Thought*, 2021)

Likewise, Heidegger, just prior to giving his first indication of being-in-the-world in *Being and Time* (H84), which, though he denies it, is almost certainly a form of volitionalism, theory of will, turns his attention, in a remarkable way, to such modes of thought, in a way which notes them as anomalous in relation to his project, (H82):

“With regard to the phenomenon of signs, we might give the following interpretation: for primitive people the sign coincides with what it indicates. The sign itself can represent what it indicates not only in the sense of replacing it, but in such a way that the sign itself always is what is indicated. This

remarkable coincidence of the sign with what is indicated does not, however, mean that the sign-thing has already undergone a certain ‘objectification,’ that it has been experienced as a mere thing and been transposed together with its what is signified to the same region of objective presence. The ‘coincidence’ is not an identification of hitherto isolated things, but rather the sign has not yet become free from that for which it is a sign. This kind of use of signs is still completely absorbed in the being of what is indicated so that a sign as such cannot be detached at all. The coincidence is not based on a first objectification, but rather upon the complete lack of such an objectification. But this means that signs are not at all discovered as useful things, that ultimately what is ‘at hand’ in the world does not have the kind of being of useful things. Perhaps this ontological guideline (of handiness and useful things), too, can provide nothing for the interpretation of the primitive world, and certainly for an ontology of thingliness.” (Heidegger, *Being and Time* 2010).

This clearly is very close to the non-linear fusional reality Freud, as we shall see, invokes as Primary Process. A deep and ancient faultline is visible here, and Freud (Wilkinson, 2021

<https://hewardwilkinson.co.uk/sites/default/files/Freud-Hegel-and-Dialectics2.pdf>) is going to account for it ontologically in developmental terms. Clearly, both Levi-Strauss and Heidegger are referring to the epoch when story-telling was dominant. This is the total philosophical and ontological situation which enables us to be speculative here.

§7. We may, then, wonder, or speculate, or tell a story about, whether there was not a prior state of affairs, which mutated or evolved into conscious Temporality as a kind of impossible human discovery. Time in human consciousness is at odds with the time of physics, which was all there is (if we leave out consciousness), and in which there is an absolute and perpetual *unalterable sequentiality of events*, the before and after, marked in the clock-determined time record, whose demarcations are not gradual in any way, and in no sense embrace the threefoldnesses of consciousness as past-present-future. This sequentiality, in another form, will soon become important. As the above extracts suggest, there may indeed be earlier, more fused and all-embracing,

forms of consciousness of time amongst indigenous peoples, which would make more complex, but not annul, this developmental-historical narrative (c.f., Heidegger, *Being and Time*, H82 in original version). This conception, however, of irreversible sequence will indeed become important, very shortly. And it will bring out that the threefold nature of time, as Kant intuited, also underpins our modern conceptions of objectivity and objective reference, and is not at odds with them.

§8. So this realisation of the possibility that Temporality *came about* brings into view a parallel with something from which I shall draw, Freud's rather uncanny conceptions of development, in which emergent modes develop, through a kind of partial splitting and partial integration, emerging into repeatable and replicable forms, fundamentally by creative compromises, from earlier ones, in a significant variety of cases. They are all, however, stories which tell us about the emergence of something like Objectivity. And these all have something of the flavour of *Once Upon a Time* or *Just So* stories or narratives; Freud's thought frequently has an inherently *dramatic* quality! Among others, there are, for instance:

- i. The emergence of Secondary Process from Primary Process (*Interpretation of Dreams*; the paper, *The Unconscious*);
- ii. The phase of absence, and desire for *refinding, for regaining after absence or loss*, emerging out of that of the primary phase of consumption versus expulsion (*Negation* – see the above paper, and this leads on to Object Relations and Attachment theory);
- iii. The 'march of repression in civilisation' out of mythic blatancy or nakedness, in the difference between Sophocles' *Oedipus Tyrannos* (Oedipus Rex) and Shakespeare's *Hamlet* (*Interpretation of Dreams*);
- iv. The (mythic in flavour) emergence of socially contracted brotherhood out of the primal murder in *Totem and Taboo* and *Moses and Monotheism*;
- v. And of Inanimate into Animate in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, as what the animate reverts to.

As indicated, I have dealt with the first two of these in some detail, discussing the paper on *Negation*, in:

<http://hewardwilkinson.co.uk/sites/default/files/Freud-Hegel-and->

§9. Is it then possible that (as Freud seems to envisage) this kind of evolution of something which emerges as dependent on consciousness is a kind of originating causality, a primordial narrative?

In respect of this, there is a kind of mythic story, which is a very direct index, for us humans now, of the radical or *primordial causal*, as I call it, character of this *type* of transformation. Unless one repudiates the inferences altogether (as, in fairness, famously, for example, the Oxford philosopher J.L. Austin does, in *Sense and Sensibilia*), perception provides an emphatic illustration that primordial causality is *not* pure mythology. Kant, as Freud indicates, is indeed a key figure here. The first step in this indexing takes the form of our recognition of *binocular vision* as showing that we simply see *representations* of things, and not things themselves (thus, if sighted with two working eyes, hold a finger up and look at distant objects, while remaining aware of your fingers, and you will see two translucent ‘fingers’, - and you can then realise, with a little further thought, that *all* our vision is double). On the basis of this, it is argued, by David Hume for instance, that the essence of *all evidence* is phenomena or sense experience (so-called phenomenalism).

Then the second step, here, is when the philosopher G.E. Moore (in his paper, *Hume’s Philosophy*) gives the illustration of his twirling a pencil around in full view of his audience, when he notes that, though none of his audience can see ‘the inside of the pencil’, none of them doubt there is such an ‘inside’ right now, which you could see if you cut it open. If this be granted, it at a stroke establishes the whole world of science, and the whole human world, as trans-phenomenalistic (i.e., not merely wholly constituted by and out of what you *would or could see*, if hypothetically, you did cut the pencil open). Though Moore does not make it explicit here, it also brings into view the reality of clock time. The great Scottish philosopher David Hume recognises that both these two forms of awareness, of binocularity, and of perception as caused by an unseen, are, or emerge, ‘later’ or ‘secondary’ to the mindset of ordinary commonsense belief and vision, even in a post-scientific era. But, because he is

absolutely wedded to the idea of the primacy for verification of immediate sense-experience (arguing from separateness and non-verifiability), he does not even so much as dream of entertaining the possibility that here is a form of primordial causality, which brings into existence all the classical theory of knowledge problems (epistemology).

We might label Moore's insight, semi-solecistically, as 'immediate inference', that is, that this 'inference' is so part and parcel of what we do assume as evidence that it is, in a different but not impossible way, also 'phenomena'. Kant does indeed recognise it, as 'things in themselves', under the label of 'transcendental analysis', but also does not recognise it as *causality*, which he himself treats as merely phenomenal, or 'transcendentally ideal'. As we shall see shortly, it is questionable whether he is really committed to this. When we reach his arguments for 'irreversible sequence', below, it is clear that, if they are valid, they are, in Moore's example, applicable to the *whole situation* Moore is addressing.

So I give this as a paradigm which may suggest that primordial causality is indeed a thing, and that we, - even as commonsensers! - do not assume that verification is confined to immediate surface sensory experience, but that, though we do know, on Moore's analysis, 'things in themselves', we do not actually, ever, perceive them as such.

§10. Now, what is clear from Freud's examples of primordial causality, such as are discussed in my paper (above), is that the more advanced level capacities are, not only stories, but *achievements* and *transformations* (conceptual transformations which establish deep repetition patterns, leading on to the centrality of ideas in Platonic and post-Platonic thought). In general, we may envisage that, roughly, the phase, in an individual child's life, when they achieve a sense of justice, and of object constancy, is the outcome of these transformations, and we may also note, and may add to this, that this is commonly also when an intelligent (modern) child begins to acquire a sense of history as narrative - and of course thereby of time, and temporality, the capacity for memory and imagination, and so on, the dawns of what may

become, in later development, a capacity for philosophical puzzlement; why am I me now, at this point in time, and as this identity rather than that, etc?

Dickens the storyteller, who perhaps would have had little to learn from Bowlby, about the centrality of attachment, or from Heidegger about Time and Care, indicates it sidelong and implicitly at the beginning of that parable of attachment, the first part of *Dombey and Son*:

“Dombey was about eight-and-forty years of age. Son about eight-and-forty minutes. Dombey was rather bald, rather red, and though a handsome well-made man, too stern and pompous in appearance, to be prepossessing. Son was very bald, and very red, and though (of course) an undeniably fine infant, somewhat crushed and spotty in his general effect, as yet. On the brow of Dombey, Time and his brother Care had set some marks, as on a tree that was to come down in good time—remorseless twins they are for striding through their human forests, notching as they go—while the countenance of Son was crossed with a thousand little creases, which the same deceitful Time would take delight in smoothing out and wearing away with the flat part of his scythe, as a preparation of the surface for his deeper operations.”

Paul Dombey, due to the deprivation of true attachment, will die prematurely, and it is Florence Dombey, the neglected sister, who becomes the true healer in this story.

§11. Now, our awareness of Temporality, thus understood, and envisioned as primordial causality somehow brought into an impossible and unconceptualisable existence, is nevertheless the foundation, and the basis of possibility, of the realisation of a considerable variety of phenomena which appertain to or are part of consciousness. Some of these are ‘commonsense’, some ‘empirical’, and some are ‘philosophical’.

There are, for instance:

- i. the foundations of Objectivity and the objectivity of subjectivity;
- ii. historical causality and the causality of science, as also implied in Kant;
- iii. the possibility of objectivity, and two views of truth as coherence and as correspondence;
- iv. the relationships of fact and fiction and imagination;
- v. implicit or tacit knowledge and the unconscious;

vi. psychotherapy and the spectrum, based in *narrative repetition and rehearsal, and reactivated attachments* (see Shakespeare, *Sonnet 30*, below), of its forms of understanding self-consciousness, based upon *Replacement Narratives* (Programmatic Work) and *Unfolding Narrative* (Process Based Work);

vii. and Temporality and historical causality, in addition to what, in the wake of Newton's vision, we may call 'causality of laws'.

All of these relate to the creation of a basis for a field theory for the psychotherapies.

§12. We human beings are well accustomed to living and being in relation to a physical universe, in which ourselves and animals as embodied beings have our existence. In effect, with the child's discovery of disappearance and reappearance of objects and Object Constancy or Permanence (Piaget, Freud's *Negation*), in the context of our emerged self-consciousness and the symbol of negation as basis for judgement, we project ourselves deeply into the physical world (Freud, *Negation*), which we seek to recover, constantly. This creates the belief in an independent world, actual apart from us, which then becomes the origin of scepticism in philosophy, since we initially *seem to have* only sense experience to verify its existence, as we already noted in §9., above. The puzzles about scepticism in philosophy almost become 'story enigmas' in their own right, fascinating philosophers, whilst commonsense folk remain puzzled as to what on earth the philosopher is doing! The most creative portrayer of these fascinating dilemmas is John Wisdom in *Other Minds*.

There is also a tendency, for psychotherapists, who are not of course alone in this, to solve this conundrum by committing us to a belief in a unified *physically monistic* universe in which consciousness is simply a form of manifestation of our physical and embodied existence, and in which, therefore, the brain is prior to the mind, the belief system nicknamed physicalism. This is a deeply natural objectivist tendency, which undoubtedly made possible the rise of modern science, especially Isaac Newton's comprehensive synthesis of physical and cosmological laws, and, philosophically, the rise of Empiricism as an epistemology or theory of knowledge (A.C. Grayling, *The Age of Genius; The*

Seventeenth Century and the Birth of the Modern Mind, and F.R. Leavis, *Education and the University*). The latter, as (Logical) Positivism, and in cognitive science, has become the dominant philosophical framework in the modern scientific world, especially in theory of mind (Jerome Wakefield's *Freud and Philosophy of Mind* is a brilliant synoptic work on 20th Century developments in all this). I refer to this pervasive worldview as Objectivism or the Objecthood Paradigm. This, however, is underpinned by, not disputed by, but neither standing on its own in relation to, the wider Temporality conception, - which can therefore, also, be fully open to pluralistic thinking and dialogue in this light.

Analysis

§13. Thus, many traditions of thought, in philosophy, religion, historical study, literary criticism and others, have argued that there is and has to be a *narrative background* to the Objectivist understanding, which founds it and, whilst compatible with it, supplements and transcends it. Much of the material of such forms of tradition, from Pascal, Rousseau, and Romanticism onwards, has been urged in a way which has been, to an extent, based in emotion and intuition, sometimes anti-scientific, and not sufficiently grounded in a developed sense of rationality. Science has sometimes been assumed, as I have previously tended to assume it myself, to be exclusively quantitative, law-based, empirical science. What I am coming to see, as will appear, is that narrative and story can be, and often are, scientific.

The thinker who is most pivotal or axial in these discussions, offering a profoundly *widened* concept of rationality, and who gives us a more transformatively comprehensive philosophical background to the scientific revolution than any other thinker, to whom I have already referred, is Immanuel Kant. Fully understood, Kant's thinking also connects with Freud's thinking in this context, for Freud, officially scientific as his value system remained, is also largely within this second tradition of broadened rationality of which I am speaking. (Matte Blanco, *The Unconscious as Infinite Sets*, and Wakefield, *Freud and Philosophy of Mind* are two remarkable, very different, yet mutually supplementary, syntheses in this context). But Kant, in a most

peculiar and astonishing way, to which I am coming shortly, manages, in a fascinatingly perplexing way, *to turn Time into scientific causality*, and then *scientific causality back into story and Time*.

It emerges from Kant's and Freud's, (as well as Bowlby's), thought that the above traditions also do not need to be construed as anti-scientific, as we shall now see. In particular, historical causality is not incompatible with science, but it offers a narrative which is, at the same time, legitimately scientific analysis of the causality of consciousness, going beyond, though not excluding, the theories of science, such as Newton's, or molecular chemistry, which are based upon statements of law.

§14. The following section now moves towards the core of the issues and needs to be a longish one. So, in Kant we have an exploration of the threefold nature of *humanly experienced time*. This conception of time is not understandable by us humans in its experienced nature. This also means that, as Hume first realised, neither the belief in causality nor the valid objectivity of perception are capable of being verified, - that is, without transcending what is exclusive to immediate sense perception, in the way indicated by Moore - by us humans, without question-begging circularity. Now, what Kant realised, - not altogether clearly, but it may be elicited from his formulations, - is that, firstly, not only does the threefold character of Temporality constitute, in ways of which Freud makes us intensely aware, a kaleidoscopic brilliance and paradoxicality of human Temporality and its processes.

But, secondly, it also constitutes a new paradigm for theory of knowledge/epistemology, in understanding causality and perception, despite the essential incomprehensibility of Temporality in its own nature. How does it do this? This becomes a complex several step process, in which a powerful hidden story or narrative is at work, so it needs patient unravelling, which is, nevertheless, well worth the trouble.

We can take the first step by looking at Kant's core formula. His formula is this: a passage of time can only be recognised as *mine*, as possible experience, if it is

objectified, which means *externally to my subjective experience*, because otherwise I have no basis to differentiate between my experiences, and my being *myself as conscious* of them. The ‘*I think*’ (self-awareness, mentalisation), says Kant, must be *capable* of accompanying all our experience.

In the context of causality, essentially it says that the continuity-coherence of Temporality gives us a parallel, or indeed a replication or objectification, in those processes of causality and perception. These have *the same and reciprocal incomprehensibility* that time has (the latter, perception, reducible to causality, in the sense of primordial causality). We treat time itself as a non-contingent non-material form of being, though we do not understand it, and it remains mysterious to us. But because perception and causality are in a sense objects, subject to the Objecthood paradigm, we assume that they do *succumb to the paradoxes* forced upon them by that paradigm (separateness and non-verifiability), which logically - within that paradigm – would render knowledge, as Hume grasped, totally void and nullified.

But *if they are integrated with Temporality*, in the way Kant envisages, they participate in its being ineluctably real and absolute, at least as a non-material mode of being. They take on the inescapability, the ‘logical hardness’, of Time and Temporality. Kant framed that phenomenally, through his residual empiricism, his concept of ‘possible experience’, but it is capable of being unshackled from that imperative. What this in effect means is that causality and external perception have, like time itself (c.f., McTaggart’s interesting arguments in *The Unreality of Time*) two modes of being (permanent irreversibility and also immediacy and inherent transience), and that when they are accessed in the human realm of consciousness, they take on the double aspect of all intentionality, its ‘Objective’ aspect, and also its ‘Subjective’ aspect. The reason for the quotation marks will become clear shortly.

We may take an unexpected step forward, by appealing to an argument brought by Sir Peter Strawson, the formidable post-war Oxford philosopher. Now Strawson, author of the magnificent classic modern British commentary on Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* (*The Bounds of Sense*), discussing Kant’s

treatment of causality, in the *Second Analogy of Experience* (*Critique*, Trans. Kemp Smith, pp. 218 ff) accuses him of perpetrating, as a logical step, a ‘*non sequitor* of numbing grossness’ (an ‘it does not follow’). He argues this consists in the confusion of the necessary sequence of *perception* of a causally determined event, with a causal necessity *in the event itself*, “conceiving the transition or change from A to B as *itself* necessary” (*Bounds of Sense* pp., 137-8).

However, in the *Second Analogy*, all of *Kant’s* examples, which indeed have the flavour of segments of narrative or story, which is why they are so powerful, comply with what *he* describes as follows:

“The *sequence in time* is thus *the sole empirical criterion* [my italics, HW] of an effect in its relation to the causality of the cause which precedes it.” (*Critique*, Trans. Kemp Smith, p. 228)

He is attending to what constitutes causality itself, very potently, not the underlying metaphysics as such, yet. This matter of causality is highly relevant to the Psychotherapies, as it is to the constitution of consciousness and self-consciousness, as shall become clear shortly.

Here is one of the great examples (as always, *Kant* is writing with daunting generality but something of its power may come through, and it is as if he achieves a compelling *absolute vision* of an event in such examples):

“That something happens, i.e., that something, or some state which did not previously exist, comes to be, cannot be perceived unless it is preceded by an appearance which does not contain in itself this state. For an event which should follow upon an empty time, that is, a coming to be preceded by no state of things, is as little capable of being apprehended as empty time itself. Every apprehension of an event is therefore a perception which follows upon another perception. But since, as I above illustrated by reference to the appearance of a house, this likewise happens in all synthesis of apprehension, the apprehension of an event is not yet thereby distinguished from other apprehensions. But, as I also note, in an appearance which contains a happening (the preceding state of the perception we may entitle A, and the succeeding B) B can be apprehended only as following upon A; the perception A cannot follow upon B but only

precede it. For instance, I see a ship move down stream. My perception of its lower position follows upon the perception of its position higher up in the stream, and it is impossible that in the apprehension of this appearance the ship should first be perceived lower down in the stream and afterwards higher up. The order in which the perceptions succeed one another in apprehension is in this instance determined, and to this order apprehension is bound down. In the previous example of a house my perceptions could begin with the apprehension of the roof and end with the basement, or could begin from below and end above; and I could similarly apprehend the manifold of the empirical intuition either from right to left or from left to right. In the series of these perceptions there was thus no determinate order specifying at which point I must begin in order to connect the manifold empirically. But in the perception of an event there is always a rule that makes the order in which the perceptions (in the apprehension of this appearance) follow upon one another a *necessary* order.” (*Critique*, Trans. Kemp Smith, p. 221)

Here we may focus on the problem of how the order is reproduced in perception and appearance, but Kant is focused on the constitution of *the event itself*, as his examples (including a ball placed upon a cushion and remaining there) show.

This is the great example of the ship going down stream, as an evocation of an event as such, which I was so thunderstruck by, when I first met it all those years ago (1966) at Cambridge. Why did it impact me so profoundly? I now see it as a segment of a narrative, a story. It is a an *absolute description of an event* or part of an event, pure and simple. Somehow, the translation of the most obvious commonsense into profound philosophy is effected here, in a way which is difficult to describe or explain.

And so, in the *Second Analogy*, as indicated, all of *Kant's* examples comply with what *he* describes as follows:

“The *sequence in time* is thus *the sole empirical criterion* [my italics, HW] of an effect in its relation to the causality of the cause which precedes it.” (*Critique*, Trans. Kemp Smith, p. 228)

And this seems pure commonsense. Which also has now struck me as a

revelation.

But behind it lies our apprehension of necessity, which is what we need to understand. It is as if in these examples we come nearer to apprehending it than ever before. Now Kant makes this depend upon *time*. And here he first translates time into causality, into a causal story. The nearest to a complete statement, difficult to follow but precise, of the link is (*Critique*, trans. Kemp Smith, pp. 225-6):

“Understanding is required for all experience, and for its possibility. Its primary contribution does not consist in making the representation of objects distinct, but in making the representation of an object possible at all. *This it does by carrying the time-order and its appearances over into existence* [my italic, HW]. For to each of them [viewed] as [a] consequent, it assigns, through relation to the preceding appearances, a position determined *a priori* in time. Otherwise they would not accord with time itself, which in *a priori* fashion determines the position of all its parts. *Now since absolute time is not an object of perception, this determination of position cannot be derived from the relation of appearances to it. On the contrary, the appearances must determine for one another their position in time, and make their time-order a necessary order* [my italic, HW]. In other words, that which follows or happens must follow in conformity with a universal rule upon that which was contained in the previous state. A series of appearances thus arises which, with the aid of the understanding, produces and makes necessary the same order and continuous connection in the series of possible perceptions as is met with *a priori* in time – the form of inner intuition wherein all perceptions must have a position.

That something happens is, therefore, a perception which belongs to a possible experience. This experience becomes actual when I regard the appearance as determined in its position in time, and therefore as an object that can always be found in the connection of perceptions according to a rule. This rule, by which we determine something according to succession of time is, that the condition under which an event invariably and necessarily follows is to be found in what precedes the event. The principle of sufficient reason is thus the ground of possible experience, that is, of objective knowledge of appearances in respect of

their relations in the order of time.....”

So this is the principle Kant is offering us:

“Now since absolute time is not an object of perception, this determination of position cannot be derived from the relation of appearances to it. *On the contrary, the appearances must determine for one another their position in time, and make their time-order a necessary order* [my italic, HW].” (*Critique*, Trans. Kemp Smith, p. 226)

Therefore, and that is to say, time for us is not an absolute given, but is determined and objectified by causality, and not *vice versa*.

How then does time as it were translate into causality? Time is ‘necessary’, absolutely so, but causality does not feel as if it is, and yet also it does. We can say Kant has ‘got so far’. However, intentional causality *is* a thing, and it is embedded in temporality. And from within it, we address ourselves to physical causality. We shall shortly look at something akin to his examples.

Whilst, to be sure, he does accept, more by default underwritten by Sir Isaac Newton, than peremptory intent, a necessitarian deterministic account, (e.g., *Critique*, Trans. Kemp Smith, p. 140. A. 114) what precisely he is saying in the detail, in example after example, is, unexpectedly, quite different. Hiddenly in plain sight, it is so obvious, in one sense, that it is stunningly easy to *mistake what it is* he is saying. He is saying that a decision about the precise causality involved, when for instance he describes the irreversibility of the perception of the ship going down river, is simply a *criterion* of the causal judgements we make, - but nevertheless is *projected proactively*, on the basis of our *a priori* concept of causality.

We can get a powerful handle on what he means as follows. It can be graphically illustrated by the appeal we thus make to the experiential phenomena involved, without even appealing directly to personal subjective consciousness based experience. All we need to do, to do this, is to turn to the video (photographic) replays by which, - as a most vivid example, - sporting decisions are nowadays supported. It is clearest in the case of reviews of umpire decisions in cricket, because intention is irrelevant there. In cricket a batter is considered dismissed

or 'out' if the ball a bowler bowls to them *would have* hit the wickets, if it had not hit their leg first, which is a dismissal by 'Leg Before Wicket', LBW. If it hit the bat before it hit the leg, even if it did hit the leg and would have hit the wickets, it does not count as a dismissal. The video technology takes account of:

- a. the *sequence* of what the ball hits, and
- b. the *trajectory* of the ball,

whether it would have hit the wickets, or gone over them, and so on.

All of these, obviously, are considered a *record of an irreversible sequence*, as Kant argues, which may be replayed many times, even publically, before a decision is reached. The *trajectory* is the *content* of the micro-narrative and the *sequence* is the *form* it takes.

These recordings, whilst quite actual independently of human subjective consciousness experience, nevertheless share in it in three ways; they are multi-angled and perspectival, not 'from a universal viewpoint', in the way vision likewise is perspectival.

They only make sense for a human observer, or at least a programme devised by humans.

And they are totally and unequivocally based on the bedrock assumption of causality, which, psychologically, is for us *a priori*. But if Moore is right that our causal perception is objective, then we already have an *a priori* grasp of it, as Kant claims.

They are recorded micro-repetitions or narratives of a *stretch* of time. Thus they now translate back into 'story' and temporality, clock time. In that sense they are both 'objective' and 'subjective', which is indeed why I put these slippery concepts in quotation marks. In that sense, whilst they *supplement* the imaginative synthesis Kant evokes in his analysis, - that which enables object constancy in regard of things, and aspects of things, which we do not perceive, but through imagination assume (something which pervades all perception) - they do not *replace* it.

Again, fictional or media transmitted accounts of such things, as in detective narratives or presentations, have to comply, in fictional simulation, with the

same conditions I have just described. Here we have ‘story’ fully fledged. In the BBC recorded version, with Joan Hickson, of Agatha Christie’s *Miss Marple* series, in *The Mirror Crack’d from Side to Side*, Miss Marple chivies a precise description of a murder sequence out of a confused and uncertain schoolgirl, who eventually clearly remembers that a drink was spilt, not by the person holding it, but by a jog of the hand carried through by the person, Marina Gregg, who therefore turns out to have been the murderer, and who then hands her own poisoned drink to the victim. Obviously that ‘irreversible sequence’ is pivotal to identifying the murderer.

Now, what is common to all these uses of the indicated criterion, is that they indeed only make sense as factual or imagined *objectifications of Temporality* (temporal sequences, and very precise ones) through causality. And what we are seeing is that, now in fusion with causality, these narratives are taking us back to time, Temporality, to *Once Upon a Time*. What is certainly the case is that we totally think in terms of causality in these instances, and are most disconcerted by anomalies. I experienced this once, in Littlemore, Oxford, when I saw a riderless motorcycle drive past me, only to discover a moment later it was on a low trailer which had been concealed by a low wall between me and the road. *For a brief unresistable moment I found it exceedingly eerie, and the time process was disrupted.*

If we think in terms of Kant’s ‘criterion’ model, all the relevant variations, such as fictional ones, or quantum phenomena, can, with suitable modifications, be dealt with. We can even account, in terms of the impact of contradictions, which are still consciousness based, for fictionally dissonant or anomalous accounts (as when, for instance, post-modernly, we think about the distinction between narrator and author in the narrative of a novel). But, for all of them, we are dealing with either forms of consciousness as Temporality, or supplements to it (that is, until computers actually, if they ever do, become persons!) And for all of them we are dealing with something, time, at another level, incomprehensible in itself to us humans.

§15. So now, I shall take a new paragraph to ask more fully the question, can

Kant's Temporality criterion also deal with intentional or subjective causality? Again, we see the slippery nature of 'subjective' and 'objective, because here we are asking whether the causality we impute to *subjective* consciousness is actually a 'real' or 'objective' thing. And Kant's criterion shows us it is. And we are far from Kant's criterion pointing us in the direction of a crude necessitarianist determinism, as perhaps is his own default position (however, he construes it phenomenally, not attributing it to things-in-themselves, see above, *Critique* p. 140, A.114). As a *criterion*, it opens the way to the definition of *all* kinds of causality, and their differentiating features, including those of the most profound intentionalistic subtlety.

For a simple example, I found tears coming to my eyes when I read the following reminiscence in Asimov's *The Robots of Dawn* in Elijah Baley's memories, after his being rescued from the storm and given chicken soup by Gladia:

"He remembered his mother suddenly – a sharp thrust of memory that made her appear younger than he himself was right now. He remembered her standing over him when he rebelled at eating his 'nice soup'.

She would say to him, "Come, Lije. This is real chicken and very expensive. Even the Spacers don't have anything better."

They didn't. He called to her in his mind across the years: They don't, Mom."

Obviously I assume the associations with my memories, and an episode of guilt at my letting her down, of my own mother, evoked the tears, but also my identification with Elijah Baley, somehow Asimov's most poignantly apostolic, and personal, character of all of his fictional characters.

<https://hewardwilkinson.co.uk/sites/default/files/Isaac%20Asimov%20and%20Lewis%20Carroll%20-%20Exploring%20Some%20Rabbit%20Holes%20.pdf>

Attachment theory is fundamental to this. And obviously we know there can be other explanatory possibilities in such a situation. All those possibilities are part of such moments. But we assume that there is an explanation, because in the first place we are aware of our reaction as *being caused*. When I first read it, - or even if I read it out loud, - when the resonance in context of 'even the Spacers', and 'They don't, Mom', hits me, the poignancy reaches me and I tear

up. And I assume it is causation because of my experience of my own version of the irreversible sequence. Another may see me tear up, but not know precisely why I have, but I know it is caused by my own connection with memory and loss. And this is 'story' through and through. Temporality has become human.

This is a simple example, but it makes the point; it is causality, not because there is any totally determinate or absolutely definitive psychological explanation, but because of the irreversible sequence, which of course nevertheless invites causal explanation.

In both art and drama, as well as psychotherapy, there is an irreducible aspect of *rehearsal* and *repetition*. As hinted earlier, this is epitomised in Shakespeare's *Sonnet 30*, one of his most 'psychotherapeutic' verses, where, besides deep resonances of attachment memory, and implicit rehearsals of 'story', also the peculiar Proustian grammar (Scott Moncrieff used the second line for the title of his translation of Proust) of Temporality is vividly presented:

“When to the sessions of sweet silent thought
I summon up remembrance of things past,
I sigh the lack of many a thing I sought,
And with old woes new wail my dear time's waste:
Then can I drown an eye, unus'd to flow,
For precious friends hid in death's dateless night,
And weep afresh love's long since cancell'd woe,
And moan th' expense of many a vanish'd sight;
Then can I grieve at grievances foregone,
And heavily from woe to woe tell o'er
The sad account of fore-bemoaned moan,
Which I new pay as if not paid before.
But if the while I think on thee, dear friend,
All losses are restor'd, and sorrows end.”

Actors, trained in method acting for instance, learn to replicate this by way of, for instance, changes of complexion, or facial expression, weeping, and so on, which is, of course, a higher level causal mesh, - but the criterion is *still* the irreversible sequence which is the criterion of causal efficacy, - and, of course, also of authenticity

in the performance. For Kant's criterion tells us why imitation, to be successful, has to be *really plausible* imitation, so much so, that we are liable to laugh, or else experience shame and embarrassment, at inauthentic or inexperienced performances, and this is also deeply affected by cultural and national differences of perception. And if we watch a really psychologically subtle film, we shall see several of such simulated irreversible sequences at work simultaneously, and even interacting with one another, all of which we readily and effortlessly take in our causal stride. Where the responses are overwhelmingly authentic, they are at their most moving, and here again, the combination of *sequence as form* and *immediate process as content*, is profound confirmation of Kant's criterion. This criterion of Kant's, then, gives us the sense of verisimilitude which is essential to the success of classical fiction, drama, and poetry – to 'story' in short.

The case of music is even more complicated; the (causal) emotional impact and aesthetic effect, pleasurable or, sometimes, too poignant to be simply pleasurable, which we get from music, is something we assume, if we know the piece, from our prior knowledge of its sequence, and its repetition in being heard. If we have a lively musical memory and imagination, it can even very easily arise from our 'hearing it in our head'. Since, obviously, it can be interrupted (as can a dramatic performance), the 'irreversible sequence' is *not* the sequence of the music or drama as such, but its merged production of a sequence of musical emotions in ourselves whose effect is, not pure repetition, but familiar enough in type to us, to be recognisable as an effect sequence in ourselves. Variations of improvisation in both classical and jazz and popular music come in here. Similar considerations apply to books, in whatever form we experience them, and whether fictional or factual, or, as in many novels, such as some of those of Dickens or Tolstoy (paradigms of attachment based dramatisations) or Robert Harris, a combination of both. And nowadays it would apply, not only to sport as a typological rule bound genre, but to the growing genres relating to online games, and narrative generative 'saga-type' dramatic simulations online. All of this is so routine we do not normally think about it as causality, but such rehearsal and repetition, modified as appropriate in terms of the improvisatory element, is also inherent in psychotherapy.

§16. So something similar is, of course, the essence of psychotherapy process. Psychotherapy is 'story' (and, in a much broader sense than the usual psychotherapy

concept, 'enactment', as I have argued previously -

<https://hewardwilkinson.co.uk/docs/Commentary-on-The-Muse-as-Therapist.pdf>).

We are here already on the fringes of psychotherapy and similar modes of human relational existence. The types of explanations, here, of causality, are not immediately relevant to the point we are exploring, though they *are* relevant to mapping the field of the psychotherapies in terms of the modalities and their variations of types and categories of explanation. But it is worth noting that Kant's criterion, once we grasp its potential, achieves two things for psychotherapy: First it recognises that human intentional or historical causality is just as real or 'objective' as physical, or material, law-based, causality; And, secondly, because it simply recognises the actuality of causality as such, as we are already seeing, it leaves us free and open to explore non-dogmatically and non-reductively the complexities and multi-layerings of intentional and consciousness based causality as such.

This does not need to be attained by non-causal, emotive or romantic, accounts of psychotherapy, on the one hand, or by simplistically mechanistic conceptions on the other. A very great proportion of these processes are sufficiently *anecdotal*, and 'one off', that the laws governing the irreversibility in question are historical causality, rather than universal-law forms of causal analysis. We are indeed dealing with *anecdotal causality*. Think for instance of the myriad ways and contexts in which people's eyes can meet, inimitable - yet still familiar in a broader sense. This does not, of course, rule out research which ascertains generalities of law, but it will not be confined to such models, and it legitimises carefully used anecdote, qualitative enquiry, and such philosophical research as the present piece, provided it is considered with the appropriate levels of caution and recognition of incomplete certainty. Here is where never complete wisdom of experience and oral tradition has a valid place; and very great amount of the work of historians and lawyers, for example, is of this kind.

I highlight an incomplete list of examples of characteristic psychotherapy processes and activities, embracing characteristic modes of *rehearsal* and *repetition*. These are very familiar psychotherapy modes, from various modalities, including examples from both ends and the middle of the *Process/Programmatic Spectrum*: experiment; script; homework on internal self-message systems; rehearsal;

improvisation on a theme; indirect hypnotic inductions; free association itself; psychodramatic exploration of the past and of attachment; narrational exploration of the past and of attachment; experimental or open-ended free flow conversation or non-directive listening; rehearsing ‘possible conversation’, in effect; role explorations, even in two-chair work form; body psychotherapy exploration of embedded tensions and imagery; projective exercises; a whole variety of systemic, or semi-systemic, forms of intervention, working with groups, families, couples, and so on; process interactions which revisit script/transference themes again and again; and meta-commentary upon a variety of aspects of the work.

It is striking that the differences between modalities, as implicit in these instances, are differences in what may be, rather misleadingly, called technique, which are actually *human modes of interaction and self-relation*, which draw upon human inter-relational and self-relational potentials, almost open-endedly and indefinitely, provided they are not fully completed actions in the most emphatic forms of action, sexual consummation and violent assault. Even when they are in the form of modalities, such as person centred approaches, which aim to be free of technique and wholly, as it were, existential, they very easily fracture or slip into technique, which, nowadays, is quite likely to be expressed in clients complaining that ‘you are sounding like a therapist’, and similar critiques of recognisable potential therapist inauthenticity.

So, ‘Technique’ evolves into ‘Approach’, and, of course, ‘approach’ evolves into ‘Theory’ and ‘Model’, all of which is a very long story I cannot pursue in full yet. But it is ‘story’, of course.

However, provisionally, the most comprehensive and important account of the range of possibilities we are talking about is to be found in John Heron’s *Helping the Client: A Creative Practical Guide*.

<https://johnheron-archive.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Helping-the-Client-ff.pdf>

Heron has two broad overarching categories and six categories within them, to classify approaches. His overarching categories are Authoritative and Facilitative and within them we have:

Facilitative: Supportive; Catalytic; and Cathartic interventions

Authoritative: Confronting; Informative; and Prescriptive interventions

Very roughly, Facilitative Interventions correspond to my dimension of Process Psychotherapy Modes, and Authoritative to that of Programmatic Psychotherapy Modes.

In turn the six categories correlate with different modalities. (There are arguments for a seventh which I would call 'Transformative' interventions, particularly in psychoanalytic and transpersonal approaches, and of course I am only offering this whole model, as does Heron, as a revisable *sample* of what is possible.) Catalytic-supportive would very roughly mesh with Person-Centred; Attachment based would be paradigms of Supportive, which Heron says are the most fundamental; Gestalt and Psychodrama would very roughly mesh with Cathartic-Confronting; and Informative-Prescriptive with Transactional Analysis and Rational-Emotive and Cognitive-Behavioural Psychotherapy, - but also Psychoanalysis (but this might be argued to be a seventh, as indicated, of 'Transformative').

The detailed working out of these conceptions is work for a less synoptic account, but, for the kind of illustration we would develop, some of it will be apparently very simple, such as the experience within deep and authentic Person-Centred work, of being deeply listened to without undue conflictual interruption, and with non-blatant deep empathy. Many of us who have benefited from being listened to in this way would know, if we had the spare attention to have attended to themselves during the process, that a gradual relaxation, increase of trust and calm, greater willingness to reveal emotion, and so on, is the 'irreversible causal sequence' which is experienced in these situations. And the abrasive effect of an interruption of the atmosphere by a too sharp intervention is also a correlated effect. Low key causality it may be, but that is indeed the form it takes, and this sort of thinking, different in different contexts, is the model which is open to being explored as a criterion, in terms of the concept, on the heels of Kant's analysis, which we have identified. Such developments of the different modes of causal realisation or enactment takes us towards generic analysis of the Modalities of Psychotherapy, without homogenising away their differences and individual character and traditions.

Also, Kant's criterion, in combination with Moore's trans-phenomenalistic paradigm, opens the way to a deeper analysis of the Humean sceptical question of the justification of causal judgements. I shall consider this briefly, within the background from which it now emerges. We - and Kant! - assume that, until a quite apocalyptic shift of understanding, we are not going to be able to understand the inner character of time or causal necessity. All we need is to make sense of its *being* necessary. The obstacle to this is the Objecthood Paradigm, as indicated above. And the combination of 'irreversible sequence', with 'immediate inference' as evoked by Moore, also with the projective understanding of physical causality by way of intentional causation, and the integration of absence into immediate perception as envisaged by Freud's second phase in *Negation*, together, enable an openness to such a necessary mode which is no longer blocked by Hume's use of the Objecthood paradigm. It is, irreversibly, causal 'story'!

This would involve (what is normally dismissed in the Anglo philosophical world, but carried out in an extraordinary way in Sartre's *Being and Nothingness*) a non-actualistic account of the all-pervasiveness of *potentiality*, as implied in the threefoldness of Temporality, in both the physical and the consciousness realms, the *in-itself* and the *for-itself* as Sartre, following Hegel, would say. And this would be underpinned by the non-phenomenalistic account and criterion which Kant gives us, contrary to his official position, of irreversible sequence in relation to Temporality. This annuls any simplistically 'Objecthood Paradigm' account of 'immediate perception', challenged, besides Kant himself, and by Freud, by such deeply different philosophers as J.L. Austin, Whitehead, Nietzsche, and Derrida, by, among many other factors, the impossibility (which is what Sartre evokes with the virtuosity of genius) of evoking *absence* and *masking* either as simple presence, or as simple non-presence, or both together.

In this connection, then, I shall end by bringing back Freud, regarding the *sociality* of Temporality and consciousness, with a delightful illustration of which he delightedly boasts, in the *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*, of how we may retrieve, most unexpectedly, memories which have 'absented themselves' in the repressed unconscious! The dream both wonderfully confirms the patient's hostility

to Freud's views, yet also confirms his thesis, which he does not note, except implicitly, by *the form it takes* and the associations with which it is connected: "A sceptical patient has a longer dream, in which certain people happen to tell her about my book concerning laughter and praise it highly. Then something is mentioned about a certain "'canal,' perhaps another book in which 'canal' occurs, or something else with the word 'canal' ... she doesn't know ... it is all confused."

Now you will be inclined to think that the element "canal" will evade interpretation because it is so vague. You are right as to the supposed difficulty, but it is not difficult because it is vague, but rather it is vague for a different reason, the same reason which also makes the interpretation difficult. The dreamer can think of nothing concerning the word canal, I naturally can think of nothing. A little while later, as a matter of fact on the next day, she tells me that something occurred to her that *may perhaps* be related to it, a joke that she has heard. On a ship between Dover and Calais a well-known author is conversing with an Englishman, who quoted the following proverb in a certain connection: "*Du sublime au ridicule, il n'y a qu'un pas.*" The author answers, "*Oui, le pas de Calais*", with which he wishes to say that he finds France sublime and England ridiculous. But the "*Pas de Calais*" is really a canal, namely, the English Channel. Do I think that this idea has anything to do with the dream? Certainly, I believe that it really gives the solution to the puzzling dream fragments. Or can you doubt that this joke was already present in the dream, as the unconscious factor of the element, "canal." Can you take it for granted that it was subsequently added to it? The idea testifies to the scepticism which is concealed behind her obtrusive admiration, and the resistance is probably the common reason for both phenomena, for the fact that the idea came so hesitatingly and that the decisive element of the dream turned out to be so vague. Kindly observe at this point the relation of the dream element to its unconscious factor. It is like a small part of the unconscious, like an allusion to it; through its isolation it became quite unintelligible."

The eliciting of the complexities of the 'irreversible sequences' of such an example would be a tricky, but not impossible, task for textual elucidation! We might start from the dilemma Freud indicates; was the client's accessing the memory of the ridiculing pun and jest *after the dream, or before, before in such a way that the dream incorporated it in its unconscious content and meaning?* If Freud is right,

that it was the latter, then we indeed have an irreversible sequence, and the elusiveness of the memory now becomes, no longer evidence *against* the sequence, but evidence *for* it, on the assumption of the process of repression of the memory prior to the dream.

So, regardless of the question of how we validate or reject this hypothesis, the hypothesis itself clearly hinges on the use of our interpretation, here, of the Kantian criterion of irreversible sequence. The arguments about the interpretation, which a sensitive psychotherapist would not need to present as certainties, would hinge on how many ‘coincidences’ are involved: the confusion and the isolation of the allusion indicating possible repression; the double allusion to ‘canal’ or ‘channel’; the clear element of ridicule masking an ostensible enthusiasm in the dream for, of all things, a book of Freud’s precisely about jokes, and about their aggressivity and libidinal purposes; and there are doubtless more, but a considerable measure of triangulation, increasing the probability, in a compressed narrative sequence, is already present. Freud’s dream accounts, such as this one, read like surreal dramatisations, drama, story.

And in discovering realisations about the strange combination of event-sequences and textual cross-connections which characterise psychoanalytic elucidations and interpretations, especially those of dreams, we have a touch of that *distinctive textual-historical science of the human realm*, which enabled Freud to go so far in opening the way to making sense of the unconscious. Such combinations are characteristic, in many different modes, of those accentuations of elements of human nature which characterise psychotherapy, and differentiate its Modalities.

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Note:

The German version of Freud’s patient’s dream and its analysis

“Eine skeptische Patientin hat einen längeren Traum, in dem es vorkommt, daß ihr gewisse Personen von meinem Buch über den »Witz« erzählen und es sehr loben. Dann wird etwas erwähnt von einem »Kanal«, *vielleicht ein anderes Buch, in dem*

Kanal vorkommt, oder sonst etwas mit Kanal... sie weiß es nicht ...es ist ganz unklar.

Nun werden Sie gewiß zu glauben geneigt sein, daß das Element »Kanal« sich der Deutung entziehen wird, weil es selbst so unbestimmt ist. Sie haben mit der vermuteten Schwierigkeit recht, aber es ist nicht darum schwer, weil es undeutlich ist, sondern es ist undeutlich aus einem anderen Grund, demselben, der auch die Deutung schwer macht. Der Träumerin fällt zu Kanal nichts ein; ich weiß natürlich auch nichts zu sagen. Eine Weile später, in Wahrheit am nächsten Tage, erzählt sie, es sei ihr eingefallen, was *vielleicht* dazugehört. Auch ein Witz nämlich, den sie erzählen gehört hat. Auf einem Schiff zwischen Dover und Calais unterhält sich ein bekannter Schriftsteller mit einem Engländer, welcher in einem gewissen Zusammenhange den Satz zitiert: *Du sublime au ridicule il n'y a qu'un pas*. Der Schriftsteller antwortet: *Oui, le pas de Calais*, – womit er sagen will, daß er Frankreich großartig und England lächerlich findet. Der *Pas de Calais* ist aber doch ein Kanal, der Ärmelkanal nämlich, *Canal la manche*. Ob ich meine, daß dieser Einfall etwas mit dem Traum zu tun hat? Gewiß, meine ich, er gibt wirklich die Lösung des rätselhaften Traumelements. Oder wollen Sie bezweifeln, daß dieser Witz bereits vor dem Traum als das Unbewußte des Elements »Kanal« vorhanden war, können Sie annehmen, daß er nachträglich hinzugefunden wurde? Der Einfall bezeugt nämlich die Skepsis, die sich bei ihr hinter aufdringlicher Bewunderung verbirgt, und der Widerstand ist wohl der gemeinsame Grund für beides, sowohl, daß ihr der Einfall so zögernd gekommen, als auch dafür, daß das entsprechende Traumelement so unbestimmt ausgefallen ist. Blicken Sie hier auf das Verhältnis des Traumelements zu seinem Unbewußten. Es ist wie ein Stückchen dieses Unbewußten, wie eine Anspielung darauf; durch seine Isolierung ist es ganz unverständlich geworden.”